Game (Theory) of Thrones
Warning: SPOILER ALERT! Do not read this post if you are not caught up with Game of Thrones!
In his Forbes article, Adam Ozimek applies game theory to the HBO show Game of Thrones. He specifically points to the Season 7 finale, in which Daenerys Targaryen and Cersei Lannister meet for the first time. The two queens are adversaries but have come together to discuss an armistice so that they can all fight the white walkers. Ozimek notes that the two queens are in a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma: if both stay true to their word and cooperate with the truce, they can defeat the white walkers. If one cooperates and the other breaks their truce, the latter would defeat the former quickly. If both queens break the truce, they are immediately plunged back into war and will most likely lose to the white walkers. Ozimek also discusses Cersei’s payoff function, as he believes that a betray-betray scenario would not be a major loss for her — Cersei would rather everyone die than just her. Ozimek writes that, “For Dany, defeating the white walkers and then losing to Cersei would be bad, but not the worst outcome. I’d venture she would rather humanity live on and the kingdom not be destroyed. Cersei, in contrast, would rather see the whole kingdom destroyed and her enemies defeated at the hands of white walkers than see Danaerys and Tyrion be victorious.” Ozimek also discusses other characters’ payoff functions, like Jamie and Tyrion’s.
Ozimek’s article is an interesting application of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma. In a show where there are so many different characters and storylines, I find it fascinating that we can simplify the plot-line to its most basic level by implementing a theory that we’ve learned in this course. But the complicated storyline does complicate the game for us slightly. Say we break down the situation into cooperate and betray (instead of win/lose). As previously mentioned, the payoff functions are skewed when one character, Cersei, would prefer betray-betray over betray-cooperate. For this reason, it is harder to see cooperate-cooperate happen when Cersei would rather everyone die than see her enemies remain alive.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, both players are expected to betray the other for their own personal gain — in this case, control of Westeros. Cersei’s malevolent nature complicates the dilemma — yes, of course her most preferred scenario would be if Dany cooperated with the truce and Cersei backstabbed her to take control of Westeros, but Cersei would also rather have everyone die than just herself. Thus, her payoff function is not a clear win/lose, and the dilemma is thereby complicated. It would also be interesting to increase the amount of players in this game to include Tyrion, Jamie, John, and the other major characters of the show. Ultimately, Ozimek’s article is an interesting and unique application of game theory which pushes the limits of the prisoner’s dilemma.