Robustness Check: Partisan Interactions

In columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 in the article, we estimated separate models for

Democratic and Republican respondents to examine the disparate impact of the experimental

treatments on support for war among different partisan groups. Alternatively, estimating a single

model with interactions between each treatment indicator and a Democratic dummy variable

yields virtually identical results. This alternate specification is presented in Appendix Table 1.

None of the main effects for any of the experimental treatments are statistically significant.

However, for Democratic respondents, the draft treatment significantly decreased support for the

use of force. This negative effect was significantly attenuated when subjects learned that the

draft would ameliorate socioeconomic inequality in military sacrifice. Finally, learning that

continued reliance on the AVF would result in socioeconomic inequality in sacrifice also

lowered Democratic support from the AVF baseline.

Robustness Check: Partisanship or Self-Interest

In the article, we discuss the results of an additional analysis examining whether

partisanship or self-interest is the most important factor moderating the effect of the draft and

inequality treatments on public support for the use of force. This additional analysis re-estimated

the analysis from Appendix Table 1, but instead of interacting each treatment with a Democratic

dummy variable, it used a self-interest variable adopted from Horowitz and Levendusky (2011)

identifying men and women forty years of age and under. The results are presented in Appendix

Table 2. Consistent with Horowitz and Levendusky, the coefficient for the draft-young

respondent interaction is negative as expected. However, it fails to meet conventional levels of

statistical significance. Alternative measures of self-interest yield similar null results. In this

experiment, partisanship, not self-interest, was the most important factor moderating the influence of military manpower policies on support for war.

Robustness Check: Partisanship or Ideology?

We have argued that partisanship is the key lens through which citizens evaluate manpower policies and their consequences for inequality. However, it is also possible that ideological beliefs, not party ties, are the key moderating factor. The two are, of course, highly correlated. However, the significant variation in self-reported ideological positions of Democrats in our sample does afford some leverage on this question. On a seven point ideological scale, 51% of Democrats identified their political views as either slightly liberal, liberal, or very liberal. However, 39% identified themselves as "moderate/middle of the road" and 10% as varying degrees of conservative. If ideology, not partisanship, is the key factor mediating the influence of the draft and its inequality consequences on war support, then we should observe significant differences in opinion across treatments between Democrats who identified as liberals and those who did not; moderate and conservative Democrats should be significantly less influenced by the conscription and inequality treatments than liberal Democrats.

As shown in Appendix Figure 1, we find little evidence of any significant differences between liberal and moderate or conservative Democrats. Democrats of all ideological stripes were less supportive of the use of force when told that the draft would be reinstituted; and support for war increased for all Democrats from this low baseline when told that the draft would reduce socioeconomic inequality in military sacrifice. The only substantive difference is that moderate and conservative Democrats, somewhat surprisingly, appear to have been more

sensitive to the cue that the AVF would result in inequality than liberal Democrats. Given the

small sample sizes, however, the main pattern observed in Appendix Figure 1 is the striking

similarity of treatment effects on Democrats across the ideological spectrum.

Appendix Figure 1: Treatment Effects for Democrats, Disaggregated by Ideology

Appendix Table 1: Treatment Interactions with Democratic Dummy Variable

	(1)
Draft	-0.19
	(0.21)
Draft * Democrat	-1.03***
	(0.32)
Draft will reduce inequality	-0.24
	(0.22)
Draft will reduce inequality * Democrat	-0.60*
	(0.33)
Draft will not reduce inequality	-0.33
	(0.23)
Draft will not reduce inequality * Democrat	-1.01***
	(0.34)
No draft, will lead to inequality	0.16
	(0.25)
No draft, will lead to inequality * Democrat	-0.61*
	(0.35)
Democrat	0.79***
	(0.26)
Republican	0.70***
	(0.15)
Education	0.06*
	(0.04)
Age	0.01***
	(0.00)
White	0.09
	(0.12)
Male	0.78***
	(0.11)
Observations	1,196

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Note: Ordered logit model of war support measured on a five point scale. Treatment 1 (no draft; no information about inequality) is the omitted baseline.

Appendix Table 2: Self-Interest as an Alternative Moderating Factor

	(1)
Draft	-.51***
	(.20)
Draft * Self-interest	-.48
	(.33)
Draft will reduce inequality	-.48**
	(.21)
Draft will reduce inequality * Self-interest	-.13
	(.33)
Draft will not reduce inequality	-.71***
	(.21)
Draft will not reduce inequality * Self-interest	-.24
	(.38)
No draft, will lead to inequality	-.19
	(.22)
No draft, will lead to inequality * Self-interest	.22
	(.36)
Self-interest	.38
	(.28)
Democrat	.13
	(.14)
Republican	.69***
	(.15)
Education	.06
	(.04)
Age	.02***
	(.01)
White	.08
	(.12)
Male	.77***
	(.11)
Observations	1,196

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Ordered logit model of war support measured on a five point scale. Treatment 1 (no draft; no information about inequality) is the omitted baseline.