Category Archives: 2003-2011

• Arab Awakening, • Pro-Democracy Movements in the Middle East, 2003-2011, Afghanistan, Arab Spring, Archives, bin Laden documents, Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), Iraq War, Islam, Pakistan, Primary Sources, Reference, Revolution in the Arab world, Revolution in the Middle East, Salafis, Salafists, Translated News from the Middle East

17 bin Laden documents / Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)

وثائق بن لادن

Seventeen of the of the 6,000 documents seized from the compound of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 were released May 3, 2012. The documents – provided by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), and totalling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation:

* Original Arabic (.zip) باللغة العربية

* English Translations (.zip) باللغة الانجليزية

نشرت يوم الخميس، 3 أيار/مايو، 17 وثيقة من أصل آلاف الوثائق التي عثر عليها في مجمع أسامة بن لادن في أيار/مايو 2011، بعد يوم على الذكرى الأولى لمقتل زعيم القاعدة

وتصف الوثائق التي نشرها مركز مكافحة الارهاب، ويبلغ عددها 175 صفحة باللغة العربية و197 صفحة مترجمة إلى الانجليزية، آليات عمل التنظيم الداخلية ومنها خلافات داخلية ونصائح للجماعات المرتبطة بالتنظيم ومخاوف لقادة بارزين فيه

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point website has provided the following summary:

This report is a study of 17 de-classified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several leaders, most prominently Usama bin Ladin. In contrast to his public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of Bin Ladin’s private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers”. He is at pain advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 de-classified documents. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.

 

The 17 documents totaled nearly 200 pages in their English translation. The earliest one is dated 2006. The latest is from 2011, according to the center. Here are the 17 documents and summaries, which were based on a CTC document that accompanied the release of the bin Laden letters.

Text of Document 1

Summary: Bin Laden asks for a lengthy version of Anwar al-Awlaqi’s resume.

Text of Document 2

Summary: American Qaida spokesman Adam Gadahn writes on a media strategy for the anniversary of 9/11.

Text of Document 3 

Summary: Bin Laden declines al-Shababa’s request for unity with al-Qaida.

Text of Document 4

Summary: This letter suggests that al-Qaida’s relationship with other terror groups was the subject of internal debate.

Text of Document 5

Summary: This letter is written by Mahmud al-Hasan (Atiyya) and criticizes the tactics of Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Text of Document 6

Summary: Jaysh al-Islam and Atiyya write back and forth on financial matters and legal advice.

Text of Document 7

Summary: This letter is part of another that was not released to CTC, but the author is concerned about al-Qaida’s image. The author was also concerned that because the name al-Qaida lacks religious overtones, the U.S. is able to wage war against the group without offending all Muslims.

Text of Document 8

Summary: Bin Laden lays out his views of the Arab Spring. The letter is dated a week before the raid that killed him.

Text of Document 9

Summary: This letter is addressed to a legal scholar who is alarmed with the conduct of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Text of Document 10

Summary: Atiyya wrote this letter addressed to the sheik, possibly bin Laden. The letter addresses the release of jihadi “brothers” from Iran.

Text of Document 11

Summary: The CTC summary says this document shows al-Qaida’s editing process: An unknown editor (possibly bin Laden) marks up statements form Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Text of Document 12

Summary: This document has two letters that, according to CTC, “read very much like an intelligence assessment, designed to provide Atiyya with some perspective on al-Qaida generally and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) more specifically.”

Text of Document 13

Summary: This letter focuses on issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also mentions the organization’s media plan for the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

Text of Document 14

Summary: The author of this letter, possibly bin Laden, Atiyya, or both of them, advises al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to focus attacks on the U.S., not Yemen’s government.

Text of Document 15

Summary: This letter focuses on strategy and the need for the group to attack the United States.

Text of Document 16

Summary: This letter is critical of bin Laden and urges him to change al-Qaida’s policy. The author says that people are now repulsed by the term jihad.

Text of Document 17

Summary: This is a long letter written by bin Laden in which he discusses his concern over the mistakes that regional jihadi groups have made.

