Private Parking Auctions In Large Cities
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8361317
This paper tackles the issue of parking issues in large crowded cities. It uses the ideas of auctions to tackle parking in these areas. I find this to be interesting because it does not initially seem to be a problem that can be handled with auctions. However, the way the author approaches this issue is very intriguing. He first brings up the point of auctions for by referencing to the amount of private parking. An astonishing 55% of the parking in large cities is taken. He points out how the parking issue is skewed, as many empty parking lots near other less used facilities will be less used, while the main facilities like malls will be jam packed. However, his main argument is about auctioning the private parking slots. For individuals who don’t use their private parking spots during certain hours, they can sell their slot for specific time slots. According to the author, drivers typically spend around 8 minutes in major cities just looking for parking. The author has the private parking spot owners split their parking spot into multiple time slots. This is then auctioned either through a first or second price auction. The author then compares first and second price auctions. Through second price auctions, the payoff is x−maxj≠nbj≥0. However, for the first price auction, we see that the bidder only wins if he pays the highest bid, and also gets no payoff unless he shadows his price. According to the author, “The second price sealed-bid auction realize incentive compatibility, however, the first-price sealed-bid auction is not. The proof is clear.”
This paper relates to class through the use of auctions. The idea of auctions can be applied to more than just gambling or actual auctions. Any form of selling an item can be seen as an auction. This is why the selling of private parking slots can be seen as an auction. Just like in class too, the author reviews and compares first price to second price auctions. Both the class and the article say that in second price auctions, bidding your true value is the dominant strategy, while in first price, it is better to bid a little lower. All of these points show how the article demonstrates the topics we went over in class.