Article: Psiaki, ML; Humphreys, TE; (2016) “GNSS Spoofing and Detection”, Proceedings of the IEEE, 104 (6): 1258-1270; SI
Abstract: Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable.
Funding Acknowledgement: National Research Council; National Science Foundation [1454474]; Data-supported Transportation Operations and Planning Center (D-STOP), a Tier 1 USDOT University Transportation Center
Funding Text: The work of M. Psiaki was supported in part by the National Research Council through a Senior Research Associate appointment at the Air Force Research Lab Space Vehicles Directorate, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, NM. The work of T. Humphreys was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1454474 and by the Data-supported Transportation Operations and Planning Center (D-STOP), a Tier 1 USDOT University Transportation Center.