Supplemental Information for: Responding to War on Capitol Hill

Inter-coder Reliability

To code the more than 7,500 speeches used in the empirical analysis, we employed a team of coders, first to construct a data set from the war's initiation in March of 2003 through May 2006 and then to extend the data set through the conclusion of the 111th Congress in December 2010. To identify congressional speeches concerning the Iraq War, coders ran a fulltext search to retrieve all speeches containing the word "Iraq" that were given on the floor of the House of Representatives during this period. Coders then read each speech looking for specific arguments either supporting or opposing the initial decision to invade Iraq and for arguments concerning its future conduct, particularly whether the United States should stay the course or begin to withdraw. If a speech did not make any specific arguments along either dimension, the speech was coded as neutral and not included in the final data set. If one or more arguments regarding the war were made, the coder then made a summary judgment of whether the speech – on the whole – was either supportive of the war and/or the president's conduct of it, or opposed to the war and/or the president's conduct of it. The complete instructions given to coders are provided in Appendix 1. As questions arose during the course of coding, questions concerning specific speeches were circulated to the entire team for discussion and group evaluation.

During both stages of the coding, at random points in the temporal sequence we asked multiple coders to code the same date ranges. Because each speech could be coded in three ways (pro-war, anti-war, neutral/not coded), we then calculated Cohen's Kappa as a measure of intercoder reliability. Scores ranged from .895 to .970, and in almost every case of disagreement, the disagreement involved one coder judging that a speech did not make a clear argument one way or the other and the other giving it a direction. In only one case did we find one coder giving a summary judgment of pro-war and another giving the same speech a summary code of anti-war.

As an additional robustness check on the reliability of our data, for speeches made between 3/19/2003 and 5/31/2006, we also asked coders to identify the presence or absence of 46 specific arguments, 12 each for and against the initial decision to use force in Iraq, and 11 each supporting and opposing the conduct of the invasion/occupation of the country. These are described in Appendix 1. While it is possible that a speech could make more anti-war arguments than pro-war arguments and still, on the whole, be supportive of the war and the president (e.g. a Republican member might acknowledge the war's high costs, high casualties, failure to find WMDs, etc., but ultimately argue that establishing a democracy in Iraq is worth even these unexpectedly high costs), generally we would expect a fairly high level of congruence between the balance of pro- and anti-war arguments and the summary coding judgment employed in the analyses in the manuscript. Of the more than 2,000 speeches during this period that contained more anti-war than pro-war arguments, all but 14 were given a summary code of anti-war. Similarly, more than 98% of speeches that contained more pro-war arguments than anti-war arguments were given the summary code of pro-war. Given these varied checks, we are confident that our data exhibits a high degree of inter-coder reliability.

Moreover, this alternative way of identifying negative speeches – as those speeches that contained more anti-war arguments than pro-war arguments – also provides an important robustness check on the results presented in Table 2. Estimating similar analyses with data from 3/2003-5/2006 and using the number of speeches with more anti-war than pro-war arguments made by each Member of Congress during this period as the dependent variable yields very similar results to those presented in the text. Most importantly, for both Democratic and Republican Members of Congress, district casualties significantly increase the volume of antiwar rhetoric.

Additional Analysis of Aggregate Data

SI Figures 1 and 2 plot the Democratic and Republican House anti-war rhetoric series over time from March 2003 through December 2010. These two series, from 2003 through the conclusion of President Bush's term in office in December of 2008, form the dependent variable for the models reported in Table 1 of the text. In the early months of the campaign, as American forces raced to Baghdad, congressional criticism of the war was rare. However, as the insurgency kindled and took hold in the summer of 2003, some criticism of the administration emerged, and the volume of congressional criticism increased sharply during the debate over the \$87 billion supplemental appropriations bill to fund continued operations and reconstruction in Iraq. Vocal criticism of the administration died down in the aftermath of its legislative victory only to flare up periodically at various stages throughout the next two and a half years of the conflict. The Democratic victories of 2006, coupled with the surge led to increased congressional criticism of the war on the floor from members of both parties. Finally, congressional anti-war rhetoric waned again in later years as the war slowly and gradually began to draw toward a close.

Scholars have long debated both the functional form of the relationship between casualties and various political phenomena of interest as well as how casualties should be measured (e.g. current month, lagged, quarterly, etc.). In the text, we used unlogged casualties in the preceding month. Using alternative specifications of casualties, such as logged or quarterly casualties, lagged or unlagged, yields very similar results. Each measure is highly correlated with patterns in Democratic anti-war rhetoric and only weakly correlated with Republican antiwar rhetoric, as summarized in the simple bivariate correlation coefficients shown in SI Table 1.

During five months in our period, Congress was not in session for even a single day. As such, in these months by definition there were no anti-war speeches. The models in Table 1 control for the number of days that Congress was in session during a month. However, to insure that including these observations did not skew the results, the first two columns of SI Table 2 replicate the models in Table 1 without these five observations. Results are virtually identical to those presented in the text.

