A Fundamental Switch: Prisons to Deterrents
Since the mid-1900s US states have been struggling to make crime deterrents effective and prisons less necessary. The article, “How Game Theory is Reinventing Crime Fighting,” describes how to shift in mentality in Texas from erecting prisons to corrections and deterrents. The article describes how other states have followed this example and how game theory is the primary basis for the logical shift. In one example Hawaii was taken into consideration. The shift was a change in equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) from “from a high-violation, high-punishment equilibrium to a low-violation, low-punishment equilibrium.” This switch occurred due to the change in variable factors that the government can control. Specifically being more swift and efficient punishments, though less intense than before. This is similar to changing the components in a simple game from lecture.
To relate this idea to lecture, at the start of the semester we discussed the concept of mixed nash equilibria. In the case of the article there are the past equilibria “high-violation, high-punishment” and there is the current one: “low-violation, low-punishment.” Taking the parole (HOPE) example from the article. The past equilibrium was held because the frequency criminals on parole were tested was low and thus the payoff for using drugs was high as the risk was low due to the low frequency despite the possibly hard punishment. The new equilibrium sees to change this difference by increasing the frequency of checks but lowering the punishment. To use mathematical terms: Payoff = (Frequency)*(Risk) – Psych. Benefit of Drugs. The Frequency would be a number between 0 and 1 where 1 is a 100% chance that any day may be tested. The Risk for the original case may be 3x the new risk. A boundary condition is that high risk punishment cannot be too frequent as then the system of parole would break down and too many people would be sent back.
By manipulating this formula a chart of payoffs for different situations can be optimized such that the equilibrium shifts. In the shifted equilibrium the convict would rationally decide that due to the frequency of checking it is more beneficial to not use drugs than to use drugs. Overall it seems this system has had wide success and “probationers are 55 percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime and 53 percent less likely to have their probation revoked than parolees in the control group.”
– Kezre
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-how-game-theory-is-reinventing-crime-fighting.html