Game Theory and the Democratic Debates
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/06/the-weird-game-theory-of-the-first-democratic-debate
Chris Smith’s article, linked above, actually speculates about the September debates which have already taken place. Smith applied the concept of game theory in discussing how candidates (20 at that time) would have to apply principles of game theory to effectively balance substantantive lines with intriguing sound bites to ensure candidates air time. He specifically mentions the candidates hovering around the middle and the bottom of the pack. Those with the single digit polls had much less to lose and theoretically be more inclined to incite controversy by criticizing front runners. Smith also takes time to point out that those in the middle of the pack who effectively are able to strike a balance between effectively standing out and coming across too aggressive and “desperate.” The stakes of this game has been upped as the debates progressed. Now with half the original 20 candidates, all taking the stage at the same time, it is even more important now than ever for those who want to stand out to stand out.
An important point I would like to address is the specific strategies of those in the middle (Buttigieg, Harris, O’Rourke, and Yang) and those off towards the end (Booker, Castro, Klobuchar, Steyer) if they were to throw their weight behind one of the three frontrunners (Biden, Sanders, and Warren). For example, Buttigieg’s could back Biden as he has little faith in a universal healthcare system. This would effectively change the dynamics of the debate and allow us to use cooperative game theory. Even if we were to discount binding agreements, just changing players from single individuals to entire coalitions would impact how the payoffs are distributed among the coalition and change both the entire purpose and outcomes of the debate. In this case, candidates could win more as a part of a coalition than as an individual player. For example, while Steyer is not likely to win the nomination, Steyer would essentially lose less on the front of universal education if Sanders were to win the nomination compared to if Biden wins. Similarly, Yang might want to consider backing Biden as they both explicitly push for zero-net carbon emissions. If each specific political front were to be prioritized, candidates could assess and determine ways in which they can benefit from losing.
This is relevant to class as we’ve discussed how game theory is important in determining which strategy to choose in order to maximize payoff. I decided to attempt to apply these principles to the democratic debates, despite the inability to precisely and consistently quantify payoffs, because the multiple dimensions of payoffs would work really well with the concepts of partition function games. To a certain degree, everyone will eventually be rooting for whoever wins the nomination, as they all reap one of the most important payoffs: the opportunity to unseat President Trump. The semantics, from there on out, will define the rest of the payoff.