Another variable, apart from combat casualties, that might be included in the analysis to examine whether partisan rhetoric responds to developments on the battlefield is a measure of major negative conflict events. Following previous scholars' attempts to track critical events in the ongoing course of a war (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Gronke and Brehm 2002), negative events for Iraq were identified using the annual chronologies of the World Almanac and the Time Almanac. Examples of negative events include: the assassination of the UN envoy to Iraq; the public revelation of systematic prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; and the issuance of the Duelfer report finding no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After identifying a list of possible events, we had a team of three coders assess whether each met the criteria for rally events outlined in previous research; where there was disagreement, we adopted the majority's judgment. The second set of models in SI Table 2 reports the results of a negative binomial model identical to that presented in Table 1 of the text, but that also includes the negative events variable. In the Democratic model, the negative events coefficient is positive as expected, but narrowly misses conventional levels of statistical significance. In the Republican anti-war rhetoric model, the relevant coefficient is negative and not statistically significant. These results are also generally

consistent with our hypothesis that, in the aggregate, Democratic members will respond to conflict developments when crafting their level of public anti-war rhetoric, whereas Republicans will not.

Finally, we also investigated whether the relationships between casualties and anti-war rhetoric were different when President Obama held office. SI Table 3 replicates the models from Table 1 in the text as well as SI Table 2 for all observations from 2003 through the end of 2010. To examine whether the dynamics were different across the two presidencies, these models include a dummy variable identifying months in which Obama was in office and the interaction of this dummy variable with the casualties measure. In each case, the coefficient on the interaction failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance, while the coefficient for the casualties variable remains positive and statistically significant in all three models of Democratic anti-war rhetoric.¹

Individual Members' Anti-War Rhetoric

Figure 2 in the text plots the estimated effect of increases in constituency casualties on both Democratic and Republican House members' number of anti-war floor speeches. SI Figures 5 and 6 plot these predicted values for each partisan group separately with 95% confidence intervals derived from simulations. Figures 3 and 4 in the text also graphically illustrate the effect of constituency casualties on House Democrats' and Republicans' level of anti-war rhetoric. These effects are from simulations derived from the models presented in SI Table 4. This model interacts the main local casualties variable and the GOP-local casualties interaction variable with a series of dummies for each Congress.

¹ A final concern is the potential for serial correlation in the error terms of our event count models; however, autoregressive poisson models yield virtually identical results to those presented in Table 1 in the text.

Robustness Checks

The following tables present a series of robustness checks on the base analyses of individual members' levels of anti-war rhetoric presented in Table 2 of the text. First, SI Table 5 presents the simplest possible models. It estimates separate models for Democrats and Republicans, and models the number of anti-war speeches given by members of each group only as a function of some measure of constituency casualties and temporal dummy variables identifying each Congress. Specifically, these models measure casualties as the logged number of total casualties within 50 or 100 miles of a district centroid, and the logged number of casualties sustained during the current Congress within 50 or 100 miles of a district centroid. In every case save one (logged current Congress casualties within 100 miles for Republican members), the relevant casualties coefficient is positive and statistically significant.

SI Table 6 re-estimates the model presented in Table 2, but uses the logged number of casualties within 100 miles of the district centroid (rather than 50 miles) as the independent variable of interest. Doing so yields virtually identical results to those presented in Table 2 in the text. Most importantly, the coefficient for the main effects local casualties measure is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient for the local casualties-Republican interaction is also positive, but fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Throughout the individual members' rhetoric models in the text, we used logged constituency casualty totals. We used logs for two reasons. Most importantly, as described in the text, we have strong theoretical reasons to believe the relationship between district casualties and anti-war position-taking is non-linear. That is, an increase in district casualties from 10 to 30 may have a much greater impact than an increase from 100 to 120. Moreover, the tallies of casualties within 50 miles of a district centroid computed via GIS have a number of outliers at

the upper end of the distribution. This can be seen in SI Figure 4. There are a fair number of relatively extreme values at the far right end of the figure; this is particularly clear when contrasted with the distribution of monthly aggregate casualties presented in SI Figure 3. In SI Figure 3, there are few outlying values, and as a result we used unlogged measures.

Nevertheless, the relationships are similar when unlogged casualties are used. SI Table 7 replicates the model presented in Table 2 of the text, but with the unlogged number of casualties within 50 or 100 miles of a district centroid. When all observations are included, the relevant coefficients are positive, but not statistically significant. However, when the top 5% of observations in terms of unlogged casualty counts are dropped, the coefficients are considerably larger and, for the 50 mile measure, statistically significant. The coefficients are even larger and statistically significant for both 50 and 100 mile measures when the outlying top 10% of observations in terms of unlogged casualty counts are dropped.

Finally, SI Tables 8 and 9 replicate the base model in Table 2, but with several additional controls. The model in SI Table 8 includes unreported state fixed effects. Even after allowing the intercept to vary by state, the results remain virtually identical to those presented in the text. Because the GIS casualty counts within 50 miles of a district centroid generate higher casualty counts, on average, in urban districts than in rural districts, the first model in SI Table 9 controls for the percentage of a district's population in urban areas. The second model in SI Table 9 also controls for a district's median family income and its racial composition. In both models, results are virtually identical to those presented in Table 2 of the text.

