Using Game Theory to Analyze the Role of the U.S. in the Paris Climate Agreement
https://www.futurity.org/game-theory-paris-agreement-2170362-2/
This article by Gregory Filiano discusses a model theorized by Oleg Smirnov, a professor of political science at Stony Brook University. Using carbon emissions data and game theory, the model predicts how different countries would act in regards to the Paris Climate Agreement. Using the model, Smirnov predicts that the U.S. leaving the agreement will cause most of the burden of reducing carbon emission to shift towards developing countries. Since other developed countries see the U.S. getting away with not following the guidelines, they will likely follow suit and not pull their weight in the agreement, according to Smirnov.
This usage of game theory reminds me of the prisoners dilemma. In the prisoners dilemma, game theory reveals that it is in either prisoner’s best interest to defect to the authorities and tell on their partner, even though a cooperative solution would result in less jail time overall. The countries involved in the Paris Agreement could work more cooperatively and hit the emissions goals, but each one wants to minimize the amount of resources they need to put in to reach those goals. When a country sees a similar country withdrawing from the deal, they know that they could be doing less and will choose to do so. One outcome that differs from the prisoner’s dilemma, however, is the outcome that results from enough nations failing to act. If climate change progresses far enough, it will bring destruction to every country, including the ones that got away with inputting less resources into trying to stop climate change. This outcome would be the lowest for every country, causing a nash equilibrium strategy of pure non-cooperation such as the one in the prisoners dilemma to be impossible.