North Korea, Nuclear War, and Game Theory
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-south-us-nuclear-war.html?_r=0
In a world where nuclear escalation between the US and North Korea is accelerating at unprecedented levels, it’s important to take a step back and analyze it from a game theory perspective – or is it?
After examining the situation, many game theorists believe that Kim Jong-Un, in order to preserve his power and regime, would always take the action necessary to prolong his iron grip over North Korea. In such a situation, North Korea’s dominant strategy would always be to avoid a nuclear attack, given that the US and South Korea have much more combined nuclear might. In other words, Kim Jong-Un would not rationally choose to attack either the US or South Korea first, as the resulting retaliatory attack would decimate the regime, and he would also avoid an attack even in the event of a limited preemptive strike, as the US and South Korea would only strike back with greater force. In a world that abides purely by game theory, it would never be in Kim Jong-Un’s interest to strike, as any lashout from North Korea would result in the immediate and rapid collapse of his own empire. Thus, one may feel safe to conclude that the potential for nuclear war to break out as a result of the actions of North Korea would be close to none; however, that may not be the case.
Yes, the game theorists are technically correct, but they make one major assumption – that Kim Jong-Un is rational. Although it is true that Kim Jong-Un is never incentivized by political power and control to conduct a large strike, many policy analysts believe that he might lash out with his (albeit limited) nuclear arsenal, with the goal of taking as many people down with him as he can, should he ever feel that his regime and his life are under great threat. In other words, while game theorists had believed that North Korea would not react to a limited preemptive strike, this might not be the reality of Kim Jong-Un’s mentality, as a limited preemptive strike could potentially cause him to feel threatened and lash out in nuclear force. In this situation, the payoffs of the game change on North Korea’s side; once threatened, Kim Jong-Un’s payoffs no longer come in the form of regime preservation, but of lives taken, instead. Under this new game with modified payoffs, it is against the US’s interest to conduct a limited preemptive strike, while North Korea is incentivized to strike quickly and harshly. As soon as Kim Jong-Un starts to feel even the slightest bit of heat, lives will be lost, and thus, the US and South Korea would start receiving some negative payoffs from the preemptive strike option, while previously, in the original game theorists’ assumptions, there would be no reason for them to suspect large-scale retaliation from North Korea. This shifted scenario shows that although one would originally jump to analyzing the situation under the lens of game theory, the situation may be more complicated than originally assumed, especially given that one of the players just might be the most irrational man on earth.