The tiny snail darter

TVA v. Hill, often noted for its importance in shaping environmental law, is also a key case in statutory interpretation law. The case involves the conflict between finishing the Tellico Dam and Reservoir, a project of the Tennessee Valley Authority that many characterized as pork-barrel spending, and protecting the habitat of the rare snail darter fish. Although the Supreme Court's decision halted construction of the nearly finished dam, Congress subsequently passed legislation ordering completion of the reservoir project. Drawing on key legislative materials and judicial documents, Professor Elizabeth Garrett shows how this case illuminates the interactions among the three branches of government on a question of statutory interpretation. Participants in all branches of government were keenly aware of the involvement of the other governmental actors and made their decisions in light of expected reactions by others. This chapter traces the Tennessee Valley Authority's decision to build the Tellico Dam and the years of congressional attention to the project through the annual appropriations process; details the litigation brought to stop the dam by a law professor and his students; and analyzes legislative reactions to the Supreme Court decision interpreting the Endangered Species Act to protect the snail darter's habitat. The story of TVA v. Hill illustrates that, despite internal rules discouraging appropriations riders and the judicial canon disfavoring such provisions, Congress can achieve its purposes by passing a clearly worded provision within the text of annual appropriations bills.

Elizabeth Garrett*

The Story of TVA v. Hill: Congress Has the Last Word

TVA v. Hill has shaped statutory interpretation law, as well as environmental law. The case resolved—but only temporarily—the conflict between finishing the Tellico Dam and Reservoir, a project that would be the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) last dam, and protecting the habitat of the unlovely but rare snail darter fish. Others have told the story from the environmental law perspective; the importance of the case for statutory interpretation demands a different narrative emphasis. To students of interpretation, the case is known first for its emphasis on the plain meaning of the text of the relevant statute, although the Supreme Court's majority opinion also spent pages analyzing the legislative history. This "soft" plain meaning rule has been contrasted with the more rigorous textualism of some current influential

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justices and judges. Second, *TVA v. Hill* embraced the canon that appropriations acts should be construed narrowly. Third, the congressional reaction to the Supreme Court case is cited as an example of a successful legislative override of a relatively extreme judicial outcome. When the Court stopped construction of the Tellico Dam after the expenditure of more than $106 million of taxpayer money and with the project essentially complete, Congress quickly established a process to exempt projects from the strictures of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). When that failed to force completion of the Tellico Dam, Congress specifically instructed the TVA to close the gates of the dam and create the reservoir.

*TVA v. Hill* provides a case study of interactions among the three branches of government: the executive branch, mainly the TVA, but also parts of the cabinet and the president himself; the legislature, including appropriations committees, committees with jurisdiction over environmental laws, and key party leaders; and the federal judiciary—all the way to the Supreme Court. It is clear from legislative materials and judicial documents that the players were keenly aware of the involvement of the other governmental actors and that they made their decisions in light of expected reactions by others. The justices knew when they stopped the completion of the dam that a proposal to establish a process to exempt some public projects from the seemingly absolute language of the ESA was moving through Congress—a proposal designed in part to resolve the Tellico Dam situation.

The story of *TVA v. Hill* begins with the TVA's decision to build the dam. The agency's connections to congressional appropriators and regional political forces allowed it to persevere with the project even though the cost-benefit analysis supporting it was unconventional and, to many, unpersuasive. The dam was not mainly designed to produce power for the region, to enhance navigation, or to mitigate the threat of floods; rather, it was built to enhance economic development. This was a "new mission" for the agency.

Second, the story will detail the litigation brought to stop the Tellico Dam, first because TVA had not produced an environmental impact statement as demanded by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and then, more successfully, because completing the dam would destroy the habitat of the endangered snail darter, an action prohibited by the ESA. Both these environmental statutes were new, passed after Congress began appropriating funds to build the Tellico Dam. The story will focus not on the substance of the environmental law, but on how all three branches of government interacted throughout the lawsuit and made decisions with an awareness of activities occurring simultaneously in other governmental forums.

Finally, the story concludes with two legislative reactions to the Supreme Court decision. The congressional response to *TVA v. Hill* demonstrates that the legislative branch will often get its way in the context of water projects, the quintessential examples of what some call "pork" and others characterize as the result of legislators representing the best interests of their constituents. Congress prevailed through a rider slipped into the text of an appropriations bill that explicitly directed the TVA to complete the Tellico reservoir "notwithstanding the provisions of [the ESA] or any other law." Ironically, unlike the earlier appropriations process that had been conducted in public with the knowledge of key legislators, this rider was added quietly on the floor of the House. However, by the time the bill was passed and the president reluctantly decided not to veto it, it was widely known that it would end our story.

**TVA: A Powerful Agency at a Crossroads**

**Creation of the TVA and Its Early Years**

The Tennessee Valley Authority, created in 1933, is a New Deal agency designed to ensure the economic development of the Tennessee River basin, an area plagued by poverty even before the Great Depression. The region had high, entrenched unemployment; the cash income of a family living there averaged less than $100 a year; and regular devastating floods exacerbated the grueling conditions. Its inhabitants had been largely overlooked by the political forces in the states through which the 650-mile Tennessee River flowed. By creating the TVA, President Franklin Roosevelt hoped to revitalize the region through  

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“regional planning on a scale never before attempted in history.” The act directed the TVA to provide flood control, to facilitate navigation, and to produce electric power for the region. Congress envisioned that one of the TVA’s most effective tools to achieve these goals would be the construction of dams and reservoirs along the Tennessee River. More broadly, section 22 of the act delegated to the president the authority, within the limits of congressional appropriations, “to make such surveys of and general plans for said Tennessee basin . . . for the general purpose of fostering an orderly and proper physical, economic and social development” of the region.12 In addition to the objectives of flood control, navigation, and power production, section 23 identified as a purpose of the act improving “the economic and social well-being of the people living in said river basin.”13 Roosevelt delegated the responsibility of implementing these sections to the TVA.14

The TVA is not a typical federal administrative agency; it is a government corporation led by a three-member board of directors. Several reasons motivated this choice of form: The TVA would be engaged in activities typically performed by corporations, such as the production and sale of power and fertilizer; the national sentiment during the Great Depression was to experiment with structures that were not constrained by a bureaucratic organization and could thus aggressively pursue economic recovery policies; and the goal of the TVA act was largely to insulate the agency from politics so it could be primarily guided by expertise and progressive policies.15

