

The text reports the results of two experiments examining the influence of two war tax instruments on public support for war. The complete wording for all prompts and treatments in the Retaliation Experiment are presented in SI Appendix 1. The complete wording for all prompts and treatments in the North Korea Experiment are presented in SI Appendix 2.

### **Sample Demographics**

We embedded the two experiments presented in the text on the nationally representative 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Our experiments were included on a portion of that larger instrument that was administered in two waves to a sample of 1,000 adult Americans. Summary statistics for the demographic composition of our sample are presented in SI Table 1.

### **Differences in Means**

In the text, we use ordered logit regressions to assess the influence of the two war tax treatments on support for the use of force in both experiments while also controlling for subjects' demographic characteristics. As a simple robustness check on those results, we collapsed subjects who “strongly support” or “somewhat support” the use of force to calculate the percentage supporting the use of force in each treatment group.

SI Table 2 presents the results for the Retaliation Experiment. Consistent with the ordered logit, in the aggregate we find a large gap in support between the control group and sales tax treatment (72% vs. 62%). The percentage supporting the use of force in the targeted tax treatment is smaller than in the control, but the difference is modest (72% vs. 69%). Among Republicans, 80% backed the retaliatory strike in the control group. However, war support among Republican fell substantially in the sales and targeted tax treatments (to 65% and 72%,

respectively). Among Democrats, support for the use of force was also much lower in the sales tax treatment than in the control. By contrast, there is little evidence of major differences in war support between the control group and the targeted tax treatment for Democrats and non-partisan identifiers.

SI Table 3 presents the results for the North Korea Experiment. The patterns are very similar to those observed in the Retaliation Experiment. Support for the use of force to defend South Korea fell from 66% in the control group to 52% in the sales tax treatment among all subjects. However, the difference in war support between the control group (66%) and the targeted tax treatment (60%) was much smaller. Among Republicans we observe substantial difference in war support between the control group (80%) and both taxation treatments (50% in sales; 49% in targeted tax on wealthy). Among Democrats and non-identifiers, support for the use of force was about 10% lower in the sales tax treatment than in the control. In sharp contrast to the pattern observed among Republicans, among Democrats and non-identifiers we find no evidence of lower support for war in the targeted tax treatment group than in the control group.

Indeed, among Democrats 67% of subjects in the targeted tax treatment supported the use of force versus 64% in the control; this difference in means, however, is not statistically significant ( $p < .10$ ). In the ordered logit analyses presented in the text, the coefficient for the targeted tax treatment among Democrats is marginally significant ( $p < .10$ ). This is due to an increase in the strongly support category, not to a major increase in support overall. In the control group, 13% of Democrats strongly supported the use of force and 51% somewhat supported it (pooled: 64%); in the targeted tax treatment group, 23% strongly supported the use of force and 44% somewhat supported it (pooled: 67%). Given that the coefficient in the ordered logit model is only marginally significant, and that the observed difference is confined to the

strongly support category, while the overall percentage supporting the use of force is largely identical across the two treatments, we do not place much emphasis on the positive coefficient in the text.

### **Controlling for Income in Ordered Logit Models**

The models in Tables 2 and 3 in the text did not control for income because approximately 13% of the sample refused to answer the self-reported income question. Including this variable requires us to drop those subjects from the analysis. However, as a robustness check SI Tables 4 and 5 replicate all models from the text controlling for income. The coefficient for the income variable is never statistically significant, and the results of interest – the coefficients on the experimental treatment variables – remain substantively similar.

### **Alternative Figures**

SI Figures 1 and 2 present alternate versions of Figures 1 and 2 in the text. The predicted probability of the median subject in the control group supporting the use of force varied significantly across the models for Republicans, Democrats, and subjects who did not identify with either party. SI Figures 1 and 2 plot the change in predicted probability produced by the sales tax and targeted tax on the wealthy from each partisan group's baseline in the control.

