Game Theory and the Seattle Seahawks last play in Super Bowl 49
There are some things that we just can’t forget. Namely, the last play of the 2015 Super Bowel is now labeled as “the worst play call in NFL history.” Ever since, critics, fans, and players have poured onto Pete Carroll for his decision to pass the football on the one yard line instead of running it with Marshawn Lynch, who was regarded as the most dominant running back in the league at the time.
When asking “why did Pete do what he did?” game theory can be a very helpful tool to look at this situation in greater depth. While the Super Bowl is much, much more complex than a single rounded “prisoner’s dilemma,” this way of thinking might help us understand what Pete was thinking at the time.
With less than a minute remaining, the Seattle SeaHawks were on the verge of overcoming a 28-24 deficit and becoming the first team ever in NFL history to win back to back Super Bowls.
To rule out some of the obvious, the Seahawks had to score a touch down. There was no other exception. While a field goal would have been very hard to block, it would only give them 3 points, making them 28-27, still down 1.
At the one yard line, they had the best running back, Lynch, who excelled in short yardage plays. So the seemingly obvious choice is to run the ball. But as Wolfers argues in one of the articles listed, teams tend to mix up their run and pass plays in an attempt to make it less clear to the opponents on what they want to do. However, in a response to Wolfers, another writer argued that while mixing up plays might help to differ attention away from the focus of a team’s strength over the course of a season, it can not be compared to when the situation is boiled down to 3 final plays. This is one of the implications that can be found in the general idea behind game theory. Because the stakes are so high, the choices that two sides make can become very situational. For instance, just because the Seahawks ran the football just as many times as they passed it during the regular season, it doesn’t mean that they will carry this balance throughout the entire playoffs. The Seahawks might have decided to try run the ball all three times on the one yard line. That would be the expected. But they did not. Because Pete Carroll was not only considering the strength of his team, but also of his opponent, the New England Patriots.
The Seahawks had 4 chances at the 5 yard line to get into the end zone. By running the ball the first time, they got to the 1 yard line. Now they had 3 chances to score. They then threw the ball and it got intercepted. But had the ball not been intercepted and was an incomplete, the Patriots would have been under greater pressure to consider the pass as more than just a trickery sort of play to waste time. This would have actually increased the effectiveness of a run play on the third attempt because now, Bill Belichick would be more aware of that possibility. And subsequently, the effectiveness of the run game would increase once more if the Seahawks had thrown again on the third down. However, it can be argued that if it had came down to the fourth down and last opportunity to score, it is more than likely that the Seahawks would have ran the ball with everything laid on the line.
How the play actually turned out was that Belichick was aware of the possibility of a pass play, but had expected a run. He had stacked the box with 8 defensive line men, but only 3 on the outside, including Butler, an unproven corner at the time. In a sense, Belichick was committed to stopping the run.
Interestingly, one of the most important aspects about game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma is that neither of the prisoners really know what the other will do. If one will betray another or if one is more susceptible to breaking down. If the Seahawks had known that Butler, the person who intercepted the ball, had practiced the exact same play and that he was unsuccessful during practice, they might have changed their play. Maybe Carroll would have called a read option, and have Russell run in the ball himself. It’s a lot of ifs, but in a sense, this explains the madness and chaotic nature of the Super Bowl and large sporting events. Anything can happen at any moment. If Wilson had made a better pass, if the receiver had caught it, if the defender had gotten there a little slower. In the end, both coaches took a gamble. The players also took gambles.
This is what makes sports so unique. Even if the coach calls the most optimal play, the players might still be unable to execute. In a specific situation, players might even disobey the call of the coach because the opponents are reacting differently. This means that nothing is set in stone. Unlike that of the prisoner’s dilemma, the result is not reached until the players carry out the play and the result is based not on the decision of 2 people, but rather all 22 players and referee officials, who can decide and take the outcome of a game outside of the players and coaches hands. If there was a play foul called on the patriots when Butler had intercepted the ball, then maybe the Seahawks would be back to back champions today. But that’s still a whole lot of what ifs. For now, the last call Pete Carroll made in 2015 would still be labeled as one of the worst in NFL history. And we know because even he admitted it.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/02/game-theory-american-footballhttp://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/02/applying-game-theoryhttp://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/160678/twitter-reaction-to-seattle-seahawks-fourth-quarter-interception