Supporting Information for "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics"

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# 1 The Distribution of Federal Grant Spending, 1984 to 2008

Figure 1: **The Distribution of Federal Grant Spending, 1984 to 2008.** A histogram of logged county federal grant totals.

2 Robustness check: Using a continuous measure of competitiveness and support for president's party

	(1)	(2)
State electoral competitiveness	0.776	1.020
	(0.103)	(0.103)
Incumbent party vote share in state		0.495
		(0.036)
MC from pres party	0.025	0.017
	(0.004)	(0.004)
MC from majority party	0.023	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.004)
MC chair	−0.022	−0.021
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Member of Appropriations or Ways and Means	−0.005	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)
County population (logged)	0.210	0.206
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Poverty rate	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Per capita income	0.005	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	14.860	14.529
	(0.297)	(0.295)
Observations	76,937	76,937
R-squared	0.618	0.620
Number of counties	3,082	3,082

Table 1: **Federal Grant Spending and Presidential Particularism**. *A robustness check where continuous measures are used for competitiveness and core. State electoral competitiveness is measured as the average statewide vote share of the losing candidate averaged over the previous three presidential elections. Core is measured as incumbent party vote share averaged over the previous three elections.* As in the main results, counties in swing states, core states, those represented in Congress by the President's party and the majority party all see more federal grant spending than other counties. Model is a least-squares regression with fixed effects for county and year. Robust standard errors clustered on county in parentheses.

3 Robustness check: Using additional Congressional controls (from Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010)).

Swing state	0.037
	(0.005)
Core state	0.064
	(0.006)
MC from pres party	0.014
	(0.004)
MC from majority party	0.025
	(0.004)
MC chair	−0.018
	(0.010)
Member of Appropriations or Ways and Means	−0.012
	(0.006)
MC ranking member	0.002
	(0.009)
MC leader	0.019
	(0.020)
MC Republican	0.031
	(0.005)
MC first term	0.017
	(0.003)
MC close race	0.014
	(0.006)
County population (logged)	0.229
	(0.031)
Poverty rate	0.005
	(0.001)
Per capita income	0.005
	(0.002)
Constant	14.947
	(0.301)
Observations	76,653
Number of counties	3,082
R-squared	0.619

Table 2: **Federal Grant Spending and Presidential Particularism**. *A robustness check where additional Congressional controls are included. These are the same controls used by Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010).* As in the main results, counties in swing states, core states, those represented in Congress by the President's party and the majority party all see more federal grant spending than other counties. Model is a least-squares regression with fixed effects for county and year. Robust standard errors clustered on county in parentheses.

4 Robustness check: Excluding Counties That Do Not Match Perfectly Into a Single Congressional District

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Swing state	0.037	0.026	0.027	0.013
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Core state	0.067	0.066	0.067	0.034
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Swing state × Election year		0.042		
		(0.007)		
Core state × Election year		0.005		
		(0.008)		
Swing state × Reelection year			0.051	0.051
			(0.008)	(0.008)
Swing state × Successor election			0.028	0.028
			(0.008)	(0.008)
Core county				−0.013
				(0.008)
Core county × Swing state				0.039
				(0.010)
Core county × Core state				0.063
				(0.012)
MC from pres party	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.012
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
MC from majority party	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
MC chair	−0.018	−0.019	−0.018	−0.029
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Member of Appropriations or Ways and Means	−0.011	−0.011	−0.011	−0.012
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
County population (logged)	0.207	0.206	0.207	0.202
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Poverty rate	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Per capita income	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	14.975	14.292	14.967	15.001
	(0.336)	(0.334)	(0.336)	(0.338)
Observations	67,713	67,713	67,713	67,072
R-squared	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.603
Number of fips_state_county_code	2,920	2,920	2,920	2,891

Table 3: **Federal Grant Spending and Presidential Particularism**. *A robustness check where we exclude counties that are not 100% matched to a single Congressional district.* As in the main results, counties in swing states, core states, those represented in Congress by the President's party and the majority party all see more federal grant spending than other counties (column 1). Swing states receive an additional increase in grant spending in presidential election years (column 2) particularly when the incumbent president is seeking reelection (column 3). Core counties in swing states and core states see larger increases in federal grant spending than other counties in the same state (column 4). Model is a least-squares regression with fixed effects for county and year. Robust standard errors clustered on county in parentheses.