The organizational autonomy enjoyed by the TVA led to dynamics that shaped the intergovernmental interactions in our story. For example, once the TVA board decided to build a dam or pursue a development project, it did not need congressional authorization to go forward; it merely had to obtain funding from the appropriations committees.16 Therefore, the TVA’s closest connection with Congress was through the

13. Id. at § 831v.
16. Murchison, supra note 2, at 10. After World War II, the TVA no longer had to seek appropriations for power projects because it was allowed to issue bonds for that purpose. Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 14. The Tellico Dam project, which was not primarily designed to produce electric power, required congressional appropriations to go forward.

appropriators. The TVA was generally not required to coordinate with other agencies as it went forward with dam construction, power production, or agricultural improvement.17 Thus, the TVA had little experience with, and even less patience for, the framework of coordination and consultation mandated by the environmental laws. The TVA was a hybrid of both a federal agency, with lobbying clout in Washington, D.C., and a regional planning agency, with close connections to state politicians, businesspeople, and community leaders. These linkages would be important to its ability to finish the Tellico Dam, but all would be strained by the years of controversy. Finally, the agency was used to winning in court when its power was challenged18; the success of plaintiffs throughout the Tellico Dam litigation surprised and frustrated the TVA’s leaders.

The TVA’s early success in developing the Tennessee River basin and producing affordable power for the region helped establish its reputation as a clear success of the New Deal. By the end of World War II, the TVA produced more electricity than any other integrated system in the United States,19 and it had built major dams at most of the locations along the basin necessary for flood control or capable of producing significant amounts of hydroelectric power. In its first twenty years, it also fulfilled most of its charge to improve navigation by building a nine-foot channel from Paducah, Kentucky, to Knoxville, Tennessee—650 miles from the Ohio River up the Tennessee River.20 It enjoyed the strong support of politicians in all the states affected by its projects and of their congressional delegations.

The Decision to Pursue the Tellico Dam Project

By the 1950s, however, the TVA was at a crossroads. It had completed virtually all of the water-improvement program that it had outlined to Congress at its inception, and it had expanded its power program past hydroelectric power to include nuclear and coal plants.21 In the early 1960s, the TVA board chairman, Aubrey “Red” Wagner—who had spent his career at the TVA beginning as a field engineer and working his way up through the general-manager position before joining the board in 1961—wanted to reclaim the idealism of the agency’s founding and demonstrate that the TVA offered the region more than

17. Doremus, supra note 2, at 110.
18. See Dean Hill Rivkin, TVA, the Courts, and the Public Interest, in TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-roots Bureaucracy, supra note 6, at 194-206.
21. Drose, supra note 19, at 77-80.
cheap power. He emphasized the broad development and planning goals articulated in sections 22 and 23 of the TVA act, and he envisioned using dams and reservoirs as a way to improve the economic conditions of the region.22

In what some scholars have termed an embrace of a "new mission" for the TVA and others have characterized as returning the TVA to the focus on broad planning and development goals articulated by President Roosevelt,23 Wagner and his team began to develop plans to build the Tellico Dam and Reservoir on the Little Tennessee River, a tributary of the Tennessee River. This project was justified primarily by the industrial and recreational opportunities it would bring to the region; its impact on flood control was minimal, and its contribution to power generation small. Agency supporters of the project were encouraged by President John Kennedy's support of public works projects to stimulate employment and economic development24; regional politicians were also certain to support a project that would bring construction jobs to the district and offered the promise of more jobs and economic activity after completion.

The area that would be flooded by the Tellico Dam was almost exclusively agricultural, containing relatively small farms worked by more than 300 families.25 Building the dam would destroy the last 33 miles of flowing river in the region, a place beloved by sportspeople fishing for trout and by families enjoying float trips. It also would eliminate places of historical and archaeological interest. For example, the Cherokees had lived in the Little Tennessee Valley before being sent west on the Trail of Tears.26 The TVA leadership believed that the region would be more prosperous, however, if it created a reservoir around which industry, residential communities, and recreational opportunities could develop. The reservoir would be connected by a canal to the power plant at the Fort Loudon Dam, but it would add relatively little additional capacity to the TVA system.27 The canal would also allow barge traffic to move from the Tellico Reservoir into the Tennessee River.

The Kennedy administration was favorably inclined toward public works projects, but it required that projects be justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.28 Most of the TVA's early projects could easily pass muster because of substantial benefits in flood control, navigation, and power production, but the Tellico Dam required more creative rationales. Wagner pushed his staff to provide such justifications, relying on questionable estimates of recreational benefits of yet another reservoir in a region full of TVA-created lakes, optimistic projections of industrial development, and the slim possibility of construction of a planned model town (a possibility that evaporated when Boeing pulled out of discussions in 1975).29 Because so much of the project's benefits turned on land enhancement flowing from economic development, a favorable cost-benefit formula depended on the TVA's condemning substantially more property than it needed for the reservoir and then selling that land at a profit to developers. Ultimately, the Tellico project resulted in the taking of 38,000 acres, with only 13,500 acres required for the reservoir. That amount of land acquisition drove up the costs of the project, but it also increased benefits under the aggressive assumptions of land-value enhancement derived from optimistic projections of shoreline economic development.30

Seeking the Initial Funding for the Tellico Dam and Reservoir

After board approval in 1963, Wagner and the TVA were ready to ask Congress for an appropriation to begin building the Tellico Dam; President Lyndon Johnson's fiscal year 1966 budget contained a request for $5.775 million. Representative Joe Evans (D-Tenn.) from the state's fourth congressional district, the chairman of the Public Works Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, was a longtime ally of the TVA. But in the first of many setbacks for the builders of Tellico Dam, Evans refused to support the appropriation, insisting instead that the funding be diverted to the Tims Ford Dam project in his district. The TVA supported both projects, but the Johnson administration had required it choose one for that year's budget because of the pressure on domestic spending. The "TVA had hoped to get Tellico underway first, because there was some local opposition to the dam and because the cost-benefit analysis was problematic.

