Was the worst coaching decision of all time really a bad decision?
https://www.economist.com/game-theory/2015/02/02/defending-the-indefensible
In 2015, my Seattle Seahawks were playing the New England Patriots in the NFL super bowl. Following a circus catch by wide receiver Jermaine Kearse and a four-yard run by running back Marshawn Lynch, the Seahawks seemed poised to win. Lynch had been the best running back in the NFL that season, and was a large part of why the Seahawks were in position to prove themselves as the best team in football.
Instead, in one of the most derided coaching decisions in history, the Seahawks decided to pass the ball to try to advance it the one yard that separated them from victory. The pass was intercepted and returned for a touchdown, quashing all hopes the Seahawks had of winning a title that year. The players could not defend their coach’s decision in the postgame interviews, and every sports analyst was quick to rip apart the Seahawks’ playcalling on live television the following day.But, was the decision to pass the ball really so unacceptable? A quick turn to game theory might help us find out.
The decision whether to run or to pass can be represented as a minigame with a 2×2 matrix, where if the defense correctly predicts what play will be called, they will be much more prepared to defend against it. An example matrix might look like this:
| Chooses to pass | Chooses to rush | |
| Defends the pass | -2, 2 | 8, -8 |
| Defends the rush | 5, -5 | -1, 1 |
In this matrix, rushing at first seems like the better option, because the payoff is greater if the opponent incorrectly guesses your plan than if you pass and they incorrectly guess your plan. Rushing is also superior if they correctly guess your strategy than passing. However, if you rush 100% of the time, your opponent can simply defend the rush every time, and you will lose the game. The optimal move is a mixed strategy, where you throw some of the time and rush some of the time.
The numbers cited in this article support this conclusion. In situations like these in the past, teams that ran the ball scored on 57.5% of those plays, and teams that passed scored the same amount, down to a tenth of a decimal. One can argue that other factors, such as reduced potential for a turnover, might have been a valid reason to run the ball. The fact is, though, that choosing not to run the ball in this scenario is an acceptable part of establishing a mixed strategy, and should not be considered one of the worst coaching decisions of all time
This relates to what we are learning in class in that it deals with mixed Nash Equilibriums. Because there is no dominant strategy between running and passing the ball, a coach should try to vary which strategy they use in a given situation, rather than going for what seems to be the best at face value every time.