Afghanistan & Game Theory
In an August article from Epsilon Theory, author Ben Hunt discussed the fall of the Afghan government to the Taliban through the lens of game theory. He posits that the collapse of the Afghan military is due to the “Common Knowledge” game, comparing it to the archetypal story of The Emperor’s New Clothes. While people individually knew the emperor was naked, they didn’t act on it until someone shouted it out loud; they were too afraid to act alone, in fears that they were the only one who saw the obvious. The author argues that the same principle applies to Afghanistan- once Afghan officials thought that everyone else thought that Afghanistan would fall, they fled.
Hunt’s application of game theory makes sense to me. People look to the group to make decisions, lessening their individual responsibility if they get something wrong. There’s also safety in numbers. I’ll try to apply Hunt’s “Common Knowledge” game in the context of what we’ve studied in class.
Imagine a game theory table, with every Afghan official as a player. They have two possible strategies- fight, or flee. Their payoffs depend on how many officials select the same action; if most choose to fight, the payoff will be greater for those who choose to fight. If most choose to flee, the payoff will be greater for those who choose to flee. When the fall of Afghanistan seemed like a certainty, due to the US government announcing they’d be pulling out, the payoffs for individual players didn’t change. However, each player’s perception of the likelihood of other players fleeing went up; reasoning that more players were likely to choose flee, more players chose to flee. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy; since everyone thought everyone else was likely to flee, everyone fled. Thus, Afghanistan fell in less than ten days.