Evins had an ally in opposing Tellico Dam in his Senate counterpart, Allen Ellender (D-La.), who chaired that chamber's Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee. Ellender was generally less friendly to the TVA and questioned the aggressive land-acquisition policy required for the

22. Gray & Johnson, supra note 20, at 77.
23. Compare Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 6, at 170, with Gray & Johnson, supra note 20, at 77.
25. Flater, Environmental Law Paradigm, supra note 2, at 809.
27. See Doremus, supra note 2, at 116 (capacity would increase only 22 megawatts; system capacity was greater than 22,000 megawatts).
29. Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 182-83.
30. For a discussion of the challenges that the TVA had to surmount to demonstrate a positive cost-benefit ratio, see General Accounting Office, The Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam Project—Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits, EMD 77-58, 26-36 (Oct. 14, 1977); Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
Tellico project to pass cost-benefit muster. Although Ellender and a few other legislators would continue to question the assumptions underlying the favorable cost-benefit analysis for Tellico Dam, Evins agreed to support an appropriation the following year once his district was met—his objection was pragmatic, not principled. The powerful House chairman was able to deliver on that promise in the fiscal year 1967 budget, ensuring that $3.2 million was available to begin construction of the Tellico project, estimated to be completed by 1970 or 1971.\textsuperscript{31}

The appropriations for Tims Ford Dam and Tellico Dam were not detailed in the text of the appropriations bill, which allocated a lump sum to the TVA sufficient to cover all the approved projects for the fiscal year.\textsuperscript{32} Instead, legislators earmarked funds in the committee reports accompanying the bill, which is the practice with most federal appropriations bills.\textsuperscript{33} Although language in a conference report is not binding law, agencies tend to bow to that legislative history closely. After all, as the interaction with Representative Evins demonstrated, members of Congress pay attention to how agencies deploy their funds. Agencies that follow congressional instructions will be rewarded with further support; agencies that ignore key members of Congress who hold positions on committees through which legislation must successfully navigate will face unfriendly faces in the next appropriations cycle. Because all legislators are aware of the importance of conference reports in determining how federal money is spent, these documents are often scrutinized carefully by members, staff, interest groups, press, and agencies' officials.\textsuperscript{34} Appropriators are therefore accustomed to providing directives in committee reports and expect that this language will be followed; they may well have been surprised, when the TVA controversy reached the courts, that judges discounted this language.

\textsuperscript{31} For a description of this initial appropriations battle, see Rechichar & Fitzgerald, \textit{supra} note 2, at 18-21; Wheeler & McDonald, \textit{supra} note 2, at 105-69. See also Cong. Rec. 14386 (June 22, 1965) (statement of Rep. Evins, debate on H.R. 9220, Public Works Appropriation bill, contrasting Tellico with Tims Ford by describing the former as a “marginal project” and “controversial”); Cong. Rec. 21366 (Aug. 23, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ellender, debate on H.R. 9220, indicting the cost-benefit analysis for Tellico project and criticizing plans to acquire so much private land through condemnation).


\textsuperscript{34} See Walter J. Olmstead, \textit{Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process} 47 (7th ed. 2007).

This initial interaction between the TVA and the appropriations subcommittees was the first of several events that delayed the completion of the dam—a reality that greatly influenced the story's outcome because the Endangered Species Act was not passed until 1973. This episode also demonstrates the intense personal attention that members of Congress pay to public works projects in their own districts. Dams and other construction projects that bring jobs and economic growth to a district are vitally important to ambitious lawmakers seeking to concretely demonstrate the benefits they provide to their constituents. Evins was a particularly savvy negotiator; not only did he get his district's project funded a year earlier than Tellico but, perhaps in part in return for his support for Tellico in FY 1967, Tims Ford Dam received another $9 million that year, and the TVA promised to study the possibility of building two more dams in Evins' district.\textsuperscript{35} Tims Ford Dam was completed in 1970, about a decade before Tellico would close its gates.

The TVA commenced work on the Tellico Dam and soon finished the concrete portion; it also put into action the land-acquisition plan. Appropriations to continue work were approved routinely in fiscal years 1968 and 1969, although the estimated date of completion slipped to 1973 or 1974, and the estimated cost of the project escalated.\textsuperscript{36} Only with resort to the third branch of government involved in our story—the judiciary—were opponents able to slow down and temporarily halt what would otherwise have been an ordinary legislative tale involving a public works project characterized by some as pork barrel.

\textbf{An Interbranch Dialogue About the Snail Darter and the Dam Litigation Under the National Environmental Protection Act: Winning Through Delay}

By 1970, the TVA had obtained title to about two-thirds of the land, and the road and bridge construction was underway.\textsuperscript{37} It had spent approximately $29 million of the estimated $69 million cost of the project. On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) went into effect; this legislation requires every federal agency to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement with regard to all major federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”\textsuperscript{38} An environmental impact statement, which is publicly available, should include a description of “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,” as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Wheeler & McDonald, \textit{supra} note 2, at 109.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Murchison, \textit{supra} note 2, at 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Id. at 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (West 2009).
\end{itemize}
well as "alternatives to the proposed action." NEPA is primarily a procedural statute, mandating that agencies consider the environmental impacts of their actions and receive input from experts and affected parties. Once deliberation occurs, including consideration of alternatives that might be less environmentally disruptive, the agency can still proceed, as long as its decision is not arbitrary.

NEPA was a boon to the opponents of Tellico Dam, a group that included trout fishermen, some local farmers and landowners who did not want to sell their property, a few local businesses from the area, environmental groups, and the Tennessee Game and Fish Commission. Although local opponents were never a majority of the area's residents, they were also not "a collection of wild-eyed anti-TVA extremists." Some were genuinely concerned about environmental issues, and others seized on the need for an environmental impact statement, and then later the quest to save the snail darter, as strategic moves to block the TVA's project. Opportunistic use of laws designed to serve the public interest is not necessarily inappropriate, however; given the costs borne by litigants seeking to enforce environmental statutes, the possibility that they may also capture some private benefit may be necessary to ensure that lawsuits are brought.

Publicly, the TVA resisted calls to produce an environmental impact statement, arguing that NEPA should not apply to any projects underway before it became effective. Perhaps because the TVA knew it was likely to lose, or at least wanted to hedge its bets, the agency began to draft an environmental impact statement in the spring of 1971, and on February 10, 1972, it filed with the Council on Environmental Quality a three-volume, 600-page final statement. Because of the initial months of foot dragging by the TVA's leadership, however, the federal courts had enjoined further work on the Tellico project until a satisfactory statement was prepared. It would take another year and a half for the TVA to convince a federal district court to dissolve the injunction.

