The Republican Primary and Game Theory
Much of campaigning during a political campaign has to be done strategically; which demographic groups need to be targeted, which can be ignored, which opponent should be attacked, which opponent should be left alone, etc. In the fast-moving world of political elections where a slip of the tongue can cost an election, enemies can become good friends, and reliable friends can be formidable enemies, this becomes especially true. That is why presidential campaigns hire statisticians and data analysts and employ cutting-edge computer programs and algorithms to better their chances of winning. However, at times, the success of a campaign can boil down to a few simple decisions.
This was especially true during the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary which many colliding circumstances. The Republican Party can generally be divided into the Establishment, which leads the party and usually consists of the wealthy, business-oriented center-right, and the Base, which tend to be poorer and more conservative than the Establishment. There was no apparent front-runner from the beginning as there were 16 potential Establishment candidates vying for the nomination, with each seeming equally capable of being president, effectively splitting the Establishment vote. Then there was Donald Trump, an outsider to the Republican party who nonetheless captured much of the party’s Base. Trump threatened to run as a third-party candidate if he didn’t win the nomination and take the Base with him.
So, each of the party’s Establishment candidates had a dilemma; they could attack each other and try to get as many votes from the Establishment while ignoring Trump in order to not alienate the Base and ultimately win the nomination. Otherwise, they could attack Trump and take votes away from him at the Base. However, doing so would incur the wrath of Trump, whose insults and commentary could sink their campaign. As a result, the dominant strategy for Establishment candidates was to attack each other; Jeb Bush’s Super PAC spent $1.4 million on ads attacking Marco Rubio in February while not making ads against Trump. However, almost all the Establishment candidates overestimated the payoff they would receive from attacking each other; the attacks only split the Establishment’s votes, causing the Establishment candidates to lose in almost every primary.
Meanwhile, Trump’s dominant strategy was to attack and insult not only his opponents but also anybody who opposed him as doing so would always increase his appeal to the Base despite horrifying the Establishment and non-Republicans. There was essentially zero cost to this strategy as he wasn’t targeting the Establishment’s votes anyway and in the primary, non-Republicans don’t matter. As a result, Trump insulted all the Establishment candidates, who failed to anticipate the costs of ignoring him. The lack of response to those insults allowed Trump to paint his opponents as weak, solidifying his support amongst the Base. Thus, Trump won the primaries by a landslide, winning 20% more votes than his closest opponent.
However, the dominant strategy that Trump carried him through the primary could cost him the general election as insults and attacks could cost him the support of minorities, women, and immigrants, demographics that he will need to win over. Normally in game theory, perfectly rational participants would change their strategies to best fit changing circumstances, however it remains to be seen if Trump will change his strategies or if he is perfectly rational.
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