Constituency Casualties and Democratic Voting Behavior

To insure that the relationships between constituency casualties and Democratic anti-war voting are not limited to the 50 mile radius casualty measures, SI Tables 10 and 11 replicate the analyses from Tables 3 and 4 in the text using 100 mile radius casualty measures. Results are virtually identical across specifications.

SI Table 12 examines whether Democrats who represented districts that would later experience high numbers of casualties were already more likely to oppose the Iraq War even before its initiation. Column 2 presents the number of Democrats voting for and against the authorization to use force against Iraq. Columns 3-6 present the average number of casualties that would be suffered by the constituencies of pro-authorization and anti-authorization Democrats in later years. None of the difference in means between pro-authorization and antiauthorization Democrats are statistically significant – representatives from districts that would later sustain higher casualty totals were no more or less likely to oppose the war in 2002 than fellow Democrats from districts that would later suffer lower casualty totals. This strongly suggests that variation in local casualties is causing the different voting behaviors illustrated in Table 3 of the article text.

The only major war-related vote from March 2003 through December 2011 on which we observe a modicum of Republican divergence (17 breaking from the party line) was a resolution disapproving of the surge in 2007 (H Con Res 63). However, neither simple difference in means analyses nor multivariate models similar to those in Table 4 using constituency casualties within 50 or 100 miles yields significant differences between these 17 and their co-partisan peers. The only war-related vote during this period on which we observe a modicum of Republican divergence (17 breaking from the party line) was a resolution disapproving of the surge in 2007 (H Con Res 63). However, neither simple differences needed to be a modicum of Republican divergence (17 breaking from the party line) was a resolution disapproving of the surge in 2007 (H Con Res 63). However, neither simple difference in means analyses nor multivariate models within the party line) was a resolution disapproving of the surge in 2007 (H Con Res 63).

similar to those in Table 4 using constituency casualties within 50 or 100 miles yields significant differences between these 17 and their co-partisan peers. Thus, whereas district casualties had some influence on Republican members' willingness to publicly criticize the war from the House floor, they appear to have had little influence on their willingness to cast votes openly critical of the administration and the war effort.

Gallup Public Opinion Models

In a prior version of this manuscript, we included an additional independent variable in the Gallup poll models: logged casualties within 50 miles of the district centroid. To eliminate any potential confusion for readers, in the article we chose to present models that only included our independent variable of interest – the number of anti-war speeches given by each individual's member of Congress – and the individual-level demographics provided by Gallup. SI Tables 13 and 14 replicate the analyses presented in Tables 5 and 6 in the text with the local casualties measure. Results are very similar to those presented in the text. In SI Table 13, in all four models the coefficients for the relevant anti-war rhetoric variables are in the expected direction and statistically significant. In the two "Stay the Course" models, the coefficients for the casualties measure are negative and statistically significant. Thus, these models afford evidence that local casualties – despite the Iraq War's smaller scale – directly influenced public support for the war in Iraq, just as Gartner, Segura and Wilkening (1997) and Kriner and Shen (2010) documented they did in Vietnam. However, these models suggest that local casualties may have an even greater influence on opinion dynamics indirectly though their influence on the public position-taking of congressional elites.

Instrumental Variables Analysis

In the text, we estimated a pair of instrumental variable probit models that account for endogeneity in the relationships between public support for the Iraq War and the level of antiwar rhetoric that members of Congress transmit to their constituents. In this approach, we use our instrument, congressional seniority, to generate predicted values of anti-war rhetoric that are then included in the models of subjects' attitudes toward the Iraq War. In both models, standard test statistics suggest that an instrumental variables approach is warranted. The Wald tests of exogeneity in the Iraq a Mistake model reports that we can reject the null of exogeneity, p<.05. The Wald test of exogeneity in the Stay the Course model reports that we can reject the null of exogeneity, p<.10.

In the text, we report the results from the main equations. The first stage equations are reported in SI Table 14. Most importantly, the first stage equations plainly show that our instrument – a member's seniority within the House – is a strong, statistically significant predictor of a member's level of anti-war rhetoric. Finally, Anderson-Rubin tests of both models that are robust to weak instruments allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between anti-war rhetoric and wartime opinions, p<.05.

As a final robustness check, we re-estimated our models using a simpler two stage least squares regression approach, which makes fewer distributional assumptions than instrumental variable probit. Results are presented in SI Table 15. As in the preceding case, robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests reject the null of exogeneity, p < .05. In both second stage equations, the coefficients for anti-war congressional rhetoric are in the expected directions and statistically significant. Greater exposure to elite anti-war rhetoric increases the probability of a respondent judging the Iraq War a mistake and decreases the probability of that respondent preferring to stay

the course in Iraq instead of withdrawing expeditiously. In the unreported first stage equations in both the mistake and stay the course models, the coefficient for our instrumental variable, congressional seniority, is in the expected direction and statistically significant, p < .01. Moreover, the resulting F-statistic in both models is greater than 10, and statistically significant p< .01; similarly, in both models the Anderson canonical correlation statistic allows us to reject the null of model under-identification, p < .01. Finally, in both models the Anderson-Rubin test statistic, which is robust to weak instruments, allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between exposure to elite anti-war rhetoric and public support for the Iraq War in the main equation, p < .05.



