The Role of Nash Equilibria in Military Strategy
Military strategists have discussed how to peacefully maintain order and defense in the world. An article written by an online Pakistani newspaper (linked below) discusses the roll of game theory in the decision to disarm or initiate war. India and Pakistan have been at odds for the last century. The tension between the countries results from cultural and religious differences, claims to traditional lands, and other reasons. Both countries have struggled to figure out how to respond dominantly in this situation. Both countries have increasingly armed themselves in order to intimidate the other. Although little conflict has been initiated, both countries argue the need to be prepared for conflict. There is also indisputable evidence as to the benefits of military spending; this is usually money put straight into the nation’s economy, which spurs military industries and general economic growth (interestingly, this argument can be used to prove that WWII saved the United States economy, not the provisions pushed by Franklin Roosevelt). However, this peaceful intimidation leaves many citizens scared of potential war and the effects of war. So a question arises: given that both India and Pakistan are armed, should these countries disarm, continuing the arms race without initiating war, or initiate violent conflict?
We can construct a game for this situation. The players are India and Pakistan and the three strategies are those mentioned in the question. Setting up this game, we can guess that if both countries go to war, both countries will be potentially damaged (it’s tough to say who would benefit the most or lose the least). If one country goes to war and the other disarms, there is a huge payoff for the aggressor. If one country goes to war and the other decides to continue building arms but not war (a completely impossible situation, because once conflict is initiated, the defending country would have to respond by either fighting back or surrendering/disarming), the aggressor would benefit little more than the defender. If one country decides to disarm while the other continues its intimidation tactics, the disarming country will lose all negotiation power. If both countries decide to maintain the intimidation tactic and continue the arms race, both countries would benefit economically, politically, and socially. Economically, infrastructure would remain intact and industry would thrive. Politically, outside nations would support a lack of war and probably not impose economic sanctions. Socially, war devastates a country and its population. Without war, the population is scared, but many more will have jobs because of the increased wartime industry.
The mutual decision to choose the strategy of intimidation tactics can be considered a Nash Equilibrium in this case. This is to say that neither country has incentive to disarm or initiate violent conflict, given that the other is choosing to continue intimidation tactics. Yes, this situation is somewhat oversimplified, but it is certainly interesting to consider. Perhaps this logic can be applied to Iran and North Korea; perhaps the world can benefit by allowing these countries to develop a larger military and build more weaponry.
http://nation.com.pk/editorials/11-Sep-2015/nash-equilibrium