A Reconsideration of Urban Traffic Congestion
I am sure that all of us have once been stuck in traffic, complaining about too many cars or not enough roads. I remember most recently when I was on a bus from Port Authority trying to catch my flight at JFK, the traffic jam was so bad that I almost missed my flight. In fact, traffic congestion is a rising urban issue that modern society is facing. In the research paper, the researchers focus on the worsening traffic congestion in L.A. They point out several factors that could potentially relieve the current situation. Here, I will specifically mention two as they connect closely with the topic on traffic equilibrium from class. The first factor has to do with the imbalance of supply and demand for road space. From a supply chain perspective, the researchers think that by constructing more roads, government could ease congestion. The other factor is a strategic pricing method catering toward congestion. Highly demanded roads will have a higher tolls than others. It attempts to encourage drivers to take the alternative routes by incentivizing them with cheaper tolls. While I think the research does convey some good policy implications, a utilization of network theory in my opinion will generate more effective results.
In class, we discuss that having an additional road does not necessarily improve the traffic system. The implementation of the new road, while ideally is to relieve congestion, attracts all drivers because it has less traffic. Nevertheless, the Nash Equilibrium becomes even worse than before as people are no longer splitting up to different routes but rather they all choose the new road which will ultimately have more traffic. Using the study of decision theory, one could easily argue that the first factor in the research is flawed because it fails to take into account drivers’ rationals to always choose less congestive roads. The second factor in fact can be combined with the first factor and create a better outcome. The new road with less traffic can take a higher toll whereas others can have a reward generated from the toll. Hence, the new Nash Equilibrium will be improved.
Research Link:Â http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9385.html