The litigation surrounding NEPA's effect on the Tellico Dam affected our statutory interpretation story in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, the litigation delayed construction for nearly two years, from January 1972 until October 1973. The snail darter was only discovered in August 1973, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was signed into law in the same month. Second, the TVA began to realize that the political forces it had always counted on to support it were no longer reliable allies. The agency had actually lost a court case, at least initially, and District Court Judge Robert Taylor, who issued the injunction, "was widely known as a friend of the TVA." The discussion sparked by the formulation of the environmental impact statement ultimately convinced Tennessee Governor Winfield Dunn, a Republican, to oppose the Tellico project, arguing that the reservoir would actually reduce recreational opportunities in the state. This was the first time since the TVA's founding that a governor of Tennessee had publicly and strongly criticized the agency.

All these developments were chinks in the agency's political armor and may have signaled to opponents that a new era was underway, due to federal environmental statutes. In addition, NEPA forced the TVA to consult with other federal agencies, notably, the Department of Interior, which had a role in the process of drafting the environmental impact statement. Interior rejected the TVA's argument that it did not need to provide a statement, and a few days before the lawsuit under NEPA began, Interior publicly announced its view that the current draft was "incomplete." This would be the first of many public disagreements within the executive branch, made most salient during the Supreme Court's arguments in TVA v. Hill when Interior refused to support the TVA's position and insisted on filing its own statement to the justices in support of the environmental groups.

The congressional appropriations process for Tellico Dam continued as the NEPA litigation traveled from the district court to the Sixth Circuit and back to Judge Taylor's courtroom. While the Sixth Circuit considered TVA's appeal challenging the injunction, Congress appropriated $5.75 million to the Tellico Dam in fiscal year 1973. Before the TVA convinced the district court to lift the injunction in light of

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39. Id. at § 4332:C.
40. See Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
41. Id. at 65.
44. Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 143-44. The TVA had moved to change venue to Knoxville because it wanted Judge Taylor to preside over the case. Id.
45. Rechiar & Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 29-30. See also Cong. Rec. 8404-8412 (Mar. 15, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Brock (R-Tenn.), providing letters opposing the project during the EIS process, including from Gov. Dunn, and TVA's response). The next governor of Tennessee, Democrat Ray Blanton, was convinced by Representative Evins to provide the TVA "100% support" on the Tellico project. Rechiar & Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 43-44 (quoting a key state official).
46. Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 143.
extensive final environmental impact statement it submitted, Chairman Wagner testified before the House Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee and informed its members that an injunction had stopped most work on the dam. The TVA nevertheless requested additional funding, expecting that the injunction would soon be lifted and planning to finish the project in about two years after work began again. Wagner acknowledged that the total cost to taxpayers was likely to be higher than $69 million because of the delays. Representative Evins expressed his optimism that the TVA would prevail in court, and the project received $7.5 million in the fiscal year 1974 appropriations bill. The conference report did not refer to the NEPA litigation. A later House Appropriations Committee’s report, for fiscal year 1976, noted that the “environmental impact statement has been completed” and urged prompt completion of the project. But, by the time this report was filed in August 1975, a new lawsuit under a different environmental statute was about to be filed.

The Endangered Species Act and the Snail Darter: Halting the Tellico Dam . . . Temporarily

While the NEPA litigation wound its way through federal courts, an enthusiastic and virtually unanimous Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973, legislation that significantly strengthened the existing protections for endangered species. The ESA emphasized protecting the habitats of plants, fish, and wildlife that are endangered or threatened with extinction; its drafters hoped to better conserve ecosystems and therefore ensure a diversity of life. Section 4 authorized the government to categorize species as either endangered or threatened, depending on how close they are to extinction, and to make those determinations “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.” Section 7 required consultation between federal agencies and the secretary of Interior or of Commerce (depending on


54. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). the species) to further the purposes of the law. It demanded that agencies “take[e] such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of . . . endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be critical.”

The ESA has been characterized as “among the strongest of environmental laws” because of the breadth of its protection for species at risk of extinction. It was adopted unanimously in the Senate and with only four opposing votes in the House; President Nixon had supported it from the start, asking for more tools at the federal level to save species from extinction. Most commentators agree that the lawmakers who enacted the ESA did not fully understand how powerful the protection was; they did not foresee that the protection might be afforded not only to majestic animals such as the bald eagle and grizzly bear or appealing animals such as the timber wolf and polar bear, but also to unattractive, seemingly useless animals such as the snail darter.

This little fish, growing only to about three inches, was discovered at around the same time the ESA was enacted. Professor David Etnier, an ichthyologist at the University of Tennessee, made the discovery while compiling a record of the Little Tennessee River’s biology before it was changed forever by the dam. Etnier later told a farmer in the area, “I think we’ve got a little fish that may save your farm.” The snail darter can survive only in a river environment that both supports the snails it eats and facilitates its reproduction. The proposed Tellico Dam would likely destroy the snail darters living nearby because it would significantly alter the nature of the aquatic environment; indeed, one reason the fish was so rare was the elimination of rivers in the Tennessee River basin by the TVA’s aggressive dam policy.

A little over a year after Etnier’s discovery, law student Hiram “Hank” Hill asked his environmental law professor at the University of Tennessee (UT), Zygmunt J.B. Plater, if he could write his class paper on how provisions of the ESA might protect the habitat of the snail

55. Id. at § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).


57. Id. at 473-76.

58. Doremus, supra note 2, at 119.


60. Doremus, supra note 2, at 119-30.
darter and affect the decision to move forward on the Tellico project. Hill had learned of the controversy because his friends at the university were Etier's graduate students. Professor Plater, who had just joined the UT law school faculty, became convinced that the ESA prohibited further work on the dam—so convinced that he, along with Hill, were plaintiffs in the case and Plater argued the case before the Supreme Court. Before they could get to court, however, the snail darter had to be listed as endangered and the Little Tennessee River designated as its critical habitat. The secretary of Interior, who had jurisdiction over freshwater fish, had delegated his authority to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). In the fall of 1974, scholars were able to establish the snail darter as a distinct species, a prerequisite for the endangered species listing. Plater and his students then filed a petition to prod the FWS into action, and about a year after Hill chose his topic for his class paper, the snail darter was officially listed as endangered. The Little Tennessee River was identified as the fish's critical habitat in the spring of 1976.

