A Terrorist’s Strategy
The article Hawks, doves, and birds of paradise explores the dichotomy between expected and actual human behavior, specifically, as relating to perpetrators of terrorism. Leading with a reference to the confrontational capacities embedded in humans and animals, author R. H. Sprinkle discusses the qualities characterizing a human who is faced with a decision: he is rational, draws from precedent, and avoids personal risk while evaluating his possible courses of action. However, the September 11, 2001 attacks reveal a stark contrast between the prediction and reality of human behavior: the Twin Towers bombers were irrational, selfless, and seeking personal risk, all opposites of the claims about personality that game theory operates on. Subtly, this article highlights the importance of clarifying an assumption within each individual application of game theory. Assumptions regarding human tendencies, although derived from years of data collection, may cause imbalance in the foundation of game theory. Of course, the passengers mentioned in the article did still value their lives and attempted to save themselves, their captors ensnared them in a wholly unforeseen situation.
Though there exist certain scenarios that defy our algorithms and prove unpredictable, our definitions of expected human tendencies in settings of conflict and cooperation are useful; they generally hold true. In class, we observed that the best strategies, captured in Nash Equilibria, are self-serving and calculated with the other players’ motives in mind. This article helps extend these principles from class into the realm of evolutionary game theory, which not only accounts for the individual human psyche, but also its place amongst fellow humans in the population. The Hawk-Dove game, which mirrors passive and aggressive human interactions, is presented with a twist—the element of recklessness could easily be a part of the hawk—in this case, the suicide bomber—or the dove—the passengers on the flights. Ultimately, the article reminds us to consider the presumptive framework carefully before proceeding to a best strategy analysis as well as to account for abnormal players.
Link to Article: http://politicsandthelifesciences.org/Contents/Contents-2002-3/PLS2002-3-1.pdf