Game Theory: A Nuclear Analysis
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-to-win-a-nuclear-standoff/
This article by FiveThirtyEight Oliver Roeder’s goes into how to win a nuclear standoff. It broaches the subject in the context of the tense relationship between American President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. With both individuals in control of their respective country’s military power and nuclear arsenal, it brings about an interesting game theory case where both of these leaders representing large groups of people are playing for small and petty victories with potentially devastating consequences. It first offers a game where you play against a person, represented by a computer program, to get $100 dollars. You each give a number between 0 and 100, and whoever has the highest number wins $100. However, there’s a catch: the lower number of the two you picked is the likelihood of you both losing $10,000 dollars. It’s this exact dynamic that depicts the actions taken by these two world leaders. They both throw threats, warnings, and slights at each other, seeing them as small victories in asserting their power. With each statement they send each other’s way, the more the tension builds. The more the tension builds, the more likely it is that nuclear warheads could be launched across the Pacific Ocean in both directions. It reveals a startling truth: that sometimes the most rational choice in a standoff is the most dangerous choice.
This relates to the class topic of game theory. It is explicitly stated to be a game theory take on the Kim-Trump conflict. It studies the strategies surrounding nuclear standoff by viewing the individuals in charge as the players and analyzing the players’ incentives, how they will act, and to where their actions will lead. This is by definition a game theory analysis, so it directly connects to class material.