The TVA was not sitting idly by as Professor Plater and his students deployed the ESA to halt the Tellico project. First, agency officials searched in other places for snail darters that could continue to thrive even if the new reservoir destroyed the population that Etier found. At the same time, it began to transplant snail darters to other rivers in the area, but it could not demonstrate that the transplanted fish could successfully reproduce before the FWS designated the fish as endangered. Second, and more problematically, the TVA sped up the construction on the project in the hope that it could close the dam's gates before opponents could convince a court to halt operations. At some points during the process to list the snail darter as endangered, the TVA worked on the reservoir 24 hours a day, using floodlights at night. Some observers contended that the TVA took steps to wipe out the little fish before any litigation commenced so that there would be no rare

62. When he argued the case, Plater was a professor at Wayne State University, after having been denied tenure at Tennessee. See Murris, supra note 2, at 180–81 (discussing the controversy surrounding the tenure decision). He is now an environmental law professor at Boston College Law School.
63. Id. at 82; Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 190.
64. Doremus, supra note 2, at 122.
66. See Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 196; Doremus, supra note 2, at 122.

species to protect anymore, although the district court later found that the TVA had worked in good faith to preserve the snail darter.

Third, the TVA contended that the ESA’s prohibition on agency actions that “jeopardize the continued existence” of an endangered species or destroy its critical habitat did not apply to projects underway before the act was in effect. Moreover, the TVA believed, it would be unreasonable to apply the prohibition to a project like Tellico that was so nearly finished when the FWS determined it threatened an endangered species. This argument was not frivolous; not only would Justice Lewis Powell adopt a similar position in his dissent in TVA v. Hill, but also the FWS’ proposed rules implementing section 7 originally allowed federal agencies some discretion to avoid consultation and other requirements with respect to projects substantially far along when the new requirements came into force. The final rules promulgated by the FWS took a different position, applying section 7 fully to ongoing projects, these rules were issued while the case was pending before the Supreme Court.

The TVA continued to appear annually before the appropriations committees, providing information about the events relating to the snail darter, and it succeeded each year in receiving appropriations to continue construction and to support efforts to move the snail darter to safer waters. In spring 1975, while the endangered-species listing process was underway, TVA Chairman Wagner appeared before the House Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee. The estimated cost of Tellico was now $100 million, and Wagner requested more than $23 million for fiscal year 1976. He blamed the increased cost on expensive litigation and the resulting construction delays. Wagner warned Congress that more litigation, this time under the ESA, was likely because “certain groups are unwilling to still admit that project is going ahead, and there is a

67. Compare Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that Plater and his allies alleged the TVA was intentionally sitting the habitat), with Hill v. TVA, 419 F.Supp. 753, 757–58, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (finding TVA acted in good faith and that it was working to prevent litigation in its clear-cutting activities).
68. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 7 “cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying to a project that is completed or substantially completed when its threat to an endangered species is discovered”).
movement that has been started where someone has found a 3-inch minnow that they call a snail darter.” Although the TVA leader acknowledged that the snail darter might be listed as endangered, he argued that the will of Congress was clear and that the Tellico project should go forward, notwithstanding the provisions of the ESA. In particular, the act should not be understood to stop an ongoing project that had received federal funding annually for nearly a decade. The TVA received the funding it requested in fiscal year 1976; the conference report did not mention the snail darter or Tellico.

After this congressional action, Plater, Hill, and others initiated a lawsuit under section 11 of the ESA, asking the court to enjoin further construction because of the effect on the snail darter’s critical habitat. Judge Taylor was again the federal trial court judge and, in May 1976, he found “it is highly probable that the closure of the Tellico Dam and the consequent impoundment of the river behind it will jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter.” He acknowledged the likelihood that almost all of the known population of snail darters, estimated to be 10,000 to 15,000, would be significantly reduced or even “completely extirpated.”

He declined, however, to issue the injunction seemingly demanded by the ESA in light of such findings. Judge Taylor concluded, “At some point in time a federal project becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification that a court of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the project to produce an unreasonable result.”

Judge Taylor discussed the appropriations committees’ deliberations both for fiscal year 1976, described above, and for fiscal year 1977, occurring as the court held hearings and issued its decision. On the basis of these proceedings and reports, Taylor concluded, “Congress was thoroughly familiar with the project when additional appropriations were made since it had been dealing with the project over a number of years.”

Two months before Taylor’s decision during the fiscal year 1977...
threatened the snail darter's habitat. The injunction would remain in effect until the snail darter was no longer endangered, its critical habitat found to be more extensive, or "Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the [ESA]." The court of appeals interpreted the prior congressional statements in legislative history about the inapplicability of the ESA to the Tellico project as merely "[a]dvisory opinions by Congress" concerning the scope of existing legislation. "To credit [such congressional pronouncements] would be tantamount to permitting the legislature to invade a province reserved to the courts by Article III of the constitution."

The appellate court also noted that Congress itself was wary of using the appropriations process to "bypass[] plenary consideration of proposed modification to existing laws," citing House Rule XXI that prohibited riders on appropriations bills. Riders are provisions added to funding bills in committee or on the floor that enact or modify substantive legislation, rather than merely allocating funds to authorized projects. One critique of riders is that they undermine committees with jurisdiction over the substantive legislation. Moreover, some lawmakers or the president may feel pressured to accept a rider that could not be enacted in a stand-alone bill in order to avoid delays in funding for hundreds, sometimes thousands, of other projects. There is also a concern that they may not be given the attention they deserve in the appropriations process. Courts have understood the legislative rule against appropriations riders to signal that appropriations statutes should be construed narrowly and should be found to change substantive legislation only with explicit and clear language.

The court of appeals was not convinced that halting the dam at that point in its construction was unreasonable. Whether a project was half-completed or even 90% completed, the court reasoned, was not relevant in determining the cost to society of the loss of a unique species of plant or animal. The court also made an institutional argument that would

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84. Id. at 1072.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1073. Although the Sixth Circuit referred only to the House rule, there is a similar Senate rule that allows a member to raise a point of order to an amendment adding "general legislation" to an appropriations bill, Senate Rule XVI(4).
87. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Iss. 689, 685-68 (2005) (linking this concern to a similar issue raised in cases disfavoring rides by implication); Sandra Beth Zeinler, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 487, 500-504 (1997).
88. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d at 1071.
89. Id.
90. The TVA also pursued a third line of attack, petitioning the FWS to delist the snail darter and rescind the finding that the Little Tennessee River was its critical habitat. This effort was predictably unsuccessful. Murchison, supra note 2, at 106.
activities of opponents of the project as “misuse of the Act.” To assist with the relocation of the snail darters, the committee allocated an additional $2 million, beyond the $11.5 million requested by the agency, for the TVA to use in expediting the snail darter relocation.