### **Potential concerns about spillover effects**

All 1,000 subjects received the Retaliation Experiment during the pre-election survey. After the 2014 midterm election, 889 subjects were successfully re-contacted and administered a post-election survey. The Korea Experiment was embedded on this post-election wave of the

2014 CCES. This raises the possibility that the treatment received in the Retaliation Experiment could conceivably have spilled over and influenced respondents' preferences in the Korea Experiment. While possible, this is extremely unlikely. The average time between a respondent completing the pre-election survey and receiving the post-election survey was 33.8 days, with the shortest time being 8 days. Nevertheless, to insure that spillover effects did not occur, we replicated the ordered logit analyses for the North Korea Experiment from Table 3 in the text with two additional variables identifying whether or not a respondent had been assigned to one of the war tax treatments in the Retaliation Experiment on the pre-election wave of the CCES. Results are presented in SI Table 5. In the main ordered logit model for all subjects, the coefficients for the two dummy variables identifying whether a subject had previously been assigned to either the sales tax or targeted tax on the wealthy treatment in the Retaliation Experiment are both substantively small and statistically insignificant. All other results remain unchanged. We then replicated each of the disaggregated analyses with these two additional variables. In only one case was the resulting coefficient significant at the  $p < .10$  level (for prior assignment to the sales tax treatment in the model for Democrats); this is approximately what we would expect through random chance alone (one in eight coefficients marginally significant,  $p < .10$ ). All other results remain unchanged.

### **Follow-Up Experiment**

In July 2015, we conducted a revised version of the Retaliation Experiment to address two potential concerns. First, because the two war tax treatments mention an “additional” source of war funding, it is possible that subjects in these treatments may perceive the war will be more costly than those in the control group. If this is correct, then different estimates of costs – not the

funding mechanism through which the requisite funds will be raised – may explain any observed differences from the control. Second, the wording of how the requisite funds will be raised in the control group – in part through the existing budget and in part through debt – is potentially ambiguous. Some might conclude that funds would be raided from other programs, while others might not; and it is possible that differences in interpretation may vary along partisan lines.

To address these concerns, in July 2015 we replicated the Retaliation Experiment on a convenience sample recruited via Mechanical Turk. Unlike the CCES, this convenience sample is not nationally representative; however, recent research shows that experiments conducted on samples recruited in this way yield treatment effects similar to those observed in experiments using nationally representative samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). The experimental set-up in the control, sales tax, and targeted tax on the wealthy treatments was identical to that included on the 2014 CCES. However, in the follow-up experiment, we added one new experimental condition. In this treatment, which also did not involve a war tax, we slightly modified the language from the control group to clearly specify that budgets from other programs would not be raided to fund the war. In this treatment, subjects were told: “The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget of the Department of Defense and in part through debt.”

Furthermore, After receiving the treatment and answering the war support question, all subjects were asked to estimate how costly they believed the war would be. Mirroring a similar follow-up experiment in Flores-Macias and Kreps (2015), we asked subjects to choose between the following options: 1.) \$100 billion (not costly); 2.) \$300 billion (a little costly); 3.) \$500 billion (somewhat costly); 4.) \$700 billion (very costly); 5.) \$900 billion (extremely costly). In

addition to monetary figures, we also provided information in parentheses raking the costs in relative terms.

SI Figure 3 graphs the means and confidence intervals for the cost estimate in each treatment group. We see no evidence that different treatments significantly skewed cost estimates of the use of force. Given the ordinal nature of the variable, we also used Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum tests to examine whether the distribution of responses to the costs question in any one treatment was significantly different from that observed in another experimental group. In each case, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference in cost estimates across any pair of treatments at even  $p < .10$ , one-tailed test. SI Table 7 presents the results of an ordered logit model in which the dependent variable is each subject's estimate of the war's cost; the independent variables of interest are dummy variables for each experimental treatment (the control group is the omitted baseline category); and demographic controls are added. None of the coefficients for the experimental treatments are statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence that any of the treatments led subjects to perceive the costs of military as being higher than in the control group.

The first ordered logit model in SI Table 8 replicates the analysis from the text with the data from this follow-up experiment. First, we find no evidence that the revised wording in the new first treatment group specifying that war funding would come exclusively from the existing Department of Defense budget and from incurring new debt had any significant impact on war support versus that observed in the control. The relevant coefficient is almost zero, and not statistically significant. Second, strongly consistent with both experiments embedded on the 2014 CCES and presented in the text, in this follow-up experiment we again found that the broad-based, national sales tax treatment significantly decreased support for war. The relevant

coefficient is strongly negative and statistically significant. By contrast, the imposition of a narrowly targeted war tax on the wealthy had no statistically significant effect on war support. Because of the small sample size and the Democratic slant of Mechanical Turk samples (fewer than 22% of our 432 subjects identified as Republican) we are unable to conduct a strong test of whether the targeted tax negatively affected war support among Republicans.

