Russia, China, and the United States: Structural Balance Theory and Its Lessons on the Geopolitical Consequences in the World
As a student of Ukrainian-Russian descent born in the United States, the current atrocities, brutality, and further political discussions of the Russian-Ukraine war permeate much of my mental energy. Indeed, whether in conversations with family or through the ingestion of what seems like a never-ending news cycle, a conflict seemingly on the other side of the globe is brought very near and dear to my heart quite frequently. Reading amongst the casualty figures, the daily updates on troop movements, and the various internet commentary on the matter leaves me often asking about the overarching decision-makers of our world: why would Russia do this? How does it impact its relationship with China? How does the US factor into all of this? In reality, and like all things in life, these questions share one common thread: people. People are the driving force of decisions in our world, and their conflicting relationships, motivations, and ultimate decision-making are prime subjects to better understand the real-world implications behind the theoretical exploration of Graph Theory in class.
An article written for the Wilson Center by Kyiv-based author and analyst for the Ukrainian Institute of the Future, Iliya Kusa, describes the new political calculus that Chinese leader Xi Jinping must reconcile with as the Russian-Ukraine war develops and continues to destabilize the region. On one hand, the Western-led response to the conflict, and both the financial and military support that has been provided to Ukraine, indicates the “West’s limits and ‘red lines,” while at the same time providing “valuable information to China on U.S. and EU response mechanisms and on their will to go beyond traditional diplomacy and use unconventional means of exercising pressure”(Kusa 1). On the other hand, “a weakened Russia may drive Moscow away from the West and closer to Beijing as China’s ‘junior partner,’ which is exactly how China has seen the relationship over the years” (Kusa 1). Finally, the author concludes that as China continues to develop its international leadership and presence on the globe, its relationships with various Indo-pacific and African nations must also be considered as such a contentious geopolitical issue continues to proliferate (Kusa 1).
Using the terms and concepts discussed in class, let’s take a look at the conflict through the lens of Graph Theory. Graph Theory builds on previous lectures regarding the “strong” and “weak” ties of nodes by further categorizing nodal relationships as either “positive,” “negative” or “neutral.” Graph Theory also gives us some rules regarding the stability of certain ties: for instance, a triangular nodal structure with three nodes and edges is “balanced” when all three nodes have “positive” relationships, while on the other hand being imbalanced when all three nodes have “negative” relationships. In the context of the Russian, Chinese and Western relationship, Kusa speaks generally of the positive relationship between Russia and China, while referencing their shared negative attitude towards the West, creating a shape that is structurally balanced in nature. At the same time, when looking at the Chinese relationship with external parties and alliances, their developing positive relationship is a similar approach to the United States and the West (with each nation seeking to court the political and economic favor of other nations, even with a “negative” political Chinese-Western relationship). By looking at any one nation, for instance, we see two “positive” relationships and one “negative” relationship shared between the West and China, leading to another example of Structural Balance Theory.
While such examples are simple microcosms of geopolitical relationships at the nation-state level, relationships between geographic alliances lend perfect evidence of the stability and instability inherent within the Structural Balance Theory. For instance, if a group of nodes share “positive” edges across all of their relationships (as a cluster) and share “negative” edges across the cluster to another cluster of positively-edged nodes, that confirms an example of the Structural Balance Theory. A good historical example of this could be the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship during the Cold War, as each nation would support their member-states through a collectivized security treaty in a direct contest with the opposing block (making the network Structurally Balanced). In reality, however, Structurally Balanced alliance structures imply a static geopolitical landscape: as nations rise and fall and their power grows or shrinks, nothing truly is ever permanently structurally balanced in the grand scheme of things. For instance, Hungary, a traditional NATO-member and Western nation has continuously courted Russian attention in order to gain access to cheap oil and natural gas and develop a more positive “working” relationship. While the rest of the alliance has attempted to wean of its traditional energy dependence with Russia, this has created inherit instability in the network as fellow NATO members criticize and in some instances seek punishment for Hungary’s approach to the conflict.
The motivations of our world leaders are oftentimes complex, inconsistent, or simply impossible to accurately predict all the time. However, the analysis of nation-to-nation relationships as they pertain to networks in the Graph Theory may shine further insight as to how relationships form, adapt, and change over time.
Sources used in this blog post:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-strategic-calculations-russia-ukraine-war