Kant Stop Won’t Stop: Game Theory and Moral Evolution
Ethical decisions have always been the subject of intense debate, largely because of their failure to produce a satisfying solution for moral dilemmas through logical means alone. One of Kant’s most prominent philosophical principles is that of the categorical imperative: according to his formula of universal law, one should only act on a maxim that one would wish to be a universal law. His reasoning is simple- a maxim should be able to be made into a universal law without leading to a logical contradiction. For example, imagine that you decide that lying for your own benefit is morally acceptable. After all, this is aligned with your self-interest and would have minimal effect on the greater public (depending on the measures you take). If this view were universally adopted, however, this would fail to yield any net benefit as no one would have any reason to believe others. Thus, a logical contradiction is produced.
While this argument is valid, it is vague and doesn’t offer a reason for how moral norms arise and persist. Abstract logical paradoxes rarely dictate our immediate decisions. Game theory can offer some insight into how we make decisions, how our morals norms originate, and the role that morality plays in our society.
Many philosophers point to functionalism- the idea that morality functions as a solution to the pitfalls of purely logical behavior. For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma, two rational agents acting in their own self-interest will arrive at nash equilibrium, betraying the other and both getting five years in prison. This is not the optimal solution– both would have been better off staying silent, maximizing payoffs. But acting on their own, they would not come to this solution. Morality serves as a sort of unspoken imperative, binding us to act in a way that maximizes utility and sidesteps the failures of pure rationality.
To further match the implications of game theory with real life, we must change the premises of the original prisoner’s dilemma, which assumes rational agents and one-off interactions. Instead, let us consider a series of repeated interactions between agents who do not act with perfect rationality. (This has been used to describe ecological behavior, and is therefore commonly known as evolutionary game theory). This approach will almost always tell us that cooperation between parties will lead to the most mutual benefit. It more closely resembles what we would see in everyday life and aligns closely with our moral intuition. Consider once again Kant’s law- this law does not apply if one chooses to lie only once. It presupposes repeated interactions which cause others to lose trust in each other. Viewed from the framework of evolutionary game theory, we can see why we have evolved our moral norms over time to produce the most beneficial outcomes despite our tendency to act in our own self-interest.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/