Finally, the follow-up experiment allows us to examine whether the treatment effects hold even after controlling for subjects' estimates of how costly the military action would be. The second model in SI Table 8 replicates the baseline model, but includes this measure of estimated cost. As we would expect, the coefficient for the estimated cost variable is negative and statistically significant. The more costly a subject perceives the war will be, the less willing she is to support it. However, even after controlling for estimated costs, we continue to find a strong and negative effect for the national sales tax. Indeed, in magnitude its downward effect on war support exceeds that of a two unit increase in estimated costs, which amounts to \$400 billion on the scale. The targeted tax on the wealthy, by contrast, had no effect on war support.

**SI Table 1: 2014 CCES Sample Demographics**

Republican	32.2%	(46.7)
Democrat	46.6%	(49.9)
Male	46.8%	(49.9)
% college degree	36.0%	(48.0)
Median family income	\$60k - \$70k	
Age	49.7 years	(16.2)
White	72.8%	(44.5)
Black	12.5%	(33.1)

Note: Table reports the mean value for each variable (except income) with standard deviations in parentheses.



**SI Table 2: Support for Use of Force in Retaliation Experiment Across Treatments**

		<i>All</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Other</i>
Control		72%	80%	71%	59%
Sales Tax		62%	65%	63%	56%
Tax on Rich		69%	72%	71%	60%

Note: Each cell reports the percentage who strongly support or somewhat support the use of force in the relevant treatment group.

**SI Table 3: Support for Use of Force in North Korea Experiment Across Treatments**

		<i>All</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Other</i>
Control		66%	73%	64%	59%
Sales Tax		52%	50%	55%	49%
Tax on Rich		60%	49%	67%	57%

Note: Each cell reports the percentage who strongly support or somewhat support the use of force in the relevant treatment group.

**SI Table 4: Retaliation Experiment Models Controlling for Income**

	All	Republicans	Democrats	Other
National sales tax treatment	-0.51*** (0.15)	-0.79*** (0.29)	-0.45** (0.22)	-0.32 (0.33)
Tax the rich treatment	0.02 (0.15)	-0.43 (0.27)	0.13 (0.23)	0.55 (0.38)
Male	0.42*** (0.13)	0.57** (0.23)	0.44** (0.19)	0.15 (0.29)
Education	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.22*** (0.07)	-0.26** (0.11)
Age	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
White	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.51 (0.41)	0.13 (0.28)	-0.08 (0.36)
Black	0.34 (0.25)	0.77 (0.99)	0.59* (0.32)	-0.15 (0.58)
Income	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Republican	0.62*** (0.19)			
Democrat	0.41** (0.17)			
Observations	862	277	418	167

Results of ordered logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$

**SI Table 5: North Korea Experiment Models Controlling for Income**

	All	Republicans	Democrats	Other
National sales tax treatment	-0.54*** (0.16)	-0.94*** (0.28)	-0.29 (0.24)	-0.42 (0.42)
Tax the rich treatment	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.78*** (0.29)	0.38* (0.23)	0.11 (0.43)
Male	0.47*** (0.14)	0.42* (0.24)	0.57*** (0.20)	0.33 (0.34)
Education	0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.09)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.13)
Age	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
White	0.13 (0.21)	-0.27 (0.47)	0.16 (0.29)	0.39 (0.40)
Black	0.30 (0.26)	-0.31 (0.98)	0.51 (0.33)	-0.24 (0.61)
Income	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)
Republican	-0.10 (0.20)			
Democrat	0.11 (0.18)			
Observations	771	252	378	141

Results of ordered logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$

**SI Table 6: Testing for Spillover Effects**

	All	Republicans	Democrats	Other
National sales tax treatment	-0.57*** (0.15)	-1.06*** (0.26)	-0.23 (0.22)	-0.57 (0.38)
Tax the rich treatment	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.89*** (0.27)	0.39* (0.22)	-0.16 (0.38)
Male	0.43*** (0.13)	0.35 (0.23)	0.59*** (0.19)	0.26 (0.31)
Education	0.04 (0.04)	0.11 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.11)
Age	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
White	-0.00 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.40)	0.04 (0.27)	-0.05 (0.36)
Black	0.07 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.94)	0.24 (0.31)	-0.38 (0.58)
Republican	0.02 (0.18)			
Democrat	0.20 (0.17)			
Prior national sales tax treatment	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.28)	-0.42* (0.22)	0.17 (0.34)
Prior tax the rich treatment	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.26)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.35)
Observations	887	291	420	176