*****

RELATED:

Key Documents — Al Qaeda & Jihadi Movements Worldwide (volumes 1-50)

Reference Corporation’s on-going Al Qaeda & Jihadi Movements Worldwide (AQJM) reference series, in early 2011, in 50 volumes, has several built-in finding guides to assist researchers. One finding guide is the Key Documents list, a bibliography with extensive cross references and scope notes. However, Key Documents is a large document and cannot be reprinted in every new incremental set of AQJM reference books. For example, the Key Documents list in the cumulative index to the first twenty volumes of AQJM is over 120 pages long. AQJM for volumes 1-50 is 332 pages long.

To make Key Documents more useful, this downloadable Key Documents list is cumulative for all AQJM volumes and will always be current.

This Key Documents edition is a cumulative finding aid for AQJM volumes 1-50

2003-2011, Iraq, Iraq War, News & Current Events, Reference

Iraq War: 2003-2011

U.S. Marks End to a Long War for an Uncertain Iraq

By TIM ARANGO; Reporting was contributed by Jack Healy, Michael S. Schmidt, Andrew E. Kramer, Duraid Adnan, Omar al-Jawoshy and an employee of  The New York Times.
2103 words
16 December 2011
NYTF
Late Edition – Final
1
English
Copyright 2011 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.

BAGHDAD — At a crowded market in the city center here, the flotsam of the war is for sale. Ripped Fuel workout supplement. Ready-to-eat meals, macaroni and cheese ”Mexican style.” Pistol holsters. Nothing seems off limits to the merchants out for a quick dinar, not even a bottle of prescription pills from a pharmacy in Waco, Tex., probably tossed out by a departing soldier.

The concrete blast walls that shielded the shopping stalls have lately come down. Since then, three explosions have struck the market, killing several people.

”This will be an easy target for car bombs,” said Muhammad Ali, a merchant who lost two brothers during the cruelest times of the conflict. ”People will die here.”

After nearly nine years, about 4,500 American fatalities and $1 trillion, America’s war in Iraq is about to end. Officials marked the finish on Thursday with a modest ceremony at the airport days before the last troops take the southern highway to Kuwait, going out as they came in, to conclude the United States’ most ambitious and bloodiest military campaign since Vietnam.

For the United States, the war leaves an uncertain legacy as Americans weigh what may have been accomplished against the price paid, with so many dead and wounded. The Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, was vanquished, but the failure to find illicit weapons undermined the original rationale, leaving a bitter taste as casualties mounted. The lengthy conflict and repeated deployments strained the country and its resources, raising questions about America’s willingness to undertake future wars on such a grand scale.

Iraqis will be left with a country that is not exactly at war, and not exactly at peace. It has improved in many ways since the 2007 troop ”surge,” but it is still a shattered country marred by violence and political dysfunction, a land defined on sectarian lines whose future, for better or worse, is now in the hands of its people. …

—[MORE] Leaving Iraq / The New York Times

SEE ALSO:

Multilateral and bilateral SOFAs — Provisions of Status of Forces Agreements — Security arrangements and SOFAs — Bilateral SOFAs : historical practice — Prospective SOFA with Iraq — Survey of the current Status of Forces Agreements.

The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. In light of the Declaration of Principles, signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, and the possibility that the United States will enter into a SOFA with the Government of Iraq, there is considerable interest in Congress in SOFAs, what they may cover, and how they have been concluded in the past. Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement; rather, it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements.

On November 26, 2007, President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki co-signed the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, which set out a number of issues concerning, among other things, a security agreement between the United States and Iraq. Since the announcement, the Administration has announced that there will be two agreements negotiated, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) providing the legal basis between the two countries for the continued presence and operation of U.S. armed forces in Iraq once the U.N. Security Council mandate expires on December 31, 2008, and a Strategic Framework agreement (together with the SOFA, the Iraq Agreements or Agreements) to cover the overall bilateral relationship between the two countries. Several Members of Congress responded with demands that Congress be involved in creating the planned Agreements, from negotiation to implementation, and took action to ensure such involvement. Congress has proposed numerous pieces of legislation that would increase its role in creating these Agreements, from calling for executive-branch consultation and reporting to requiring formal congressional approval. It has also conducted multiple hearings that have concerned the proposed Agreements, receiving clarification on many important issues from Administration officials and experts. This has also equipped Congress with information pertinent to deciding what further action can be taken to involve Congress more in the agreement-making process. Several options remain available to Congress regarding the Iraq Agreements.