Prisoner’s Dilemma of Kenyan Politics
Link: http://www.herald.co.zw/kenyas-political-game-theory/
The prisoner’s dilemma shows how individual self interest can prevent socially optimal cooperation. This game theory situation is able to clearly express this concept thanks to the quantifiable nature of prison sentencing. Though game theory is often applied to easily quantifiable situations creates clear outcomes, the concept has applications in less clear fields. The above article shows how the current political turmoil of the Kenyan presidential election can be explained via the prisoner’s dilemma. President Uhuru Kenyatta is competing with Raila Odinga for the presidency. With the polls neck and neck, the election has escalated into an exchange of intense criminal accusations between the candidates. Thinking about this situation as an example of the prisoner’s dilemma, we can imagine each candidate having the option to run a slander campaign or a clean campaign. If both candidates were to run a clean campaign, each candidate’s payoff is a roughly 50% chance at the presidency and very good public perception as a politician. However, in this competitive election, both candidates are looking to get an edge. If one candidate ran a slander campaign and the other ran a clean campaign, the candidate running a slander campaign would maintain their public perception since they are not being associated with a criminal history, and would also have a higher chance at the presidency as they are making the other candidate look bad. However, since both candidates are being presented with this option, and it is in both players’ best interest to run the slander campaign, both candidates are being battered with accusation of criminal cover-ups. Since the volume of slander is so high, the likelihood of either candidate winning has stayed the same, except now public perception of both candidates has been lowered significantly.
Using game theory analysis sheds a great deal of light on why these candidates are choosing not to cooperate for their betterment. It also can be used to help guide how the politicians should proceed. The optimal social situation is to both run clean campaigns. While our initial analysis shows how both candidates will transition to slander campaigns, if we can adjust the payoff of running clean campaigns such that each candidate is directly incentivized to run not switch to a slander campaign, then both candidates will stay at the socially optimal clean campaign. One possible alternative in emerging market nations with political unrest is a mutual coalition for political stability. If both parties engage in a political coalition that seeks to ensure fair elections, they could stipulate that members of the coalition not make unsupported accusations at other candidates. If this is the case, then the payoff of switching from a clean campaign to a slander campaign is lowered as the slander campaign results in removal from coalition which is harmful to public image and may therefore lower chances of winning. While there are many ways to adjust the payoffs of the different campaign styles, this is just one example of how we can push candidates towards socially optimal action. More broadly, this example shows how when we define the payoffs of actors in a situation, we can apply game theory to many different fields.