How Game Theory Explains the Leaks in the Trump White House
During the Trump presidency, there have been many high-profile leaks from the White House: National Security officer Michael Flynn met with the Russians, Trump called Africa a sh**hole, and unfortunately many more. In May, one particular leak caught the public’s attention and opprobrium: White House aide Kelly Sadler mentioned very callously that McCain’s opinion did not matter because “he’s dying anyway.” Anyone will admit that leaks have been a problem in every White House administration over the years, but I think we can agree that leaks have become more prevalent under Trump than ever before.
Pulitzer Prize winner John Cassidy, in a May New Yorker article, uses game theory to explain why leaks are more prevalent in the Trump administration than in others. He compares the situation to the simple Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where White House staff are the players, and they have two possible strategies: to leak or not to leak. Cassidy notes that Trump has created a “factionalized, dog-eat-dog” culture within the White House, so his staff plays the game similar to the prisoners. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both prisoners are concerned only with their own self-interests, so the dominant strategy is that both confess, or in the case of Trump’s administration, both leak. To deconstruct this dominant strategy down further, a staff member receives a better payoff if both 1) he or she leaks information before his or her rival has the opportunity, and 2) he or she leaks damaging information about his or her rival even if this rival has nothing to leak.
We have learned in class that people behave rationally and with self-interest in mind, so we would expect that regardless of the current President, White House staff should act according to the Prisoner’s Dilemma dominant strategy and choose to leak. However, if this were true, leaks would have been far more prevalent in every administration preceding Trump’s. The key difference to note is that the payoffs have changed radically in Trump’s administration and current staffers are more concerned with self-preservation. In previous administrations, leaks were low because there was a high level of team spirit and staffers received higher payoffs for being loyal. Thus, the dominant strategy in most situations previously was not to leak any damaging information.
Cassidy finishes his article with an important conclusion: internal witch hunts will not stop Trump’s staff from leaking information; in fact, the only way to change people’s rational behavior is to change the payoffs of the game by fostering a more friendly, loyal, and cooperative environment.