Results of ordered logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$

**SI Table 7: Factors Influencing Estimated Cost of War, Follow-up Experiment**

	(1)
DOD budget + Debt	-0.16 (0.26)
National sales tax treatment	0.12 (0.25)
Tax the rich treatment	0.38 (0.25)
Republican	-0.36 (0.27)
Democrat	0.06 (0.23)
Male	-0.10 (0.18)
Education	0.21** (0.10)
Age	-0.01* (0.01)
White	0.57** (0.24)
Black	0.04 (0.44)
Observations	432

Results of ordered logit model. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.


\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$

**SI Table 8: Factors Influencing Support for War, Follow-up Experiment**

	(1)	(2)
DOD budget + Debt	0.02 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.26)
National sales tax treatment	-1.00*** (0.26)	-1.02*** (0.26)
Tax the rich treatment	-0.25 (0.26)	-0.20 (0.26)
Republican	0.92*** (0.29)	0.84*** (0.29)
Democrat	0.44* (0.24)	0.47** (0.24)
Male	0.13 (0.19)	0.09 (0.19)
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)
White	-0.01 (0.24)	0.11 (0.25)
Black	0.65 (0.44)	0.61 (0.44)
Estimated war cost		-0.42*** (0.09)
Observations	432	432


Results of ordered logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$


**SI Figure 1: Retaliation Experiment, By Party**

Note: Each horizontal line shows the predicted probability of the median subject in the control group supporting the use of force. Each dot presents the predicted probability of the median subject in the relevant treatment group supporting the use of force. I-bars present 90% confidence intervals around each estimate.



**SI Figure 2: North Korea Experiment, By Party**

Note: Each horizontal line shows the predicted probability of the median subject in the control group supporting the use of force. Each dot presents the predicted probability of the median subject in the relevant treatment group supporting the use of force. I-bars present 90% confidence intervals around each estimate.

**SI Figure 3: Mean Estimates of Cost of War Across Treatments, Follow-up Experiment**

Note: Dots represent mean values in each experimental group. I-bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

**SI Appendix 1: Retaliation Experiment**

All subjects received the following prompt:

*Imagine the following scenario that could arise in the future. Terrorists have attacked a major US military installation overseas. Intelligence officials have determined that the funding for the group and the weapons used in the attack came from a rogue state in Central Asia. The President, backed by leaders of both parties in Congress, has decided to launch a military operation to overthrow the regime of the rogue state that sponsored terrorism against American forces abroad.*

Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups.

Subjects in the control group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt.*

Subjects in the first treatment group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt. Additionally, the government would impose a 1% national sales tax paid by all Americans to help fund the military action.*

Subjects in the second treatment group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt. Additionally, the government would raise the top tax bracket on those earning more than \$400,000 a year by 2% to help fund the military action.*

All subjects were then asked the following question:

*Would you support or oppose the president taking military action in this situation?*

Subjects were asked to choose from the following options:

*strongly support; somewhat support; somewhat oppose; strongly oppose.*

**SI Appendix 2: North Korea Experiment**

All subjects received the following prompt:

*Imagine the following scenario that could arise in the future. North Korea has begun massing troops on its border and has threatened to invade South Korea. To defend our long-time ally, the President, backed by leaders of both parties in Congress, has decided to send a large number of American troops to South Korea.*

Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups.

Subjects in the control group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt.*

Subjects in the first treatment group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt. Additionally, the government would impose a 1% national sales tax paid by all Americans to help fund the military action.*

Subjects in the second treatment group were told:

*The United States would finance the conflict in part through the existing budget and in part through debt. Additionally, the government would raise the top tax bracket on those earning more than \$400,000 a year by 2% to help fund the military action.*

All subjects were then asked the following question:

*Would you support or oppose the president taking military action in this situation?*

Subjects were asked to choose from the following options:

*strongly support; somewhat support; somewhat oppose; strongly oppose.*