January 11, 2012
by Annelise Riles

The Contract as Machine

Yesterday I spoke about Collateral Knowledge at the Saint Louis University Law School.  One member of the audience, a former general counsel of a hedge fund with extensive experience with ISDA agreements, raised a great question:

Q: You talk about how ISDA agreements create a kind of settled system of private market governance outside the purview of the state. But there is so much that is undecided or in flux about ISDA agreement. All the key terms are in the attached schedules and other negotiable aspects of the agreement and those are left to the parties. So it is not nearly standardized enough.  (The implication of the question for the thesis of the book, then, was that private law beyond the state may be much less effective, or authoritative, than I suggest).

Great question. Here is my answer in a nutshell.

It is absolutely correct that, from the point of view of users of ISDA agreements such as this speaker, all the important stuff is in the schedules and other negotiable portions of the agreement. And that is the very intent of technologies like the master agreement–to draw users’ attention to certain questions, only.  In fact, I found that many users of ISDA master agreements don’t even know what the rest of the document says in much detail–they just focus on the parts that need to be filled out. This is why I describe the contract as a machine (something meant to be used) rather than a text (something meant to be read).

However, your point really just confirms the power of this technology! Because look what it has done–it has convinced you that the only really salient issues, the only important issues, are the ones it intends you to focus on.  But in fact there are many other potentially significant issues that are entirely determined by the boilerplate, and industry practice, effectuated through this document, is to treat those issues as entirely settled and noncontestable.  This is what Gramsci calls hegemony: when something is so much of a given, so generally accepted, that it is unthinkable as a potential source of conflict or contestation. Talk about a tremendous political achievement.

April 21, 2011
by Annelise Riles

Raising questions about close-out netting

stock market chartEarlier this month, Stephen Lubben at Dealbook posted an interesting piece querying whether there may be hidden costs associated with giving banks huge breaks in their capitalization requirements under Basel III for close-out netting, the clause in the ISDA master agreement that provides that under a long list of specified conditions such as bankruptcy, reorganization, nationalization and so on, one of the parties to a swap transaction can demand that the two sides close out all their obligations and net them all out.  As I explain in detail in my book, Collateral Knowledge, the reason the parties want to do this is that under modern bankruptcy law, even if Bank A cannot pay Bank B because it is bankrupt, Bank B is still obligated to pay Bank A.  If the two sides have netted out their obligations though, the amount Bank B owes Bank A in this situation will be much less–it’s obligation minus whatever Bank A owed it but couldn’t pay.

One chapter of my book is devoted to the events surrounding the passing of a Netting Law in Japan that would guarantee that netting was enforceable.  At the time, ISDA, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, was busy pushing such laws through in every major jurisdiction in which derivatives trading occurred. And as Lubben says, everyone in the industry asserts that netting is a universal good. In fact, in the entire period of my research I never heard a single person–not a regulator, not a market participant, not even an academic specializing in derivatives–suggest that there were any possible costs associated with netting. But as my research progressed I became increasingly curious about some of the possible costs. Indeed, ISDA’s furious drive to get netting laws passed all around the world suggested to me that someone at ISDA had to believe that there were at least some judges out there who, faced with a case about the enforceability of close-out netting agreements, might see enough costs there to decide to hold the agreements unenforceable. And yet when I queried people about these issues–even people without a direct pecuniary stake in the matter such as academics and bureaucrats–the question was just dismissed again and again as completely out of left field.

Lubben focuses on one possible problem with close-out netting, the fact that the parties can invoke the clause under the contract for a laundry list of reasons, not simply for actual bankruptcy. His concern is that “letting everyone rush to the exits in time of financial crisis” increases systemic risk.  I am not sure if this is as big of a problem in practice as it appears to be on paper.  My research documents numerous occasions in which parties could have invoked the terms of the netting clause but chose not to do so for a variety of interesting and complicated reasons relating to their calculation of what was in their long term best interest. One of the things I try to do in the book is to show how distant law in the document may be from law in practice in the financial markets and this is an example.

However I have another kind of concern about netting agreements. What I think Lubben is really getting at in his comment is that they run an end game around national bankruptcy laws. This means not only that the parties get to liquidate their agreements for reasons that would not be valid under the bankruptcy law but also that in cases of real bankruptcy or reorganization the parties get out of the rules governing who gets paid first. Under the bankruptcy laws of every country I know, swap counter parties would be close to the end of the line of creditors to be paid in bankruptcy.  In other words citizens, through their legislatures, have decided that when there is not enough money left in a bank to pay everyone, others–secured creditors, employees, and so on–should be paid first. Moreover if you compare the class of creditors who would be paid first with the average class of swap counter parties you will find that the former are more local–employees, landlords, tax authorities–while the latter are far more likely to be offshore. But yet netting says forget all that, swap counter parties’ claims come first, before we even get to the bankruptcy priority list. No wonder ISDA members were worried some judges might not see things their way.

And yet in Japan where I did my research there was absolutely no public debate about the netting law. No NGO took up the issue; no bankruptcy law professors raised any concerns; the opposition did not even raise any questions about it. Perhaps it is not too late, in the context of Basel III, to simply begin to ask whether the benefits to market stability entailed in netting really do outweigh the very serious social costs. That would require at least beginning to recognize what those costs are however.

December 15, 2009
by Annelise Riles

Regulatory Compliance in the Global Financial Markets: What is it? How do we get it?

On December 10, Annelise Riles gave a presentation on the lessons of anthropological research for global financial regulation at the US Treasury Department. Here is an outline of some of the key points of her presentation.

Skip to toolbar