Game Theory: the Deadliest Game
Roy Lindelauf, an assistant professor in Quantitative Intelligence Analysis at the Netherland Defense Academy, writes about the game theory involved in nuclear deterrence in his chapter of the Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies. Lindelauf explains that many game theory models developed in the onset of nuclear buildup have since become outdated and obsolete. While these models have been overly criticized by many theorists over the years, game theory can still be correctly used in the broader aspects of nuclear deterrence. However, every expert will admit that their theoretic models cannot possibly take into account all the peculiarities involved in decision making and therefore be an accurate model of such situations. Essentially, the failures of most commonly used game and decision models occur due to the increasingly multifaceted and complex state of world affairs, with many details not having been accounted for. The main flaw with game theory is that theoretical models determine what a decision maker should do given a certain situation and not what a decision maker actually does, nor what his opponents actually do. It is therefore predominantly important to recognize and account for the dynamic relationships between all players in the game of nuclear strategy. The historical aspects of nuclear deterrence have also shown to help counter theorists’ human cognitive biases. Finally, the increasingly autonomous nature of nuclear defense systems points to a future with a much more algorithm-based approach to the nuclear game. Therefore, what Lindelauf calls “rational deterrence theory” will always play a defining role in the nuclear landscape.
The relevance of Lindelauf’s academic paper needs no introduction. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war and the fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, have kept the world on edge, with the fear of a nuclear outbreak coming back once again. Both the invasion of Ukraine and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan have tested game theory models of deterrence to the fullest extent. During the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, military experts and strategists around the world agreed the war would be over within days. The “wins and losses” predicted for both sides have since never been more wrong. But while we seem focused on Ukraine’s exceptional defense, many forget that the game of nuclear deterrence dominated the days leading up to the invasion. The likelihood of evident escalation set against subsequent theorized de-escalation was a key factor in Russia and Ukraine’s zero sum game. However, in game theory, when locked in a zero sum game, one side’s win is the other’s loss, which can more easily sabotage than fortify negotiations. While Russia has only used the nuclear threat as a scare tactic so far, nuclear deterrence remains all but active on both sides in the Ukrainian war theater. The Taiwan strait crisis shares both similarities and differences with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Both the United States and China are nuclear powers with a history of deadlocks involving Taiwan. However, while Russia escalated to the point of all out war, Pelosi’s visit, originally thought by many to be the final straw in the game of escalation, ended up leading to more escalation rather than an invasion of Taiwan, let alone military conflict between the United States and China. In summary, game theory seems to fail in many aspects in the current game of nuclear deterrence. Yet as Lindelauf theorizes, rational deterrence theory still holds true, or it would have already been “game over.”
Work cited: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_22