Exploring the Role of Game Theory in the Horizontal-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
This blog post builds off my previous one, and examines, through the lens of game theory, how the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) played a pivotal role in incentivizing horizontal nuclear proliferation.
Massive increases in nuclear stockpiles around the world in the 1950s was a cause for great concern; between 1952 and 1960 alone, the United States’ nuclear arsenal grew from an already-formidable 1,005 weapons to well over 20,000 weapons. These anxieties were only enflamed by the lax rhetoric of world leaders surrounding their potential uses: in a 1953 statement, President Eisenhower declared that “In the event of hostilities, US will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”
These concerning developments ultimately lead to calls for international disarmament, which were pioneered in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Proposed by the Irish in 1961 and finalized in 1968, the NPT has garnered nearly 190 signatories. This proposal, despite its intentions, however, has led the confounding reality that it has inadvertently promoted the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This is because the treaty created winners and losers. For example, large power-platers like the US, UK, USSR, and China were allowed to shirk the requirements of the treaty and continue developing their stockpiles. Article IV of the treaty also allowed state that non-Nuclear Weapon States had an “unalienable right” to continue researching and developing nuclear energy—for peaceful purposes. These conditions of the treaty, however, institutionalized a soft arms race among non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) that can be demonstrated in the game matrix below.
The payoff matrix, created by Dr. Peter Z. Revesz of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, use a methodology outlined in his paper (linked below) to ascribe quantifiable gain/loss values for the signatories. One of the most notable factors considered when calculating these values is that the NPT makes nuclear development much cheaper, as it encourages collaboration and information/resource sharing. The three columns (None, Reactor, Bomb) describe the actions NNWS can take: build nothing, build peaceful nuclear energy reactors, or build bombs. The rows (NWS Ally and NWS Adversary) describe the relationships NWS can forage with NNWS: become allies or become adversaries.
|
None |
Reactor |
Bomb |
|
|
Nuclear Weapon State Ally |
*0, 0 |
*0, 2* |
*-1, 1 |
|
Nuclear Weapon State Adversary |
*0, 0 |
-7, 3 |
-9, 4* |
This payoff matrix demonstrates how the NPT encourages the development of nuclear reactors. Though both states would gain/lose nothing from not further developing nuclear technologies, the NPT incentivizes and lowers the cost for NNWS to develop nuclear weapon technologies, forcing the Nash equilibrium to be at the Nuclear Weapon State Ally and Reactor intersection.
Conversely, using the methodology developed by Dr. Peter Z. Revesz, we can see that without the NPT, it would be more expensive for NNWS to develop nuclear technologies, and would therefor lead to less development, as shown below:
|
None |
Reactor |
Bomb |
|
|
Nuclear Weapon State Ally |
*0, 0* |
*0, -1 |
*-1, 4 |
|
Nuclear Weapon State Adversary |
*0, 0* |
-7, -1 |
-9, -2 |
http://www.inase.org/library/2014/athens/bypaper/MMCTSE/MMCTSE-16.pdf