In our discussion of Colin Kaepernick, a single issue was bugging me: the question of permissibility. This is not a question of the legal implications of Kaepernick’s acts within the labor law context; it is one of personal opinion, but one I feel may be important in terms of how we approach these discussions. The question of whether or not Kaepernick’s act of kneeling constituted a “permissible” form of protest is fraught with issues, the first being that standard of what is and what is not permissible is always disproportionately applied to people of color. In Kaepernick’s case, there have been a number of acts committed by white players that have ranged from insensitive comments about particular social groups to acts of violence. And yet, when these players commit such acts, they are not dropped by their teams or banned from playing–their acts go unnoticed, and are often not followed up with questions of branding and “image” for the NFL. Which begs the question: Why is Kaepernick’s decision to non-violently protest police brutality such a contentious issue, where acts of extreme violence committed by NFL players is not? If there is a difference in how these acts are received (and there is), how do we then resolve this question? How can we both apply standards that protect the rights of players like Kaepernick to protest, while forcing the NFL to take accountability for the culture it breeds? Perhaps the question should not be whether or not Kaepernick’s action constituted a permissible form of protest, but whether the notion of standards of permissibility are productive, or at risk of being grossly misapplied to shut out future forms of resistance.