Game Theory and the War in Ukraine
Nuclear warfare is a subject that has been fraught with caution ever since the first nuclear weapon was made in 1945. After everyone witnessed the horrifying destruction that came from the two nuclear bombs at the end of World War 2, no more nuclear weapons have been used in warfare since then. However, that does not mean that this topic has been completely avoided. Throughout the Cold War following World War 2, there have been many instances where the two major powers of the time, the USA and the Soviet Union, have come close to using the nuclear weapons at their disposal. There is in fact a wikipedia article on all instances of nuclear close calls (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls). Nowadays in modern times, with the issues over Ukraine, it seems like once again, the rising of tensions have brought up the topic of nuclear warfare between the two sides. In a recent address, Putin warned the countries backing Ukraine about the usage of nuclear weapons, and that Russia had their own arsenal of nuclear weapons that are better and more modern. Although there is no direct intention of using nuclear weapons, the threat is still there, and it may be an option that he may resort to. If the Russian military was defeated in Ukraine, would Putin take the loss gracefully? Or would he resort to something more disastrous?
All of this talk about nuclear warfare ties into the concept of game theory. There are two sides with essentially two choices: use or do not use nuclear weapons. At the beginning, the dominant strategy for both sides would be to not use nuclear weapons. In almost all scenarios, the destruction and chaos that would come from nuclear warfare is strictly detrimental to both sides, and peaceful alternatives are almost always preferred. However, the payoffs for these decisions can change based on circumstances. If one side is heavily losing in a war, would nuclear warfare still be strictly detrimental for them? If they’re pushed to the edge and on the verge of defeat and losing everything, would they still completely refrain from using everything that they have at their disposal? In these scenarios, the dominant strategy of the winning side would still most likely be the same: refrain from using nuclear weapons. However, for the other side, the distinction may become muddier, resulting in no dominant strategy. At that point, they would have to decide on the best response to the situation. At this point, it would heavily depend on circumstances and the beliefs and goals of the side that is losing, but there may be a nonzero chance that the usage of nuclear weapons would be, in their opinion, the best response to the situation. Game theory comes into play quite heavily when dealing with nuclear warfare and warfare in general. What is the best course of action to take in order to come out on top and avoid nuclear warfare? This is a question that could be being asked at this very moment.
References:
Wikipedia link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls