Game Theory and Nuclear Standoffs
This article compares America’s current nuclear standoff with North Korea with an imagined game over a $100 bill. The rules of the game are the the two players choose a number between 0 and 100. Whoever chooses the higher number wins $100, but there is also a chance that you will have to give up $10,000 and that chance is equal to the lower of the two numbers. For example, if I choose 40 and my opponent chooses 20, I get the $100, but we both have a 20% chance of having to give up $10,000. If I think my opponent is weak, or can tell that the opponent is intimidated by me, they will most likely choose a small number and I will pick a higher one, so the risk of either of us losing $10,000 is low, and I would get the $100. However, if my opponent is not intimidated by me, I might feel inclined to choose a lower number, give up the $100, and lower my chances of loosing $10,000. In any case, my perception of my opponent may be false and could raise the potential of me loosing a substantial amount of money for only $100. A similar argument is made here about Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. They are in a kind of “game of egos” in that each player feels they must appear more intimidating. In this example (according to the article), the $100 becomes the diplomatic relationship between the two countries, that might manifest in disputed territory, and the $10,000 is a full on nuclear war.
I found this comparison interesting because the article begins by explaining a very simple game that eventually helps bring an outlandish and frightening topic back down to earth. This has been the basis of our discussion in class about game theory and defense. In this case, while Trump promises “fire and fury” against North Korea, their military is testing missiles and promising attacks around Guam. Neither party can be fully sure of the consequence of their actions until the opponent makes a move, and the stakes are extremely high. They must consider how much it is worth to appear to be strong.