Game Theory in Elections: 3-Cornered Fights And Spoiling Your Vote
In 2011, the Singaporean presidential election winner won with only 35% of the vote. How? The blame goes to the one-ballot, one-vote system that Singapore employs. Because of this, a third-party candidate has a much higher potential to become “spoiler” to a more popular candidate with similar views, thus causing a less popular candidate to win.
This causes a large obstacle to third party candidates because they become a threat to the party with the views most similar to theirs. Here’s where the game theory comes into play: is it better to attempt to gain support and awareness on special issues, hoping that the issue would be assimilated into either major party’s platform, but to cause the major party with the least similar views to win? Or is it better to stay out and not create the possibility of a spoiler election? The former course of action has an immediate negative payoff but could cause future payoffs that outweigh the negatives. The latter strategy is prudent but may not result in any action on the issues that the third party candidate is pushing for. And as a voter, would the best course of action be to support the candidate who best represents your views, but has no chance of winning? Or should the vote be reserved for someone who is more likely to win but may not agree with all your views?
These questions have led to the creation of voting blocs, where citizens of similar groups could band together to vote for a single person or party. If the bloc’s big enough, it could cause a candidate to adjust their policy, lest he/she lose support of the bloc. That way, even minority groups that may normally be voting for a third-party candidate can end up having a say in an election.
Source: https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/game-theory-elections-3-cornered-043007988.html