Prof. van de Walle’s talk last Wednesday on the relationship between foreign aid and economic development in nations with corrupt or ineffective governments was particularly interesting to me because in his Intro to Comparative Politics class, which I’m currently taking, we are discussing other aspects of the same issue. For class this week, we read a piece by two political scientists, Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, titled “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood.” (a link if anyone’s interested in reading it) Jackson and Rosberg draw two different definitions of statehood: the “empirical”, which refers to a socially stable state with effective ruling systems in a defined territory, and the “juridical”, which may lack the on-the-ground functionality and cohesion of an empirical state, but is granted legal “state” status and its trappings (like the right to sit at the UN, for example) by the international community.
Jackson and Rosberg, considering a number of “weak states” in Africa, note many of the same problems that Prof. van de Walle discusssed at the talk: corruption, inability of government to carry out its duties, low levels of economic development, etc. They continue on to offer an explanation why these weak states, which seem to be failing as empirical states, still remain sovereign juridical states today. I’m paraphrasing here, but essentially it’s because the support these states receive from the international community (on account of their status as recognized juridical states) keeps them going. Foreign aid helps finance government budgets, the backing of the international community, etc. Thus, states that wouldn’t have survived long in an earlier, less international setting have held out in the twentieth century and into the present.
Like Prof. van de Walle’s talk, this seems like a compelling explanation. Unfortunately, it doesn’t offer much in the way of solutions. One problem that Prof. van de Walle mentioned was that foreign aid to weak or corrupt governments often ends up being siphoned off to elites or spent on other functions besides those it was intended for. To solve this problem it seems like you have to go one of two ways: either reform the government (or maybe monitor its performance closely), which is tricky, or go around it and have other organizations like NGOS or charities do the work the aid was intended to accomplish. I read another article that suggested that a proliferation of NGOs may lead to the state being run like a protectorate, rather than a sovereign nation. But if governments prove really intractable, is there merit to that approach anyway? Should concerns for national sovereignty prevent attempts at improving the efficacy of aid? Or maybe aid and development potential should be put directly in the hands of the people through some sort of micro-financing program. Any thoughts?