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Can we avoid climate change? Or are we playing the game all wrong?

https://www.sciencenews.org/article/game-theory-suggests-current-climate-negotiations-won%E2%80%99t-avert-catastrophe

http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=climate%20change&cmpt=q

In recent history, climate change has often been a topic of both political and social importance. While search rates on Google, of the phrase “climate change”, have dipped from highs reached in late 2009, it is still a pressing issue. Thus, it is interesting how a complex issue that matters a great deal to many is so easily to a game. In this game, nations can decide how much they wish to reduce their emissions by, and whether or not they reduce them by enough to cumulatively make a difference for the better of the environment.

In a study, game theorists from Columbia University devised a game that they believed would model the predicament that exists with climate change. The predicament of climate change is that scientists believe that if the world warms by 2 degrees Celsius there will be wide spread impacts. However, scientists can only say that they know the chances of impacts are greater at this point but cannot give an exact answer. To model this situation the researchers created two situations. In one, there was an exact threshold of donations that players had to raise to avoid catastrophe (which in the game was represented by a large loss of their “nations” wealth). In the other situation, there was an unknown varying threshold to meet to avoid catastrophe. In the situation with a set threshold, they found that people usually worked together and avoided the major worldwide event. While when there was a varying, goal people were tempted to cheat. That is people saw it to their favor to put in less towards the global effort than they claimed they would. This is indicative of the fact that in the first situation with a fixed goal a Nash equilibrium exists. People didn’t want to have catastrophe and lose most of their nations wealth and were therefore willing to all equally pay in so all could leave with the same amount and be certain they would avoid massive climate change. In the second game, however no equilibrium exists. This is because if all players agreed to pay the same amount to reach the top end of the catastrophe range then it would be very tempting for people to actually put less in to the communal fund then they pledged. This is because they know it’s unlikely the world will actually have to raise that much money to avoid climate change and therefore they know that they can make out with more if they put in less.

The issue with the second game is that all players understand that they can cheat and the world will “most likely” still be fine. Nevertheless, in the current situation of climate change this is not a possible solution. We cannot afford to have nations not funding clean energy enough because they think that they can save money and the earth will “probably” still be ok. Scientists’ warning of 2 degrees simply isn’t enough to motivate Nash equilibrium in this international game. Suggested in this article, is that further punishments could help to make countries allocate enough funds to halt climate change. For these punishments to make a large enough difference they will need to effect the countries to a large enough degree that the money saved by not investing in clean energy will not be a factor in any country’s decision.

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