Game Theory and the Iranian Bomb Crisis
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-t.html?pagewanted=all
Bueno de Mesquita, a renowned game analyst, was hired by the CIA two years ago to apply game theory to Iran’s bomb crisis. In order to predict the outcome of the Iran bomb crisis, Bueno de Mesquita spent a year conducting research on all the “players” within the Iran bomb network. He added a numerical value representing each player’s interest in Iran developing and testing a bomb. The scale ranged from 0 (opposing to Iran developing and testing a bomb) to 200 (active testing of a nuclear bomb). After all the data and research were collected, Bueno de Mesquita entered his acquired information into a program that he had written to predict the outcome of the Iran bomb crisis. The program started in 2009 with a Forecast value (overall value of the likelihood of Iran developing and/or testing a nuclear bomb) of 160, a value indicating potential bomb development and testing. In 2010, the program spit out a value of 118, a value indicating fervent bomb development but lack of interest in testing. In other words, the program predicted that in 2010, Iran would be close to developing a nuclear bomb but would eventually curb its own interest in testing one.
In class, we saw how understanding student ties with two karate powers (the owner and the instructor) in a class could predict the eventual split. Bueno de Mesquita incorporates his research into his program to determine the eventual shifting of powers in the Iran bomb network. The strength of the edges would most likely not have been designated just by “strong” or “weak”, but its strength determined by the values on its connected nodes (whether it’s the average, the sum, or of some unknown function). Over time, the values change on the nodes which shift the strengths of the edges. In class, we saw how game theory applies to two players in games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Matching Pennies and how it applies to a large volume of players such as the Network Traffic Problem in Braess’s Paradox. The 90 players in Bueno de Mesquita’s analysis create a larger scaled game in which the costs and benefits continuously change for each player creating a convoluted and incredibly mathematically complex network. The Nash equilibrium is most likely difficult to determine, but I believe that the program eventually predicts that this is the case: Iran on the verge of developing a bomb but not actually testing one. Iran obtains the utility of becoming a threat in the global power struggle while the other nations keep a relatively hostile nation (in their eyes) from entering the nuclear market.
In a sense, game theory used here acts as a “psychic tool” to predict the likelihood of future occurring events. However, what separates game theory is its reliance on analytical information such as data on human behavior. Bueno de Mesquita has already accurately predicted several political events around the world and in a sense, the Iran bomb crisis, as we currently believe that Iran has not yet tested a nuclear missile. What will game theory eventually bring to the table as national powers shift in the new generations to come?
The Game of Evolution
While we have only scratched the surface of the myriad applications of game theory in class, it is easily seen that the the study and utility of game theory traverses multiple disciplines of study. Beyond the application of game theory for the study of human behavior