SI Figure 1: House Democratic Anti-war Rhetoric, 2003-2010



SI Figure 2: House Republican Anti-war Rhetoric, 2003-2010



SI Figure 3: Distribution of Monthly Iraq War Casualties, 2003-2010



SI Figure 4: Distribution of Casualty Tallies Within 50 Miles of CD Centroids, 110th Congress



SI Figure 5: Local Casualties and Anti-War Rhetoric, Democrats

Note: The solid line plots the predicted number of anti-war speeches for the median Democrat at each level of district casualties. Dotted lines plot 95% confidence intervals.



SI Figure 6: Local Casualties and Anti-War Rhetoric, Republicans

Note: The solid line plots the predicted number of anti-war speeches for the median Republican at each level of district casualties. Dotted lines plot 95% confidence intervals.

	Democrats	Republicans
Casualties in current month	.16	.02
Casualties in last month	.31	.07
Ln casualties in current month	.22	.05
Ln casualties in last month	.29	.09
Casualties in last quarter	.32	.11
Ln casualties in last quarter	.32	.11

SI Table 1: Monthly Anti-War Speech Counts and Casualties Correlations

Note: Each cell presents the bivariate correlation coefficient between the relevant measure of US Iraq War casualties and the monthly number of Democratic or Republican anti-war speeches given on the House floor.

SI Table 2: Aggregate Models (2003-2008) Robustness Checks

	No 0 days		Eve	ents
	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP
Casualties	0.08**	0.04	0.11**	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Approval	0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Unemployment	-0.52*	-0.05	-0.32	0.07
	(0.29)	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.43)
Days in session	0.15***	0.13***	0.14***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Negative conflict events			0.41	-0.17
			(0.27)	(0.42)
Constant	4.00***	0.45	3.61**	0.03
	(1.36)	(2.12)	(1.68)	(2.05)
Observations	65	65	70	70

Negative binomial event count models of the monthly number of anti-war speeches given by a partisan group in the House. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

	All		No 0	days	Events	
	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP
Casualties	0.13***	0.07	0.10**	0.05	0.11**	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Casualties X Obama	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Approval	-0.01	-0.03**	0.00	-0.03**	-0.01	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployment	-0.25	0.12	-0.31	0.08	-0.24	0.12
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Days in session	0.14***	0.13***	0.14***	0.12***	0.14***	0.13***
-	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Obama	0.23	-0.54	0.47	-0.37	0.17	-0.52
	(0.96)	(1.34)	(0.93)	(1.33)	(0.97)	(1.33)
Negative conflict events					0.42	-0.16
-					(0.27)	(0.41)
Constant	3.26***	0.03	3.40***	0.16	3.41***	-0.02
	(0.99)	(1.41)	(0.98)	(1.45)	(1.00)	(1.39)
Observations	94	94	87	87	94	94

SI Table 3: Aggregate Models (2003-2010) with Obama Interactions

Negative binomial event count models of the monthly number of anti-war speeches given by a partisan group in the House. Robust standard errors in parentheses All significance tests are two-tailed.

Ln casualties * 108 th Congress	0.35***
C	(0.10)
Ln casualties * 109 th Congress	0.31***
e	(0.10)
Ln casualties * 110 th Congress	0.16**
e	(0.08)
Ln casualties * 111 th Congress	0.08
C C	(0.13)
Ln casualties * 108 th Congress * Republican	-0.03
	(0.20)
Ln casualties * 109 th Congress * Republican	-0.15
	(0.18)
Ln casualties * 110 th Congress * Republican	-0.02
	(0.13)
Ln casualties * 111 th Congress * Republican	0.33**
	(0.13)
Republican	-2.99***
	(0.40)
Leader	-0.26
	(0.18)
Foreign policy committee memberships	0.33***
	(0.10)
Seniority in chamber	0.04***
	(0.01)
Military veteran	0.70***
	(0.19)
Female	0.38**
	(0.16)
Latino	-1.42***
	(0.16)
African American	-0.23
100.1 C	(0.16)
109th Congress	0.12
1104 0	(0.43)
110th Congress	0.89**
111th Congress	(0.36)
111th Congress	-0.69
Constant	(0.01)
Constant	(0.27)
	(0.29)
Observations	1,769

SI Table 4: Effect of Local Casualties on Rhetoric by Congress

Note: Model is a negative binomial event count. Dependent variable is the number of anti-war speeches given by a House member in a given Congress. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP	Dem	GOP
Ln casualties w/in 50 miles of district	0.22***	0.30**						
Ln casualties w/in 100 miles of district	(0.05)	(0.15)	0.18***	0.31*				
Ln current Congress casualties w/in 50 miles of district			(0.00)	(0.10)	0.22***	0.35**		
Ln current Congress casualties w/in 100 miles of district					(0.06)	(0.17)	0.18**	0.23
109th Congress	0.06 (0.20)	-0.18 (0.51)	0.09 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.55)	0.20 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.51)	(0.08) 0.21 (0.19)	(0.21) -0.02 (0.55)
110th Congress	0.19 (0.17)	0.38 (0.44)	0.22 (0.17)	0.32 (0.47)	0.47*** (0.16)	0.78** (0.39)	0.45*** (0.17)	0.70* (0.42)
111th Congress	-1.60*** (0.23)	-0.06 (0.60)	-1.57*** (0.23)	-0.11 (0.61)	-0.92*** (0.25)	0.87 (0.59)	-0.98*** (0.31)	0.73 (0.70)
Constant	1.13*** (0.18)	-2.01*** (0.42)	1.11*** (0.27)	-2.29*** (0.59)	1.13*** (0.19)	-2.11*** (0.46)	1.10*** (0.31)	-2.04*** (0.73)
Observations	913	854	913	854	913	854	913	854

