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‘Fatally flawed’: Why third parties still fail despite voter anger

http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/21/politics/third-party-fail/index.html

In this May 2012 article, CNN’s Kevin Liptak discusses why third parties have always failed in the American political system. Focusing on the upcoming election, he explains that a third party seemingly had all the necessary tools to successfully break into the established two party system. National polls had been showing extremely high dissatisfaction with both parties, suggesting that people would be excited about a new, fresh alternative. Furthermore, they had both money and an organization. Americans Elect spent over $35 million to try to get a candidate with a realistic chance on he ballot and still failed miserably. Having failed to get just 1,000 supporters in 10 different states, there will be no Americans Elect candidate on the ballot in this election round. The article takes a look into the history of third parties and finds that the plight of Americans Elect is nothing new to third parties. Even when candidates have made it to the ballot and gotten votes, such as Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Strom Thurmond in 1948, Ross Perot in 1992 and Ralph Nader, they have never even been close to winning. Nader was even blamed for ruining the race for Al Gore. From getting the candidates themselves to be willing to attach themselves to a third party to convincing voters that they are credible candidates, third parties seem to always be “fatally flawed.”

 

The reasoning behind why third parties are never very successful can be well explained through game theory. Voters have three options: Democrat, Republican, or the third party candidate. The Third party candidate will always have a platform that is closer to either the Democrat or Republican. For purposes of simplification, lets assume that the third party candidate is closer in beliefs with the Democrats than with the Republicans. Each citizen has a choice of whom of the three they vote for and their payoff will depend on who ultimately gets elected. If your honest preference is for the Democrat to win, lets say your payoff is 1 if the Democrat gets elected, 0 if the Third Party gets elected, and -1 if the Republican gets elected. For those with Republican preferences, the payoff is 1 if the Republican gets elected, 0 if the democrat gets elected and -1 if the Third Party gets elected. For those who honestly prefer the Third Party candidate, the payoff is 1 if the Third Party wins, 0 if the Democrat wins and -1 if the Republican wins. Also, as is explained in the article, the majority of the population does not believe that the third party has any chance of winning the overall election. Since their vote is the only way to have any influence over the outcome, all citizens would like to maximize the likelihood of getting a high payoff and minimize the likelihood of getting a -1 payoff.  Because of this, people are well aware that even if they prefer the Third Party candidate (payoff of 1) and vote truthfully, that candidate will not win, and the may end up with the Republican (payoff of -1) in office. Because of this, people who prefer the Third Party will vote strategically to try and get their second best option, the democrat (payoff of 0), for fear of wasting their vote, and having their least favorite option win. There is a Nash equilibrium when those with preferences for the Third Party candidate vote for the democrat because even if they change their vote to their honest preference, they will not be better off and could possibly be worse off.  Through game theory, it is very obvious why Third Parties have such a difficult time ever being successful. Candidates know that voters will rarely risk wasting their vote on a third party candidate so they do not wish to run attached to a third party and voters know that third parties are unlikely to reach office and will thus vote strategically.

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