To nuke or not to nuke?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/16/what-game-theory-tells-us-about-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.c6dbd73f6778
All everyone is aware, “NUCLEAR WAR WITH NORTH KOREA?” has been dominating the headlines for the past couple of weeks. Given the unpredictability of both leaders in charge of both countries, people on both sides of the conflict are unsure of what to think of the threats and how seriously to take the headlines. In order to obtain some clear answers, some individuals are looking for alternate sources of information or predictions about the situation. Game theory has been able to provide some mathematical, probabilistic answers to the issue at hand. These predictions are bolstered by scenarios handled in similar manners using the same theories and predictions during the Cold War era. This article discusses an interview with, Tim Roughgarden, a professor of computer science at Stanford University who is knowledgable in Game Theory. Professor Roughgarden explains game theory and how it is useful in planning military strategy. Specifically, Roughgarden likens nuclear war to the prisoner’s dilemma, positing that in both scenarios, “each player has the opportunity to screw over the other.” He then qualifies his position saying that the prisoner’s dilemma is a ‘game’ played only once, whereas the international relations and interactions between North Korea and America are exist for a long time regardless of war or peace. Therefore, if one country ‘betrays’ or attacks another, like the dominant strategy suggests in the prisoners dilemma, they are exposing themselves to potential issues in the long term. Since each country fears the threat of retaliation of an attack, cooperation becomes the preferred strategy and the countries act against their short term interests of attacking one another out of fear of retaliation.
The interviewer ends by asking what does game theory suggest the US do in this situation. Roughgarden responds by saying that game theory can provide an idea about some possible outcomes that can occur, if both sides think rationally and stick with their dominant strategy, but it cannot help so much with guiding events toward a desired outcome. However, since both administrations are known to be irrational at times, and fairly new to their positions of power, there is no mutual understandings of the goals and intentions each side has about the other. Therefore it is hard to make judgments at all about the situation. However, if the US developed or identified a dominant strategy no matter what NK does, it should not matter what the other side wants to do since the dominant strategy will be played no in any event.