The Influence of Social Media in the Arab Spring
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/guest/27122/?p1=A3
Recent revolts in the Middle East toppled autocratic regimes that have been in power for decades. Hosni Mubarak, the former ruler of Egypt, was forced to end his thirty year reign by crowds of protestors that used Facebook and other social media devices. Zeynep Tufekci, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, argues that the new wave of social media outlets are making it more difficult for autocratic governments to control their people.
Online forums and media sources served as arenas for freedom of speech to flourish in countries where free discourse is discouraged. In the absence of internet social media, autocrats could prevent people from discussing their true beliefs by severely punishing anyone suspected of speaking out against the government. The internet and social media creates a virtual discussion arena, which gives people anonymity and protection against the controls of their governments. The voicing of people’s opinions on social media has two important effects. First, the ideas can persuade others to join the movement. Secondly, it provides reassurance to people that were unsure if others felt the same negative feelings about the government.
Tufekci classifies the relationship between an autocratic governments and its people as a collective action problem. She states that through cooperation, people could successfully form a mass revolt against their governments. Large protests, which must be created through some form of cooperation, are very hard to contain and make it almost impossible for the government to punish the protestors. Governments enact strong negative incentives for protesting, such as torture and long prison sentences. Without cooperation, no individual will know how large their protest will be, and if it will be large enough to counter the negative incentives of protesting. Social media gives protestors the opportunity to plan events, which ensures that their protest should be large enough to counter the negative incentives.
The collective action problem of protesting against a government can be broke down into a Prisoner’s Dilemma example, which was discussed frequently in class. In the first case, where the size of the protests is unknown by the players (protestors) and social media is not used, the payoffs for both players protesting are negative, and the payoffs for doing nothing are zero. In the second case, in which the individuals know that the protests will be large and social media is used, the payoffs for protesting together are slightly positive because of the chance of a new government, and the payoffs for doing nothing are zero. Both cases account for the outcome where one player protests and the other does nothing. In this case, the player that protests faces a lesser payoff since the protest size is smaller, and therefore easier for the government to control and punish the protestors.
Essentially, the two cases display the display the different outcomes based on the information available to the individuals. Social media changes the game by giving information to the players, which changes their payoffs and expected behaviors.
Case 1: No Social Media Used, Protest Size Unknown by Players
p1(vert)/p2 (horizont) Protest Do Nothing
Protest -1, -1 -2, 0
Do Nothing 0, -2 0, 0
Case 2: Social Media Used, Protest Size Known to be Large by Players
p1/p2 Protest Do Nothing
Protest 1/4, 1/4 1/8, 0
Do Nothing 0, 1/8 0, 0