Game Theory and White House Leaks
Cassidy, J. (2018, May 15). How Game Theory Explains the Leaks in the Trump White House. The New Yorker.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-game-theory-explains-the-leaks-in-the-trump-white-house
This article paints Trump’s White House as a real-life instance of the prisoner’s dilemma. The author points out that in the classic prisoner’s dilemma, mutual denial is the best option for both parties. Similarly, he argues, in former administrations White House staffers were united as a common front and therefore leaks were not as frequent or severe because all parties involved were able to see and engage in this best practice of mutual denial. Trump’s White House, the author offers, is divided into warring factions with little mutual interest or communication between the groups. This mimics the prisoner’s dilemma in which technically the two prisoners share a common goal, but are each acting in their own self-interest without being able to communicate freely with each other. In the words of one White House official, “there’s rarely one peaceful conclusion so you might as well shoot first.” Just as the prisoner’s, unsure of what the other will choose, operate in their own individual self-interest and confess, the White House staffers will choose to “confess” in the form of leaks.
Not only does the factional structure and power struggle among White House staff mirror the prisoner’s dilemma, but leaking is also a dominant strategy in this version of the game. We can see this by walking through a staffer’s decision to leak or not to leak. If our staffer is in Faction A and another is in rival Faction B, our staffer will be fearful of damaging information being exposed by Faction B while simultaneously seeking to spread damaging information. If Faction B doesn’t leak, Faction A will still want to because being the first to bat is a form of self-defense. If Faction B leaks, it is still in Faction A’s best interest to leak as well and try to damage their opponents equally, regardless of the blow they’ve taken. Through this example, we see that leaking is a dominant strategy in the White House dilemma and begin to understand why leaks are so frequent.
By comparing the current White House administration to the prisoner’s dilemma, the author asserts that only by encouraging teamwork and cooperation will denial again become the dominant strategy, and only then will Trump be able to cut back on leaks.