The Inconsistencies of Sanctions: Iran’s Story
Devin Hegelein writes:
While those who ascribe to the traditional view of sanctions will tout the act as nearly fool-proof way to destabilize and punish a rogue state without the gruesomeness of full-on warfare, modern literature on the subject makes the final verdict on the effectiveness of sanctions debatable. A wealth of information exists on the debate over the efficacy of sanctions to produce the desired results, but I will be analyzing this debate in the context of Iran. Since the overthrow of the Western-backed Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the United States has instituted sanctions against Iran with near-perfect consistency, and I will be analyzing the different types of sanctions, their context within the international setting, and their context within Iran’s domestic sphere to determine which are most effective [1].
During this time of increasing tension between the greater international community and pariah states like Iran and North Korea, which are continuing their unrelenting pursuit of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly important to implement policies that will guarantee success. In the United States, the decision to adopt sanctions as a policy can manifest in one of two ways. The first way is through executive order – this is when the President authorizes certain departments of government to act in a way that prohibits trade with Iran, while also decreeing that no individuals may engage in trade with Iran [2]. Legislation is another form of enacting sanctions. These sanctions are often broader in scope, and when these two forms of sanctions work in tandem, they generally produce a more effective result [3]. The impetus for choosing to create sanctions may come from an actor entirely separate from the government – public policy institutions. These institutions, also known as think tanks, often provide research and Congressional testimonies to provide evidence that sanctions may, or may not, be the best course of action.
As previously mentioned, the efficacy of sanctions is subject to some degree of debate. Obviously there is considerable evidence to support the claim that sanctions are the most effective means of deterrence as war is both costly and unpopular, hence its use today to (hopefully) prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. However, points of contention arise from a few topics. First, if the sanctions are unilateral, meaning only the United States is choosing to enforce sanctions, then it is unlikely that the sanctions will be as effective. Suppose the United States chooses ban banks from loaning to Iranian companies – if the sanctions are unilateral, Iran can receive funding from any number of other international banks whose governments have not chosen to impose sanctions. Questions of morality also arise when considering the effects of sanctions on the Iranian population – are sanctions really going to affect the government, or is it more likely to cause harm to the Iranian people. While proponents of sanctions would likely argue that the harsh economic conditions that the general populace endures while sanctions are imposed is part of the effectiveness of sanctions to destabilize and potentially overthrow an undesirable regime, those in opposition would argue that the United States has a moral obligation to provide certain goods – such as medicine for example – on a moral basis.
On the surface sanctions may appear simple, a panacea for disciplining belligerent tyrants, but this is far from true. To emulate the effectiveness of present-day Iranian sanctions in the future, I will compare previous attempts to create effective sanctions to present day sanctions to determine a more effective means of using sanctions as a detterent.
—
[1]Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions.” Congressional Research Service. Jan. 10, 2013. Pg. 1.
[2]“Executive Order from the President regarding Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to Iran.” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Oct. 9, 2012.
[3]Baker & McKenzie, “U.S. Congress enacts additional sanctions targeting Iran.” January 31, 2013.
Recent Comments: