A Battle is Brewing in the South China Sea: The Fight Between China and the Philippines
On Monday June 17th, a Philippine supply ship and a Chinese coast guard vessel collided off the Second Thomas Shoal, in the most recent confrontation between the two rivals in the South China Sea. The shoal belongs to the disputed Spratly Islands, which lie within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, but also within China’s “nine-dash line” maritime claims. Such a calculated collision exhibits the persistent tensions in the region perpetuated by Chinese aggression and Indo-Pacific defense. As the intensity of these confrontations grows and foreign intervention becomes more likely, the threat of region-wide war looms over the South China Sea.
History of Hostilities
Disputes over the territory in the South China Sea (SCS) began as early as the 1970s. However, satellite imagery in the 2020s has shown China to be increasing its efforts to reclaim the region through both the physical development of islands and the deepening of its military presence, particularly in the Parcel and Spratly Islands. China argues that the SCS embodies “historical waters,” claiming a u-shaped boundary known as the “nine-dash line,” that encompasses around 90% of the sea. These claims of sovereignty have heightened tensions with overlapping territorial claimants in the region, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. Each of these countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs)—as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a country’s exclusive rights to fishing and resource extraction within a 200 nautical mile radius of their coastlines—lies within the SCS. UNCLOS is an international agreement establishing the legal framework for regulation of ocean territory and maritime activities which has been signed by 168 countries, including China. However, the basis of China’s nine-dash line, and claims to economic and militaristic sovereignty within it, conflicts with the standards laid out by UNCLOS.
In recent years, China has been seen as the conflicts’ primary driver. China claims that foreign militaries cannot conduct operations within its EEZ (the theoretical nine-dash line) under international law. However, according to the United States and UNCLOS, claimant countries should have freedom of navigation even through other EEZs and aren’t required to notify the defendant of military activities. In an international court case in July 2016 initiated by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China’s nine-dash line under the terms of UNCLOS, and further ruled that China’s activities in the SCS and the Philippines’ EEZ, including island building, fishing practices, and naval interferences, were unlawful. China, however, has refused to accept the court’s authority on the matter.
Besides the upholding of basic international territorial rights, the contention in the region is largely due to its abundance of natural resources and its strategic position between international maritime routes. There is an estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas beneath its waters, as well as rich fishing areas along islands in the region. Additionally, the SCS contains crucial shipping lanes, encompassing around 3.4 trillion dollars or ⅕ of all global trade in 2016. According to the UN, an even greater ⅓ of all global shipping passes through the SCS today. For China specifically, the SCS poses a strategic position for repossession of Taiwan. Together, all this makes the region one of immense strategic economic and political competition, and renders China’s bid to control it more worrisome to international bystanders, as Chinese domination of the SCS could have global repercussions.
A Filipino Fight
As Xi Jinping has grown more aggressive over China’s claims in the SCS, the opposing Southeast Asian nations have taken steps to assert their own territorial claims, and confrontations in the sea have become increasingly prevalent and hostile. There is particular tension between China and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands, which lie within the Philippines’ EEZ, thus granting them resource extraction privileges, but also within China’s claimed nine-dash line. In recent years, this tension has reached a precarious state.
When Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos assumed office in June 2022, he countered the conciliatory stance of the previous president and instead adopted offensive tactics; increasing military actions in the region and strengthening diplomatic partnerships with Indo-Pacific neighbors and the United States. Since his incumbency, repeated confrontations between the two countries have occurred, and the likelihood of provoking a U.S. response due to their alliance with the Philippines has increased. In other words, “the failure of Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders to resolve the disputes diplomatically could undermine international laws governing maritime disputes and encourage destabilizing arms buildups.” China may not intend to start a war, but the international implications of their actions have worried many: “What’s happening in the West Philippine Sea is only a microcosm of what China wants to do to the world,” said Commodore Trinidad, a spokesman for the Philippine navy speaking on China’s expansionist ambitions. Foreign (especially U.S.) response to Chinese encroachment in the Philippines’ EEZ would likely requite all out conflict.