SI Table 5: Reduced Form Models of Local Casualties and Anti-War Speeches By Partisan Group

In each negative binomial event count model, the dependent variable is the number of anti-war speeches made by a member of Congress in a given Congress. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

SI Table 6: Casualties Within 100 Miles of District

	(1)
Ln casualties w/in 100 miles of district	0.17**
Casualties * Republican	(0.07) 0.18
Leader	(0.14) -0.22
Republican	(0.20) -3.66***
Foreign policy committee memberships	(0.56) 0.36***
Seniority in chamber	(0.11) 0.04***
Military veteran	(0.01) 0.76***
Female	(0.21) 0.41***
Latino	(0.16) -1 31***
African American	(0.17)
100th Congress	(0.15)
110th Congress	-0.01 (0.18)
111th Congress	(0.16) 1 20***
Tith Congress	-1.20*** (0.26)
Constant	0.56** (0.27)
Observations	1,769

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

	All	Drop 5%	Drop top 10%	All	Drop 5%	Drop top 10%
Casualties w/in 50 miles of district	0.02	0.06***	0.11***			
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)			
Casualties w/in 50 * Republican	0.00	0.00	0.01			
I I I I	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Casualties w/in 100 miles of district	()			0.00	0.01	0.04***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Casualties w/in 50 * Republican				0.00	0.00	-0.00
1				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Republican	-3.06***	-3.06***	-3.10***	-3.04***	-3.05***	-2.97***
1	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Leader	-0.18	-0.27	-0.40**	-0.17	-0.22	-0.32
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Foreign policy committee memberships	0.35***	0.33***	0.34***	0.36***	0.36***	0.40***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Seniority in chamber	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***
-	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Military veteran	0.76***	0.77***	0.78***	0.75***	0.79***	0.80***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Female	0.43***	0.44***	0.42**	0.43***	0.45***	0.44***
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Latino	-1.32***	-1.47***	-1.53***	-1.25***	-1.29***	-1.45***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
African American	-0.15	-0.16	-0.19	-0.13	-0.10	-0.12
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
109th Congress	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.15	0.10	0.01
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
110th Congress	0.49***	0.43***	0.36**	0.54***	0.49***	0.40**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
111th Congress	-1.03***	-1.05***	-1.12***	-0.98***	-0.98***	-1.00***
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Constant	1.07***	0.97***	0.89***	1.07***	1.03***	0.87***
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Observations	1 760	1 677	1 504	1 760	1 602	1 502
Observations	1,709	1,077	1,J74	1,709	1,000	1,393

SI Table 7: Unlogged Constituency Casualties Measures and Anti-war Rhetoric

Models in columns 2 and 5 drop the top 5% of districts on the 50 or 100 mile casualty count metric. Models in columns 3 and 6 drop the top 10% of districts on the 50 or 100 mile casualty count metric. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

Ln casualties w/in 50 miles of district	0.17**
	(0.07)
Ln casualties * Republican	0.07
	(0.11)
Republican	-3.17***
	(0.35)
Leader	-0.12
	(0.22)
Foreign policy committee memberships	0.27***
	(0.09)
Seniority in chamber	0.03***
	(0.01)
Military veteran	0.65***
	(0.15)
Female	0.33**
	(0.14)
Latino	-1.32***
	(0.19)
African American	0.01
	(0.15)
109th Congress	0.03
	(0.16)
110th Congress	0.44^{***}
	(0.15)
111th Congress	-1.20***
	(0.22)
Constant	-16.18
	(18.07)
Observations	1,769

SI Table 8: Constituency Casualties and Anti-war Rhetoric model with State Fixed Effects

Model also includes unreported state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

	(1)	(2)
Ln casualties w/in 50 miles of district	0.16**	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ln casualties * Republican	0.11	0.12
-	(0.12)	(0.13)
Republican	-3.23***	-3.29***
	(0.39)	(0.40)
Leader	-0.23	-0.07
	(0.18)	(0.17)
Foreign policy committee memberships	0.32***	0.34***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Seniority in chamber	0.04***	0.05***
·	(0.01)	(0.01)
Military veteran	0.76***	0.78***
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Female	0.38**	0.41***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Latino	-1.36***	-1.17***
	(0.16)	(0.21)
African American	-0.22	0.19
	(0.15)	(0.22)
109th Congress	0.01	-0.01
-	(0.18)	(0.18)
110th Congress	0.37**	0.34**
	(0.17)	(0.17)
111th Congress	-1.17***	-1.22***
	(0.26)	(0.27)
% Urban in district	0.35	0.95*
	(0.42)	(0.49)
% White in district		1.48***
		(0.49)
Median family income in district		-0.00
		(0.00)
Constant	0.41	-0.97
	(0.30)	(0.64)
Observations	1,769	1,769

