Tension in Korean Peninsula and Game Theory
Game theory in conflict between countries has been an interesting topic for years. Cold War was tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, and citizens in both countries had to suffer from fear of death. A notion that the counter-party may attack with nuclear weapons makes the other to prepare a possible war with nuclear weapons. Countries that have nuclear weapons have an option to threaten all other nations, but all countries choose not to use them because they understand that nuclear wars can destroy themselves and neighboring states. In the article, professor Roughgarden argues that nuclear buildup actually makes the world a more peaceful place because each country has an incentive not to attack each other. I understand that nuclear issue is more complicated than his argument, but all other countries that do not have nuclear technology should also have nuclear weapons so that all countries have an incentive to cooperate each other by not attacking.
The fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons and South Korea does not have nuclear weapons makes the game uneven; however, the alliance between the United States and South Korea certainly places pressure on North Korea to not use nuclear weapons. An interesting technique used by North Korea is that the North Korean military wants to remind South Korean and the US army that they have not made a final decision on the game that two parts are playing just yet. In order to remind the joint forces, they use periodic provocations such as missile launch tests and violating rules that both parties agreed. To respond to the threats from the North, the joint forces perform periodic joint exercises to show that they have enough forces to stop North Korean Army. Both North Korea and the joint forces understand the concept of prisoner’s dilemma in game theory and both believe that it is better off when they do not attack each other, but believe continuous provocations are necessary for making sure that both parties choose not to attack each other.
Decisions on game theory in Korean peninsula are made by the heads of each party; however, citizens have to always remain afraid of the possibility of war. Because continuous provocations by North Korean army are used to South Korean citizens, they no longer place immense stress on South Korean citizens; however, no one will enjoy this game theory. Not knowing what strategy the opponent will choose is still a problem. I once served the South Korean military for 2 years, and had a privilege to work with the US army. I always believed that the war would never happen unless North Korean army has no choice but to attack South Korea due to economic situation. During every exercise, I felt that North Korean army can still choose an irrational choice which is using nuclear weapons on Korean peninsula. There will be a lot of variable involved if we make the situation in Korean peninsula into game theory equations, but it will be interesting to see who loses more if both parties decide to attack each other.
Source:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/16/what-game-theory-tells-us-about-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.23a36213c50b