The Senate Appropriations Committee agreed to both the requested funding for Tellico and the special allocation for snail darter relocation. Its report emphasized that the appropriators did not view the ESA “as preventing the completion and use of these projects which were well underway at the time the affected species were listed as endangered.” It noted that Congress had been “fully informed of the Endangered Species Act problem as related to these projects.”

The appropriations bill, with the full funding, including for relocation of the fish, was approved and signed by President Jimmy Carter, a president seen as sympathetic to environmental causes.

The TVA also began to push for an explicit congressional exemption for the Tellico project from the ESA. It relied on its close connections with local politicians and federal lawmakers representing Tennessee; for example, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a resolution supporting completion of the Tellico Dam, and Governor Ray Blanton issued a proclamation calling for the state’s congressional delegation to obtain passage of federal legislation exempting the project from the ESA.

Several bills were introduced in the 95th Congress, with the most enthusiastic support for an exemption shown by Representative John Duncan, Sr. (R-Tenn.), the lawmaker representing the district in which Tellico was located.

Because of the prospect of further legislation, in March 1977, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which had jurisdiction over the ESA, joined by TVA supporters Representative Duncan and Senator James Sasser (D-Tenn.), requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the project’s costs and benefits and to assess alternatives that might achieve some of the benefits without threatening the continued existence of the snail darter. The report, issued in October 1977, sharply questioned whether the project’s benefits exceeded its costs. The GAO concluded that the cost-benefit analysis provided by the TVA years ago was no longer accurate and was problematic even then; Congress should not go forward without better information, including more extensive assessment of alternatives. Duncan immediately attacked the GAO’s report as “a new high-water mark in bureaucratic irresponsibility,” but it succeeded in raising again the question of whether this project was worthwhile even without the threatened extinction of the tiny snail darter. Moreover, the report made salient the possibility that an alternative to the reservoir — allowing the river to remain as a scenic stream — might provide many of the recreational and other benefits while protecting the snail darter’s habitat. President Carter’s new appointee to the TVA board, S. David Freeman, who would soon replace Wagner as the TVA’s chairman, seemed open to considering this alternative, the first time any TVA leader had hinted that he was less than fully committed to the original dam design.

The Tellico situation focused intense legislative and public attention on the ESA’s effect on public works projects that were threatened by wildlife that was not glamorous, inspiring, or cuddly. Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), perhaps the strongest Senate supporter of the Tellico project, seized on this opportunity to work with Senator John Culver (D-Iowa), the chairman of a key subcommittee of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, which had jurisdiction over the ESA. They proposed amendments to section 7 of the ESA to create an administrative-exemption process to resolve conflicts between authorized federal projects and species threatened by continuation of those projects. Senator Culver was part of a group of lawmakers who were committed to environmental protection but were also increasingly concerned that the publicity surrounding the Tellico Dam and other controversial public works projects would produce a backlash that could result in sweeping revisions to the ESA, thereby gutting its protection. Culver hoped to craft a targeted response that would only exempt projects where benefits clearly outweighed costs, all reasonable steps had been taken to mitigate damage to the species and its habitat, and no reasonable alternative existed.

Our story will return to this exemption process later; for now, its importance lies in the fact that, at the time of the Supreme Court’s
deliberations, such a legislative proposal was under serious consideration and supported by key players from both parties, including lawmakers active in the environmental movement as well as allies of the TVA. In their brief to the Court, filed about a month before the Culver/Baker amendment was formally introduced, the respondents informed the Court that “House and Senate hearings on Tellico and Section 7 are currently being scheduled by the committees with jurisdiction over the Act, for review of the GAO report, of agency implementation of the Act, and of public policy resolutions for the longstanding Tellico issue.” The case was argued six days after Culver and Baker introduced their amendment and four days after Culver’s subcommittee held hearings on the proposal. At oral argument, Professor Plater noted that, although Congress had not changed the law, the legislature was currently “reviewing public interest resolution for the conflict” arising from the Tellico Dam controversy. A month before the Supreme Court released its decision, the Senate committee recommended passage of the Culver/Baker amendment.

The duration and intensity of the ongoing legislative activity may explain why Chief Justice Warren Burger, whose initial response to the petition for certiorari had indicated he would rule for the TVA, ended up as the author of the majority opinion stopping the construction of the dam to save the fish. Papers of several justices now available at the Library of Congress reveal that some justices supported summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit, ruling in favor of the TVA without oral argument. Although summary reversal is highly unusual in the Supreme Court, four justices—Chief Justice Burger and Justices Byron White, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist—were initially inclined to take that path. Justice Harry Blackmun also favored reversal but thought the case should be set for oral argument. Justice Rehnquist argued for summary reversal because the district court had not abused its equitable discretion in refusing to issue an injunction, while Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, favored the reasoning that the ESA did not apply to projects under construction when it was passed. The chief justice indicated that he was inclined to be the continuing congressional appropriations for Tellico as having amended the “Snail Darter Act” to exempt the Tellico project.

The justices supporting the court of appeals decision were also busy circulating drafts and memos to head off the threat of summary disposition. Justice Potter Stewart argued that Congress, not the courts, should balance the merits of completing the dam and reservoir project against those of saving the snail darter from extinction. Justice William Brennan wrote a memorandum to his colleagues, arguing that “the wealth of writing [by the justices] surely proves that a summary disposition is most inappropriate.” His position prevailed: The petition was granted, and the case was argued in April 1978.

The briefs and argument seem to have changed votes: Chief Justice Burger and Justice White ultimately voted that the ESA’s language was absolute and precluded further work on the dam. The notes from the conference following oral argument indicate that Justice White passed during discussion of the case, saying he would vote over the weekend. The chief justice indicated that he thought it was common sense to hold that the ESA would not halt a project well underway when it was enacted and for which Congress had continued to appropriate money, but he could also join a majority reaching the other conclusion. When Justice White notified his colleagues that his vote had changed and he would affirm the Sixth Circuit, Chief Justice Burger also voted to affirm, assigning himself the opinion. Interestingly, two of the justices who had always favored upholding the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall, told their colleagues at conference that they believed Congress would quickly amend the ESA to respond to the Court’s decision. It seems likely that it was easier for Chief Justice Burger and Justice White to switch their positions in light of an almost certain legislative response that would provide an exemption for Tellico. This sort of legislative reaction could be tailored to other current and future controversies, unlike a judicial opinion limited to the facts before the justices.