The Recent Run-in
To break down the most recent confrontation between China and the Philippines, it is important to note that the Philippine Coast Guard has conducted monthly resupply missions to a ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, since 1999. The Sierra Madre was strategically grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands as a means of maintaining a presence in the area. On June 17th, one such supply ship collided with a Chinese military vessel near the shoal, with both countries blaming the other for the incident. China claimed that the Philippine ship “ignored repeated ‘solemn warnings’ and instead proceeded to ‘dangerously and unprofessionally’ approach the Chinese coast guard vessel, leading to the collision.” The Philippine government quickly rejected this account, pointing to the damage inflicted by the Chinese forces. At least two military boats were bashed with machetes, axes, and hammers, damaging equipment including guns and inflatable life rafts, and several members of the Filipino navy were injured, with one man losing his thumb in the violent clash. Since 2023, the Chinese Coast Guard has used particularly aggressive tactics against these Philippine supply missions, and on June 15th, 2024, coincidently two days before the collision, the Chinese government issued new regulations that allow their coast guard to use lethal force against foreign ships in China’s claimed waters.
International Involvement
Use of lethal force, however, would threaten U.S. involvement. A Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States was signed in 1951, and there is concern that this treaty will draw the U.S. into a potential China-Philippines conflict. Beginning in the early 2020s, the two countries initiated joint naval drills in the SCS. As of March 2024, the U.S. Secretary of Defense reaffirmed that the treaty extended both countries’ armed forces and cooperation in the region. Besides the terms of the treaty, the United States’ involvement is explained by their economic and militaristic interests in the SCS. In securing freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication for their own benefit, and protecting their Philippine ally, the U.S. has challenged China’s claims and provided military support to the neighboring Indo-Pacific. The U.S. has also repeatedly warned China that the 1951 Treaty applies to the Sierra Madre case, and that a full attack there would instigate a U.S. response. Jose Manuel Romualdez, the Philippine Ambassador to the U.S., has cautioned that “a conflict with China over [the Second Thomas Shoal] would engulf countries across the Indo-Pacific” and even raises concerns over “a possible nuclear war.”
Alongside the U.S., other foreign actors, including Canada and Japan, have stepped in. The Royal Canadian Navy conducted bilateral operations with the U.S. in the SCS on June 18th through 20th after the recent clash, showcasing a “strong commitment to regional security and cooperation.” Even China’s historical rival, Japan, has sold military ships and equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam, taking an indirect approach to deter Chinese aggression through improving their allies’ maritime security capacity. With growing international concern in the region, the SCS threatens a global front.
De-escalation or Prolonged Dispute?
Despite upcoming joint military exercises in the SCS (scheduled before the June 17th collision), Manila and Washington are attempting to de-escalate tensions in the region. “We are not in the business to instigate wars,” said Philippine President Marcos on June 23rd. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell affirmed that the Philippines “do not seek a crisis with China,” and are instead “seeking dialogue.” Nonetheless, China continues their intractable stance. A Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman responded that “Our message to the Philippines is very clear: stop the infringement activities and provocation.” With both countries maintaining the territory as rightfully theirs, clashes between them escalating, and the risk of foreign interference becoming more worrisome, will the South China Sea be the next frontier for global conflict?
Suggestions for Further Reading:
Overview of the South China Sea debate:
1. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
2. https://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea
More on China’s activities in the South China Sea:
4. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/chinas-new-coast-guard-regulations-in-south-china-seas\
More on the Second Thomas Shoal dilemma:
More on the recent collision:
More on international involvement:
8. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/25/philippines-china-second-thomas-ayungin/
9. https://www.ft.com/content/b159b5a6-ba06-401c-8585-bc71ad73a69f
10. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/n-u-s-canadian-naval-forces-hold-bilateral/