Game Theory in International Relations with North Korea
Article Link: https://theconversation.com/what-game-theory-says-about-dealing-with-north-korea-78195
Over the course of the last few years, North Korea has been gradually but surely increasing their nuclear arsenal and capabilities. As of this month, they are believed to have around 60 nuclear weapons and have been conducting tests on their equipment for quite some time. Global leaders have agreed that stemming North Korea from further advancing their nuclear capability should be a top priority, but it is not easy to make progress in diplomatic relations with a country so isolated from the West.
Game theory can be applied very usefully to conflict and cooperation in situations where there are a few players and much information is known. The best outcome comes as a result of reciprocalism, when the option of retaliating exists against bad behavior in situations where the game repeats for an infinite amount of times and players therefore have very little incentive to cheat and cooperation becomes an optimal strategy. However, this ideal situation is definitely not the case in relations with North Korea thanks to both the volatility of nuclear weapons themselves and relations with the autocratic country. This game has several key players and strategies of each participant are not common knowledge. The dangers of nuclear warfare also means this game has little resemblance to “infinite repetition” and in this case, players tend to choose a “self-oriented” strategy.
North Korea has stated that they will retaliate against any military action on their nuclear capabilities. This makes reciprocalism very difficult to reach as it is very difficult to impose harsh military sanctions on a regime that rarely communicates and cannot be expected to abide by the conventions of more civilized nations. This leaves open the route of economic sanctions but in order for these to have much success, China needs to be willing to join the action. The global superpower has been unwilling to impose harsh sanctions on North Korea because although they do not want it to have significant nuclear power, it’s leadership remaining in power prevents a refugee crisis and United States influence from stretching even further into the Korean peninsula.
In the time since this article has been published, Donald Trump has tried meeting with Kim Jong-un to negotiate a settlement between the US and North Korea regarding nuclear de-escalation and other human rights issues. Despite the President’s assurance that his words were heeded and North Korea was willing to cooperate, little evidence has been seen to support this claim. Although the best outcome is cooperation, it seems impossible without China fully committing to peace talks and bringing its influence to the table. One can only hope that this happens soon as relations with North Korea and its neighboring countries clearly aren’t stable (as shown by the Structural Balance Property as well) and instability with nuclear weapons is a very dangerous situation.