Love Is Just A Game
“Love is just a game that everybody plays
And when the game is over, not everybody pay”
(Love Is Just A Game, Larry Galtin)
From Hinge to Grindr, online dating has monopolized dating into a multidimensional game with two players at its core. Nobody is a stranger to playing different strategies to secure a date. The methods to secure a date have no numerical value—these values vary and are subjective at best. However, non-numerical values do not stop economists from analyzing the best response and dominant strategies when talking to other people.
Throughout the two articles, authors Christina Gravert and Manu Dal Borgo made similar claims and analyses of the dominant strategies during the talking phase of dating. Primarily, they focused on online dating via apps such as Tinder, Hinge, Bumble, and Grindr; each author’s unique analysis helps readers develop their matrix with two players.
Christina Gravert offered possible strategies in response to a potential date, such as creating a profile rooted in separating strategy. Creating a profile embedded in a separating strategy is a strategy that highlights strongly desirable traits. Thus, one can distinguish oneself from others in the dating pool. While pooling strategy ambiguously highlights strongly desirable characteristics. An example of a separating strategy could be an individual’s Ph.D. in literature. An example of a pooling strategy could be an individual hiding their Ph.D. degree by writing the university they attended. Both methods are valid with different payoffs. A separating strategy may be helpful to target a specific type of person, but the results may yield a limited amount of people to date or nobody at all. While the pooling strategy may make one seem casual or aloof, it makes room for an engaging conversation about traits or hobbies that were not mentioned on an individual profile. Thus, the dominant strategy highly depends on what a person values. Furthermore, the payoff matrix would have no concrete numbers but rather, the value of each payoff is given by a player’s strategy and the response from the other player.
Manu Dal Borgo offered an analysis of dominant strategies through evolutionary game theory. The author focused on the side-blotched lizard in California, which are divided into three different kinds of mating and dating strategies regardless of sex— “harem-minder” (polygamous), “sneakers” (monogamous but seeking others for sex), and “monogamous.” Over time various generational trends of mating prevail. Although the immediate payoff may not be obvious, an evolutionarily and historical comparison of lizard mating can be analogous to human dating. For example, a payoff of institutional monogamy in human society reduces criminal activities and unmarried individuals in communities where harem-minders are normal. While in side-botched lizards, monogamous mating results in more territorial/living space for others. Thus, the payoff is a function over time that benefits society and cultures.
Authors Manu Dal Borgo and Christina Gravert analyzed dating as a game. Although all authors wrote about dominant strategies in terms of game theory, their analytical lenses were different. For example, Christina Gravert analyzed dominant strategies in dating based on interpersonal values through separating and pooling strategies. On the other hand, Christina Gravert analyzed the dominant strategy in the mating pattern of side-botched lizards parallel to human dating. The payoff matrix in both instances will differ because the inputs are non-numerical. Yet, it is still possible to analyze the multidimensional game of dating when there are two players with various strategies, which is the core of Game Theory.
Articles of Interest:
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