Applying Game Theory To The Super Bowl
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/02/applying-game-theory
This Economist article discusses a three round game we all (or a large majority) experienced, the Super Bowl in 2015. The situation was so—The Seahawks had 2nd down within the Patriots 10-yard line and less than a minute to go. A touchdown would win it for the Seahawks. Almost any coach would run the ball in this situations as this is a safer and less risky play. The Seahawks did not. Ultimately, the Seahawks threw an interception to lose the game in the final seconds. This has been a play call that has been criticized more than almost any in recent times. The author, though, takes the Seahawks side in the debate, as he points to the way game theory’s optimal strategies evolve over time or rounds.
On the most simple level, we can analyze at the final plays from the game. The 2nd down play created an isolated three-round (2nd, 3rd, and 4th down) game which we can think about in terms of game theory. Each of the three rounds has varying level of significance. For example, the final round has no future impact because there is no game following it. Conversely, the third to last play (2nd down) is a great opportunity to establish unpredictable to your opponent by passing (extremely illogical given the field position, score, and players). If the Seahawks passed, it would raise questions that they may pass again on the second play. This uncertainty may be great enough to shift the Patriots optimal strategy to be a defense that protects against both the run and the pass equally, which would allow the Seahawks could be more effective running the ball in the second or third play.
I find this article fascinating because it illuminates the real world impact simple game theory can have. Coaches and players are constantly creating uncertainty by their choices in order to better themselves. This leverage of payoffs and positions is exactly what game theory aims to understand. What was also ideal about the Seahawks situation was that three games is the minimum number needed to instill unease in your opponent. You only have one play to do something “wild” and throw off your opponent. The second play doesn’t add much uncertainty because the final play can be viewed as unique and a situation which does not rely on past behavior and previous strategies. With respect to the Seahawks, their strategy from the entire previous season had no relevance in those final plays, which is why this is such a fundamental example of game theory. Overall, the Seahawks gamble did not pay off, but the coaches must have been attempting to “throw off” the Patriots by choosing the play they did. When you think about the Seahawks decision through the lens of game theory, the pass play makes a whole lot more sense