SI Table 9: Constituency Casualties and Anti-war Rhetoric model with District-level Demographic Controls

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Year	Bill	Number of Votes	Avg. Casualties
2003	HR 3289		
	Anti-war	118	11.3
	Pro-war	83	9.2
2004	H Res 557		
	Anti-war	105	19.8
	Pro-war	90	14.8
2005	Woolsey amdt. to HR1815		
	Anti-war	122	52.2
	Pro-war	79	42.6
2007	HR 2237		
	Anti-war	169	104.9
	Pro-war	59	62.7

SI Table 10: District Casualties (Within 100 Miles) and Democratic Voting Patterns on Iraq War

The differences in average casualties (within 100 miles of the district centroid) between anti-war and pro-war votes for all votes are statistically significant, p < .05.

	2003	2004	2005	2007
	HR 3289	H Res 557	HR 1815	HR 2237
Ln casualties within 100 miles	0.09	0.38*	0.45**	0.79***
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Leader	-0.25	-0.96	-1.17	-0.43
	(0.87)	(0.77)	(0.95)	(1.33)
Foreign policy committee memberships	-0.29	-0.56*	-0.90***	-0.20
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Seniority in chamber	0.05	0.11**	0.01	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Veteran	-0.49	0.02	-0.26	-0.65
	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.43)
Black	2.23***	2.14***	1.29***	2.01***
	(0.63)	(0.55)	(0.46)	(0.78)
Latino	0.38	0.71	0.26	0.29
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.61)
Female	0.90**	1.35***	0.23	1.01**
	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.41)	(0.49)
Constant	-0.38	-2.21***	-1.13*	-3.04***
	(0.44)	(0.62)	(0.68)	(0.91)
Observations	201	195	201	228

SI Table 11: Logged Constituency Casualties and Democratic Voting Behavior, (100 miles)

Logit models were utilized when the dependent variable is casting an anti-war vote. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

		Casualties				
	Number	2003	2004	2005	2007	
No	124	5.3	9.0	26.3	52.1	
Aye	79	4.9	7.9	23.0	46.1	
p-value		.26	.17	.15	.17	

SI Table 12: Democratic Votes on 2002 HJ Res 114 Authorizing Iraq War

Note: This table examines whether Democrats who represented districts that would later experience high numbers of casualties were already more likely to oppose the Iraq War even before its initiation. Column 2 presents the number of Democrats voting for and against the authorization to use force against Iraq. Columns 3-6 present the average number of casualties that would be suffered by the constituencies of pro-authorization and anti-authorization Democrats in later years. None of the difference in means between pro-authorization and anti-authorization Democrats are statistically significant – representatives from districts that would later sustain higher casualty totals were no more or less likely to oppose the war in 2002 than fellow Democrats from districts that would later suffer lower casualty totals. This strongly suggests that variation in local casualties is causing the different voting behaviors illustrated in Table 3 of the article text.

SI Table 13. Gamup Opinion Models with District Casualities	SI	Table	13:	Gallup	Opinion	Models	With	District	Casualties
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	Mistake	Stay the course	Mistake	Stay the course
House anti-war speeches	0.06*	-0.06**	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Anti-war speeches * Know party			0.24**	-0.09*
			(0.10)	(0.05)
Ln Casualties w/in 50 miles	0.02	-0.09**	0.02	-0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Republican	-1.07***	0.71***	-1.07***	0.70***
•	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Democrat	0.68***	-0.29***	0.67***	-0.28***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Age	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***	0.01**
0	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.01	0.13***	-0.01	0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male	0.04	0.43***	0.01	0.44***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)
White	-0.49***	0.30***	-0.51***	0.30***
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Know party of Congressman			0.07	0.00
			(0.10)	(0.08)
Constant	0.06		0.13	
	(0.27)		(0.27)	
Observations	970	956	970	956

"Mistake" models are probits and "Stay the course" models are ordered probits. For the latter, cut-points are omitted. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

	Anti-War Speeches	Anti-War Speeches
	(Iraq a Mistake)	(Stay the Course)
Seniority in chamber	.035***	.036***
	(.011)	(.011)
Republican	170	179
	(.113)	(.112)
Democrat	.187*	.149
	(.109)	(.109)
Age	004	004
-	(.003)	(.003)
Education	.098**	.091*
	(.048)	(.048)
Male	.081	.051
	(.090)	(.090)
White	132	145
	(.128)	(.128)
Constant	.193	.225
	(.251)	(.251)
Observations	970	956

SI Table 14: First Stage Equations from Instrumental Variable Probit Models

All significance tests are two-tailed.

SI Table 15: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions

	Mistake	Stay the course
House anti-war speeches*	0.203*	-0.225*
Ĩ	(0.112)	(0.116)
Republican	-0.349***	0.284***
1	(0.045)	(0.048)
Democrat	0.187***	-0.066
	(0.045)	(0.046)
Age	0.003***	0.001
0	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.016	0.049**
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Male	-0.004	0.153***
	(0.034)	(0.035)
White	-0.119**	0.109**
	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	0.477***	0.192*
	(0.098)	(0.106)
Observations	970	956
Anderson canon. corr. statistic	10.316	10.785
	(p=.001)	(p=.001)
Anderson-Rubin test statistic	4.52	5.09
	(p=.03)	(p=.02)

"House Anti-War Speeches*" are predicted values obtained from a first stage OLS model using a member's seniority in the House as an instrumental variable. All significance tests are two-tailed.