Both Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion and Justice Powell’s dissent were based in part on assumptions of how Congress legislates. As one of the leading examples of the “soft” plain meaning approach developed in the Burger era, the majority opinion emphasized the clear and absolute text of the ESA, but then spent the bulk of the opinion describing the legislative history surrounding the controversy. It contrasted the pellucid text, which mandated absolute protection of the habitats of endangered species, with contrary instructions specific to the
application of the ESA to Tellico found only in legislative history produced by appropriations committees. Chief Justice Burger noted that the earmarks for Tellico “represented relatively minor components of the lump-sum amounts for the entire TVA budget.”\footnote{107} He further explained in a footnote that appropriations to the TVA had been made in lump sums, with Tellico mentioned specifically only in legislative history; therefore, “unless a Member scrutinized in detail the Committee proceedings concerning the appropriations, he would have no knowledge of the possible conflict between the continued funding and the Endangered Species Act.”\footnote{108} The majority was unwilling to impute to the entire Congress an intent that was manifested consistently only in reports written by its appropriations committees.\footnote{109}

One problem with this description of the legislative process is that it may not be generally accurate with respect to the appropriations process, and it is certainly questionable in this particular case. The Court was correct that important instructions regarding the allocation of lump-sum appropriations appear only in the conference reports and not the text of any statute, but every member of Congress understands that aspect of the appropriations process and therefore relies on the legislative history. Moreover, the level of congressional awareness of details in appropriations bills may not be significantly different than the knowledge members have about the intricacies of substantive legislation. For example, few lawmakers voting for the ESA were aware of its scope or its likely effect on ongoing or even future public works projects that might threaten the habitat of obscure mussels, weed-like plants, or unappealing small fish.\footnote{110}

Furthermore, Professors McCubbins and Rodriguez have argued, using TVA v. Hill as an example, that, in many ways, the appropriations process may be a “better process” in terms of the quality of deliberation, the representativeness of the members of the committee, and the transparency of the decision-making, compared to the processes in other committees.\footnote{111} As we have seen, the TVA also had an unusual relationship with Congress because the board could essentially “authorize” its own projects as long as it could convince the appropriations committees to fund them. So the role of the appropriators was different here than with other public works projects, although those committees did not officially have responsibility for determining the scope of environmental laws. With respect to Tellico, many lawmakers, on and off the appropri-\footnote{107. Id. at 189.} \footnote{108. Id. at 189 and 189 n.35.} \footnote{109. Id. at 192.} \footnote{110. See Peterson, supra note 56, at 478–83.} \footnote{111. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 695–707.}

To support its contention that repeals by implication through the appropriations process are particularly disfavored, the majority opinion cited the internal House rule against appropriations riders.\footnote{112} The chief justice described the jurisdictional principles undermined by a legislative process that bypassed the committees with responsibility over the environmental laws. “We venture to suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on the substantive legislation had been undone by the simple—and brief—insertion of some inconsistent language in Appropriations Committees’ Reports.”\footnote{113} The knowledge that the appropriate committees in Congress were now moving to amend the ESA to deal with the Tellico Dam and a few other similar, controversial projects likely influenced the majority’s decision to use congressional rules and jurisdictional norms to shape judge-made canons of construction.

Justice Powell’s dissent also relied on interpretive principles premised on a particular view of the legislative process. The presumption against construing statutes to have retroactive effect persuaded him that Congress could not have intended the ESA to halt ongoing public works projects,\footnote{114} particularly not those as far along as the Tellico Dam. He also emphasized the silence of Congress about the act’s effect on ongoing public projects. If members thought the ESA could be used to force termination of expensive and nearly completed projects, “we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed important and so likely to arouse public outrage.”\footnote{115}

Finally, the dissent cited the oft-invoked maxim that statutes should be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.\footnote{116} Justice Powell
was convinced that halting construction of the dam was absurd. Although the majority did not go that far, one has the impression that even the majority was not convinced that abandoning work on the dam was the best final outcome. The chief justice noted, however, that judges are not experts on how to balance the need to save threatened species against the need for certain public works projects. In the end, “Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities.”

Perhaps because most of the Court, including the author of the majority opinion, apparently believed that the most reasonable decision would be to finish the dam, both opinions invited Congress to overturn the result. Chief Justice Burger observed: “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course selected by Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. ... We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of the veto.” It was the province of the political branches, he concluded, to determine if the result it had enacted accorded with common sense; however, the tone of the final paragraphs of the opinion suggest he would not characterize the result as sensible. Justice Powell was even clearer, “I have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to prevent the grave consequences made possible by today’s decision.”

Several scholars have studied the conditions under which Congress is likely to overturn a judicial statutory precedent and in which the Court actually invites such a response. This case exhibits many of the characteristics that the literature suggests will give rise both to a rare invitation to override and then to an actual legislative reaction. The government is typically in the best position to obtain overrides; a disproportionate number of the cases overridden have employed a method of statutory interpretation that relies on the “plain meaning” of the text; and overrides often occur in areas where the legislature is exercising its power to control over the expenditure of revenue, such as distributive decisions about public works projects. The Court is likely to issue an invitation to override when it faces a conflict between the result

117. Id. at 194.
118. Id. at 194–95.
119. Id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting).
121. Percival, Highlights from the Blackburn Papers, supra note 104, at 10643.
122. The exception is Spiller & Tiller, supra note 120, at 514 n.41. In contrast, other scholarship suggests that Congress was reacting to the Court’s decision. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 120, at 65.
mitigate adverse consequences to its habitat must be adopted. Congress did single out Tellico Dam, along with Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming that threatened the whooping crane, and required that the committee consider these two cases through an accelerated process. If the committee did not make a decision within 90 days, the dams would be deemed exempted.

The first God Squad included one well-known opponent to Tellico Dam. Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus so strongly disagreed with the TVA’s position that he had insisted that the government’s brief to the Supreme Court include an appendix presenting his department’s views supporting the other side. It is unusual for the government to speak with a divided voice before the Supreme Court. It was a compromise forged after Attorney General Griffin Bell learned that political aides had convinced President Carter to switch positions and back the opponents of the dam. Bell objected to a political decision trumping the legal decision of his office; he convinced Carter to maintain the government’s stance favoring completion of the Tellico project, and he even argued the case himself to make a point. Although Andrus was nearly certain vote against completion of the Tellico Dam, other members, such as the representative from Tennessee, were seen as more sympathetic to the project.

