Covert Social Networks: Using Network Analysis for Anti-Terrorism Efforts
At the very early introduction to this course, we were shown images of different examples of networks to demonstrate the ubiquitous application of the concept. Most networks that we think of provide post hoc information, such as the spread of STDs in a high school from a map of intimate relationships between students. But how can we use the information we extract from networks for predictive matters? Cornell’s very own sociology professor Matthew Brashears has received a $797,000 grant for a three-year project from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (a subgroup under the US Department of Defense) to develop new methodology of uncovering what is called “covert social networks.” Terrorist organizations, whether they are radical religious cults, drug smugglers or human traffickers, all must function within a social network. This is the essence of their operations – these groups must be able to establish connections and contact one another efficiently without being discovered by authorities. The goal of Brashears’ project is to “develop methods for identifying individuals who are engaged in [acts of terrorism] and refine methods for identifying members of a covert social network from an initial point of entry.”
To further understand this project, I spoke with Michael Genkin, the sociology doctoral candidate who is collaborating with Professor Brashears in the terrorism research efforts. Genkin explained that their particular focus lies in how scientific professionals become involved in these terrorist organizations, especially as key roles in the acquisition or creation of weapons of mass destruction. Genkin referred me to a terrorist attack by a religious sect called Aum Shinrikyo that released Sarin gas in the underground subway system in Tokyo in 1995. The initial steps in outlining the (incomplete and partial) network information involve gathering and coding numerous primary and secondary sources. The research team is reviewing mass media published in Japan that detailed both the attacks and the individuals involved in the crime, some who were eventually apprehended and convicted. In identifying how scientists were chosen, approached, and potentially coerced into joining the organization, Brashears and his team hope to discover patterns unique to the covert social networks of terrorists.
Why use a sociological networks analysis approach to identify terrorists? Brashears believes this technique will prove to be more accurate and reliable than the standard and popular practice of “profiling.” Though the methodology Brashears and Genkin are using to identity individuals and their covert networks is extremely advanced for the undergraduate population of CS 2850, the core of Brashears’ argument and project thesis are quite accessible. I believe that because this research concerns both relevant coursework and U.S. national security, understanding Brashears’ project is imperative. This project is just one example in which the application of network analysis can be used beyond the typical “dispersion of information” prototype. I hope that by understanding how network analysis plays a role in anti-terrorism efforts, even at such an elementary level, we can begin to brainstorm on our own other possibilities in the domain of social networks.
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/index.php?nid=150&sid=2006370
For even MORE reading, check out this CNAS (Center for a New American Security) report:
http://www.cnas.org/node/6703
Network analysis is not central, but one can extrapolate key themes of networks in the case study regarding the acquisition and development of WMDs.