Appendix 1: Instructions to Coders (for all years, 2003-2010)

Search instructions:

- Go to the Library of Congress web page, <u>http://thomas.loc.gov</u>
- Select the appropriate Congress for the dates that you will search within (entered below)
- Enter "Iraq" in the search bar. Check "Exact Match Only" button.
- Select "Any Representative" (leave "Member speaking or mentioned" checked, as well as combine multiple members with "OR")
- Under Section of Congressional Record, leave only the box "House" checked.
- Because Thomas will only return the first 2,000 hits, you will need to use smaller increments of time. Select the "From" button and then enter annual increments to avoid returning too many hits, e.g. click the "From" button and enter "1/1/2007" through "12/1/2007".
- Finally, under "Sort results by date" select "Yes."

Speeches Not Included:

- Speeches honoring fallen troops, unless they contained significant arguments either in support or in opposition of the war effort
 - For example, in Congressman Wilson's speech on 06/25/2003, he said, "I ask all of my colleagues to join me in extending to O.J.'s family our most sincere thanks for their son's sacrifice and commitment to bringing liberty and freedom to the oppressed people of Iraq while protecting the American public in the war against terrorism." Though the speech honored a fallen soldier, Congressman Wilson still made an argument in favor of the war effort. Thus, we coded for "Establishing Democracy" and for "War in Iraq is part of the war on terror."
- A small number of "hits" may not be speeches at all, but just the text of legislation mentioning the word "Iraq." These hits are not coded.

Summary Evaluation of Speaker's Comments:

Read each speech paying careful attention to the arguments made by the speaker either for or against the war in Iraq and/or the president's Iraq war policies. If a speech does not make any explicit arguments for or against the war (and/or the president's conduct of it), then the speech is not coded and not included in the final data set.

For example, consider the following line from Congressman Poe's June 2006 speech on border security:

"Lawlessness on the border breeds lawlessness in the heart of America. And 13 legal citizens will die because a drunk illegal got behind the wheel of a car. That occurs today, and tomorrow, and every day. That is 28,000 homicides by illegals since 2003, 10 times the number of U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan."

This speech does not contain any content taking a position on the war in Iraq one way or the other, and therefore it is not coded.

For all other speeches that do make one or more arguments concerning the war, please make a summary assessment of whether the speech on balance is supportive of the war and/or the president's war policies, or opposed to it. Thus, each speech that makes one or more arguments directly related to the war should be coded as either:

- Pro-Bush (or Obama from 2009-10)/Supportive of the War
- Anti-Bush (or Obama from 2009-10)/Negative toward the war

In making this determination, please include only parts of speeches that forward opinions pertaining to rationale supporting/opposing the initial invasion or the subsequent occupation.

For example, in Congressman Crowley's speech on 4/1/2003, he lays out his reasoning for supporting the invasion toward the beginning, yet he heavily criticizes Bush's treatment of veterans for the rest of the speech. Therefore, only that initial part of the speech is included to determine this coding category. Because his speech reaffirms his believe that the decision to invade was correct and it does not call for a change in course in Iraq, it is included in the "Pro-Bush/Positive" category and not the "Anti-Bush/Negative" category.

Any speech that advocates drawing down our commitment, even if the speaker claims to have supported the initial decision to invade, should be coded as Anti-Bush/Negative.

If the speech does not explicitly take a position on staying the course vs. withdrawal or on whether the initial invasion was right or wrong, give your assessment of whether the various arguments presented in the speech – on balance – reflected positively toward the war or negatively toward it.

For example, if a speech focuses heavily on the costs of the conflict – in lives and/or dollars – but does not explicitly take a position one way or the other, code this as positive.

Alternatively, if a speech acknowledges the costs of the conflict, but strongly emphasizes the benefits the war has brought to the United States and to the Iraqi people (without explicitly saying the war was right or that we should stay), code the speech as positive.

Consider the following speech from Congressman Royce:

This is a war unlike any other we have fought, and it has been vexing. All of us, supporters and opponents of this resolution alike, Republicans and Democrats, all Americans, have a vital interest in our Nation succeeding in helping to build a stable Iraq and defeating Islamist terrorism. That is the challenge of our time. we have heard, mistakes have been made. There is no doubt about that. I have been dismayed by some of them: the lethargy in training Iraqi troops, the inability to meter oil and protect civilian infrastructure. But we can't allow this to cloud our strategic judgments. To my mind, this resolution, indeed our struggle in Iraq, can be boiled down to two questions: Are Iraq and the global struggle against Islamist terrorism separable? And is Iraq hopeless? The answer to both questions is no."

In the remainder, Royce explicitly calls for staying the course, but if the speech ended here, this should still be coded as Pro-Bush/Supportive of the war.

Additional Instructions for Coders (3/2003-5/2006)

In addition to the instructions above asking coders to make a summary judgment of whether a speech was, on balance, pro-Bush/supportive of the war, anti-Bush/negative toward the war, or made no clear arguments concerning the war, in the first stage of the coding project from March 19, 2003 through May 31, 2006, we also asked coders to identify the presence or absence of a specific set of arguments for or against the war. These are detailed below:

Arguments Supporting the Decision to Invade Iraq

- Saddam was a brutal dictator/tyrant; harmed his own people; his removal was justified
- The pre-emptive nature of the war is necessary to protect the United States
- Establishing democracy or freedom in Iraq/Liberating the Iraqi people are worthy goals
- Saddam defied the world; invasion was justified because it enforced UN resolutions/war is legitimate
- Military action was justified because it was not unilateral/coalition of the willing; US does not need UN approval to act
- Saddam had WMDs
- Saddam posed an imminent threat to the world/United States
- Saddam had ties with Al Qaeda or 9/11
- The war in Iraq is part of the war on terror
- The war in Iraq is having positive spillover effects in rest of Middle East/the world/ Saddam was destabilizing
- Administration did not intentionally mislead Congress/the nation; relied on best available intelligence
- Oil/Reconstruction profits (Halliburton) did not have anything to do with the decision to invade/Oil played only a negligible role

Arguments Opposing the Decision to Invade Iraq

- Saddam may be a brutal dictator/harm his own people but his removal was not justified.
- The pre-emptive nature of the war sets a bad precedent when there is no immediate threat to the US
- Establishing democracy in Iraq/Liberating the Iraqi people are worthy goals, but in the absence of an imminent threat to the US it alone does not justify military action
- Invasion violated international law/war was illegal/illegitimate/immoral
- Military action was unjustified because of the unilateral nature of the war
- Saddam did not have WMDs; The administration should not have sent troops in if it was unable to discover specific locations with WMDs within Iraq; Claims of WMDs are doubtful
 - For instance, in her speech on 06/11/2003, Congressman Jackson-Lee called for an independent investigation of the administration's claim that there were WMDs

in Iraq. She said that the American people deserved to know "the truth," meaning exactly which intelligent data the administration had. This speech and others like it were included in this category.

- Saddam did not pose an imminent threat to the world/United States
- Saddam did not have ties to 9/11 or Al Qaeda even if he was brutal
- The war in Iraq is a diversion from the war on terror; invasion has made Iraq a haven for terrorists, which it was not before
- US presence in Iraq destabilizing the Middle East and weakening US position in world
 - Arguments about the negative effects of Abu Ghraib should be included under this category.
- Bush misled country into war/was dishonest; The Administration handled intelligence information inappropriately prior to the war
- Oil/Reconstruction Profits (Halliburton) unjustly played a major role in the decision to invade

Support for the Conduct of the Invasion/Occupation

- More troops were not needed at the outset of the war; administration planning was adequate.
- US casualties were kept to a minimum and manageable
- Iraqi civilian casualties have been limited and pale in comparison to the brutality of Saddam's regime / The US has tried to limit Iraqi civilian casualties; Low Damages to Country of Iraq in general
- Sustained commitment of US troops necessary to ensure a democratic Iraq
- Costs of war/occupation/reconstruction are manageable; Iraq will help pay for its own reconstruction
- Troops are not spread too thinly across the globe to meet all of our national security priorities; Troops not overstretched
- Iraq is not hindering the military's ability to get all of the recruits it needs
- Military is making progress training Iraqi troops
- Situation on the ground improving
- Reconstruction efforts/Contracting is contributing to the growth of Iraqi infrastructure and economy
- Reconstruction is a successful multilateral effort; Administration is seeking needed international support

Opposition to the Conduct of the Invasion/Occupation

- More troops were needed at the outset of the war; no exit strategy; administration had poor planning
 - \circ Include arguments about the lack of body armor or other equipment in this category.
- US casualties were unacceptably high
- Iraqi civilian casualties were unacceptably high; High damages to Iraq in general

- Continued occupation by US troops hampering democracy; spurring insurgency; Iraqi people want us to leave.
- Costs of war/occupation/reconstruction have been frightfully high; Iraqi oil resources has not paid for the reconstruction as promised; Costs of war divert money from much-needed domestic programs
- Troops are spread too thinly across the globe to meet all of our national security priorities; Troops are overstretched
- Iraq is hindering the military's ability to get all of the recruits it needs
- Military is not making enough progress training Iraqi troops
- Situation on the ground deteriorating
- No-bid contracting process is wrong/costs taxpayers dollars; fraudulent contracts, wasteful recovery spending.
- Reconstruction is wrongly a unilateral effort; the Administration is not seeking needed international support

Included in the "Conduct of the Invasion/Occupation" categories are speeches that make prospective statements. For example, in Congressman Rangel's 03/19/2003 speech, he mentioned that the costs for the war would be high. This statement is coded in the "Costs of war" category even though his comment is a prediction.

In addition to the summary evaluation, we also asked coders, if relevant, to make a summary evaluation of whether the speech argued that:

- The US was right to invade Iraq
- The US was wrong to invade Iraq
- The US should stay the course or escalate our commitment in Iraq
- The US should withdraw or de-escalate our commitment to Iraq