The decision, handed down in January 1979, was unanimous in favor of protecting the snail darter. The committee found that the benefits of completing the dam did not outweigh the benefits of alternative, particularly that of developing a free-flowing river. Before the committee met, the new TVA Chairman Freeman had suggested that such an alternative was viable and might even be superior, and a report by the Department of Interior and the TVA supported that conclusion. In its deliberations, the committee faulted the cost-benefit analysis used to justify the project. As Charles Schultz, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, observed, even though the project was 95% complet-

ed, “if one just takes the costs of finishing it against the benefits and does it properly, it doesn’t pay.”

A process begun to protect an endangered species discovered years after the initial decision to build the Tellico Dam had led to an administrative proceeding that focused mainly on the economic justification that had been problematic from the outset. Many lawmakers, including supporters, knew that the cost-benefit analysis presented by the TVA was weak; at one point during the debate on establishing the Endangered Species Committee, Senator Baker admitted: “Maybe it was a mistake to build Tellico Dam. I don’t know. But you cannot go back and undo that decision and you cannot carry off that $116 million worth of concrete.”

Supporters were hoping that the God Squad would be influenced by the political dynamics of Tellico and by the fact that the project was so nearly completed that abandoning it would be considered unreasonable. When that hope was dashed by the unanimous rejection of the TVA’s project, legislators turned back to the political process.

**Congress Finally Completes the Dam**

Senator Baker’s immediate response, in direct contradiction to his more statesman-like position during the debate about the amendment to section 7, was to propose legislation eliminating the God Squad and ordering completion of the Tellico project. He fumed, “If that’s all the good the committee process can do, to put us right back where we started from, we might as well save the time and expense.” Representative Duncan, who had always wanted Congress to enact an explicit exemption for the project, took the lead. In June 1979, when the House was considering the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Duncan came to a nearly empty floor with an amendment instructing the TVA to close the dam “notwithstanding the provisions of [the ESA] or any other law.”

He had already arranged with the floor managers of the bill to accept the amendment quickly; it was passed without objection in less than one minute. This episode was the first time in our story that a supporter of Tellico slipped a provision surreptitiously into an appropriations bill. But if Duncan could succeed, the objection about tactics sounded in *TVA v. Hill* could not reverse his victory because his amendment had been added to the text of the bill itself, not contained only in legislative history.


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**ELIZABETH GARRETT**

Duncan’s move soon became public, to the outrage of conservation-minded members in both houses. Although Minority Leader Baker and some others in the Senate supported the exemption, it infuriated members such as Senator Culver, who saw it as reneging on the deal reached when they forged a consensus to create the exemption process. The bill went back and forth between the two houses, with the Senate resisting the amendment, and through a conference committee. During this debate, the Supreme Court’s invitation to Congress to override the decision in *TVA v. Hill* was cited by proponents of the exemption, both as justification for congressional action and as evidence that respected entities outside Congress viewed abandoning the project as a waste of money. Finally, after three months of disagreement, at the end of the fiscal year when continued impasse would derail all the projects in the bill, and after Baker had “pulled out all the political stops,” a majority in both houses approved the bill with the Duncan amendment.

Secretary Andrus had not given up his opposition to Tellico Dam, however. He and other environmentalists lobbied President Carter, who opposed pork-barrel water projects generally and did not like the Tellico project specifically, to veto the appropriations bill. Carter decided that he could not veto the entire bill, which he largely supported, and therefore he accepted “with regret” the provision relating to Tellico. He noted in his signing statement that he continued to support vigorous enforcement of the ESA and he believed resolution of the high-profile snail darter case would “help assure passage of the Endangered Species Act reauthorization without weakening amendments or further exemptions.”

He concluded by acknowledging that his administration was pursuing several controversial initiatives in Congress, such as arms-reduction treaties, creation of the Department of Education, and the implementing legislation for the Panama Canal treaty, and so he was eager to avoid a “divisive veto battle” that would undermine focus on more important priorities.

**Conclusion**

In November 1979, the TVA evicted the last two farmers who had refused to leave their land taken for the reservoir by eminent domain. At the end of that month, the dam was closed, and the reservoir was created. The little fish that triggered the case did not disappear, however.

139. Wheeler & McDonald, *supra* note 2, at 212.
140. Murchison, *supra* note 2, at 166.
er, because the transplanted population in the Hiwassee River reproduced successfully, and several other populations of darters were found in the region. The same biologist who discovered the snail darter in 1972, Professor Etner, was one of the scientists who documented these new populations. 142 The Fish and Wildlife Service reclassified the darter as threatened, not endangered, and rescinded the critical-habitat designation in 1994. 143

The substantial economic development promised by the TVA did not materialize, although there are some businesses in the area that employ around 8,000 people and several residential developments with golf courses and access to the lake. 144 Pictures reveal a pretty wooded environment surrounded by large homes, but also, in the lake itself, unsightly tops of silos from the farms flooded by the dam. 145 The lake habitat is at the low end of the fair range in terms of its ecological health, with reduced diversity and density of fish species and warnings of PCB contamination of catfish. 146 Nonetheless, there is recreational use by boaters and fishermen, although not at the levels projected, in part because the region is full of similar man-made lakes. Water from the project helps run turbines at nearby Fort Loudon Dam and produces some energy. The development has created tax revenue for local governments, albeit in smaller amounts than anticipated.

As a story of statutory interpretation, the Tellico Dam, the snail darter, and the case that they spawned demonstrate that, if it is determined enough, Congress has the last word on federal spending. Moreover, despite internal rules and the judicial canon disfavoring appropriations riders, Congress can achieve its purposes by passing clearly worded provisions within the text of appropriations bills. Whether its decisions will be good national policy—from either an economic or an environmental perspective—or dictated by pork-barrel politics is much less certain and likely to be contested. The final judgment on the tradeoffs that are made is left to the voters, who continue to wrestle with their views of earmarks, public works projects, and environmental policies.

142. Murchison, supra note 2, at 184.
144. See Doremus, supra note 2, at 135; Gray & Johnson, supra note 20, at 81-53, 151.
145. See Plyler, supra note 60, at Slide 25-33.