The Foreign Policy Agenda: Nuclear Nonproliferation
In the wake of the 2012 election, and Obama’s subsequent re-election, the nation will face some serious challenges, especially when it comes to the foreign policy and defense decisions to be made within the next four years. The November 11th editorial article, “Foreign Policy Agenda,” in the New York Times highlights that “One of Mr. Obama’s singular contributions has been his vision of a world without nuclear weapons. It is a lofty goal that won’t be achieved in his second term, or maybe for four years after that. But it offers a framework for reducing America’s stockpile and for arguing credibly that other countries should follow suit.”
So where does networks come in?
The decision to reduce amount of nuclear weaponry the United States has is not one to be taken lightly. Since the build up of the Cold War and the emergence of the military industrial complex, the United States has always been among the top. According to statistics, the size of strategic nuclear warheads around the world was as follows: (part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) USA = 2,200, UK = 160, France = 300, Russia = 2,800, China = 180; (not part of the NPT) Israel = 80, Pakistan = 60, India = 60, North Korea < 10.
However, in the new age, there is a certain normative hierarchy/status associated with the possession of nuclear weaponry, yet there is an even stronger normative stigma associated with threatening to deploy such weapons. Domestic public opinion turned away from weapons in the 40s; the world followed suit and the practice became taboo and could be evidenced by a change in leader beliefs: civilization is marked by the regulation of warfare (to use them would be barbaric)
So why do nuclear weapons continue to exist and why do countries continue to pursue them to such a degree? And what network effect surrounds it?
The article argues that, “If Mr. Obama can draw the other nuclear powers, including China, Pakistan, India and Israel, into the discussions and persuade the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, so much the better.” Yet a huge criticism to this is that there are very little information based or direct benefits associated with not pursuing nuclear weaponry – from the perspective of such countries.
Information-wise, they are at a distinct disadvantage. If they stop trying to create these weapons and developing a nuclear program, they will never be on the same knowledge level that other countries who possess nukes do. Therefore, they take this as a motivating factor. Direct-benefit wise, there is always the fact that through the use of nuclear deterrence or threat, one can achieve political objectives that can’t be done through other means.
In response to both, countries most likely will always puruse nuclear weaponry and programs until there is an established global norm, which negatively or positively influences the network effect (reach z’ unstable equilibrium) … until either no countries have nuclear weaponry or all countries do. Yet as food for thought I pose some additional questions which are aimed at questioning the pro-nuclear stance (arguably unrelated to the network effect, but effective nonetheless):
- Why not use nuclear power when confronting states without nuclear power?
- Why do non-nuclear states attack states with nuclear power?
- Why don’t non-nuclear states live in a permanent nuclear deterrent dilemma?
- Why don’t most of the threshold states (who have the capability) develop nuclear weapons? Or why do they give them away?
Is the network effect really that powerful?
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/opinion/president-obamas-foreign-policy-agenda.html?hp
-mrh