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# CIA Operations in Tibet and the Intelligence-Policy Relationship

by John Masko

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One of the greatest challenges of covert action, as detailed in John MacGaffin's essay "Clandestine Human Intelligence," comes in defining how it fits into the larger enterprise of intelligence. As MacGaffin claims, in order to have successful and judicious covert operations conducted through the Intelligence Community (IC), those actions must be integral to the larger human intelligence enterprise.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, though, covert action through the IC has long been closely linked to both foreign policy and diplomacy. In 1954 the Eisenhower administration first instituted regulations creating the Operations Coordinating Board—an organization intended to harmonize policy objectives of the Departments of State and Defense with CIA-directed covert action. In the intervening years, particularly in the aftermath of highly publicized covert operations failures like the Bay of Pigs Invasion, foreign policy, not just intelligence needs, has become an increasingly pivotal player in determining the covert operations agenda.<sup>2</sup> It is easy to see how this dual allegiance—a need simultaneously to support the official foreign policy of the United States and to achieve intelligence collection goals—can create tension. For one thing, foreign policy and diplomacy are conducted largely out in the open, subject to the ever-shifting environment of politics, while intelligence agendas are created and executed behind closed doors.

The example of CIA covert operations in Tibet, an episode of American intelligence history not well-known until the declassification of related documents in 1998,<sup>3</sup> serves as a useful case study of this balance between intelligence and policy. The Tibet project, generally referred to as "Mustang," was a long-term venture which served dual purposes: both the implementation of a foreign policy—to undermine communist Chinese efforts to bring Tibet under direct rule—and the collection of intelligence on Chinese activities.

Whether or not the foreign policy aims of the project succeeded remains somewhat unclear. It depends on whom you ask. For the former Tibetan resistance fighters based in Mustang, Nepal, which the CIA funded, trained, and armed for years, and who now eke out a living weaving carpets,<sup>4</sup> the project was an abject failure. The humiliated former rebel

fighting force, which once thought it had a chance to bring down Mao's formidable People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet, was forcibly disarmed by the Nepalese military and abandoned by its foreign benefactors.

For the United States, more mainstream Tibetans, and other opponents of the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, the message is somewhat more ambiguous. While the project failed militarily, its public relations efforts largely succeeded in raising the issue of Tibetan autonomy from a regional squabble to an international human rights rallying cry. Through vigorous propaganda efforts, diplomatic contact with the Dalai Lama, and the creation of "Tibet Houses" around the world, the CIA worked to promote the idea of an indigenous Tibetan government in exile.<sup>5</sup> In the process, it greatly undermined Chinese efforts to portray the PRC as an open and tolerant society.

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Most of all, though, CIA covert operations were an intelligence gold mine for the United States. Between document recoveries in field battles with the PLA, the operation of missile spying stations, and signals intelligence collection, the Tibet program was hugely successful in informing policymakers regarding one of the world's most militantly closed societies. Furthermore, as we will later discuss, those intelligence successes would have been impossible without the CIA's paramilitary efforts. With many of their greatest intelligence discoveries coming in their final years, Mustang rebels continued to be a fairly viable source of intelligence right up until the program was dismantled in 1971.

Though some of the blame for the program's decommissioning lies with changing foreign policy priorities, it was mostly phased out because of ineffectiveness in accomplishing its main policy goal: beating back PRC influence in Tibet. At the same time, as the Nixon administration moved toward a diplomatic breakthrough with

communist China, it increasingly began to see the Tibet operations, and any perception of diplomatic closeness with the Dalai Lama, as a liability.

In the end, the Tibet project paints a complex picture. It shows a program which had difficulty defining its primary purpose: policy implementation or intelligence. At the same time, however, it revealed covert operations and the pursuit of policy objectives as a valuable forum for achieving intelligence collection goals. In the end, many of the lessons we can learn from Tibet—particularly the need for an intelligence program with paramilitary elements to adapt both to a larger national security policy and its own policy goals—can inform some of our current and future intelligence challenges.

This essay uses CIA operations in Tibet as a case study. It draws on anthropological and historical studies of the period—most notably John Kenneth Knaus' *Orphans of the Cold War* and Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison's *The CIA's Secret War in Tibet*—as well as original research in primary source materials. While it summarizes some of these books' historical arguments about the Tibetan episode, the article is an initial attempt to write about this unusual chapter of intelligence history from an IC perspective. After summarizing the pertinent history at play, the essay will bring out some of the key lessons to be learned from the incident and suggest some applications to current intelligence issues.

## HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Tibetan leaders found themselves in a politically difficult situation and one they had not faced in quite some time. Tibet had long enjoyed a sort of quid pro quo with the Manchu or Mongol dynasties in China—religious and political autonomy in exchange for general allegiance.<sup>6</sup> However, when the Kuomintang took power, under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, Tibet declared independence from China, fearing that its time as a loosely-affiliated satellite might no longer survive in the era of the modern nation-state.

Even then, however, Tibet was an ambiguous presence in East Asia. As both a religious and political entity, it has long had an uneasy relationship with the concept of borders.<sup>7</sup> The internationality of Tibetan “northern” Buddhism and the Dalai Lama's growing popularity on the world stage have made Tibet's borders ever more fluid. This fluidity would make Tibet's freedom fighters in Mustang comfortable with living decades in exile. When the Chinese Army invaded Tibet to carry out forced collectivization in 1951, it was the Buddhist connection between Tibet and other South Asian nations that turned a localized resistance into an international one. When the CIA began to establish

its Tibetan program following the Chinese invasion, it would take full advantage of both pro-Buddhist and anti-PRC sentiments in the region, creating a network of sympathizers that stretched from India to Taiwan to Nepal. News of Tibetan resistance against the forced collectivization projects of the PLA, and desires to support it, spread throughout the Buddhist world.

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India, despite having much to lose from a conflict with China, voluntarily inserted itself into the conflict on Tibet's behalf.<sup>8</sup> This Indian partisanship would become especially strong after 1959. In March of that year, amid a popular uprising against Chinese influence in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, fled to India disguised as a soldier to establish a Tibetan government in exile. The Dalai Lama's flight was met with a harsh reprisal from Mao's lieutenant Zhou Enlai, who announced the official dissolution of Tibet's still nominally independent government.<sup>9</sup>

The previous few years had already seen the inauguration of CIA assistance to Tibet's growing rebellion. Frank Wisner, a CIA officer who had presided over that agency's abortive attempts to support the Hungarian anti-Soviet uprising in 1956, introduced a new program to aid what he saw as a similar rebellion in Tibet later that year. The CIA program was essentially a blank check, as most were during the early Eisenhower years: “a full program of support if the initial teams found it warranted by the situation on the ground...”<sup>10</sup> The CIA program had the potential to become basically whatever CIA administrators wanted it to be. They busied themselves over the coming years with building a reliable, well-trained rebel Tibetan force, both for the purposes of fighting PLA forces and collecting intelligence that the United States could also use on the home front.

In 1960 the CIA relocated its central base for the Tibetan guerrilla project to Mustang Province in Nepal (at first unbeknownst to the Nepalese government), quickly recruiting 300 guerrilla fighters.<sup>11</sup> The CIA would continue to support the rebels for the next ten years, giving aid in the form of weapons airlifts, direct human aid, and even leadership training programs for prospective Tibetan officers hosted by Cornell University.<sup>12</sup>

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In the early 1960s, a united front from the communist world made it difficult for the Mustang operation to gain a foothold. With the game-changing Sino-Soviet split still in the future, the Soviet Union emerged as a strong supporter of establishing a communist order in Tibet. Soviet United Nations (UN) diplomat Valerian Zorin announced, for example, that the Soviet Union would not “press [a] U2 [surveillance] complaint” against the U.S. after the U2 spy incident if it agreed to drop support for rebels in Hungary and Tibet.<sup>13</sup> Of course, Zorin was also referring to overt U.S. support for the Dalai Lama’s government in exile and incessant public relations efforts. It was almost impossible, though, that both the Soviets and Chinese were not fully aware by this time of U.S. covert involvement in the region, after several confrontations with PLA troops wielding U.S.-distributed weapons.

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In the first years of the 1960s, Mustang rebels provided some of the Tibet project’s first major intelligence windfalls. In 1961 a captured cache of documents revealed that the consequences of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” were causing significant material suffering and loss of morale among PLA troops in Tibet.<sup>14</sup> This capture of 1,600 classified documents would become known as the “Blue Satchel Raid.” Not only did it provide CIA agents and Mustang troops in Tibet with valuable tactical information, it has been referred to as one of the most significant one-off intelligence seizures in American history, including U.S. intelligence’s first accurate appraisal of Mao’s catastrophic but well-guarded Great Leap Forward.<sup>15</sup> As John Kenneth Knaus recounts, this huge success came at a vital time in the debate over extending funding and support for Mustang. John Kenneth Galbraith, a noted economist and Ambassador to India under the Kennedy administration, vociferously opposed continued support, arguing (correctly) that the program had been miserably ineffective in accomplishing its stated goals, having achieved little in pushing the PLA back.<sup>16</sup> As other members of the administration noted, though, it had become quite effective in accomplishing some of its unstated goals. In the end, the CIA won the day and an extension of the Tibet program.

Over the ensuing years, Mustang would continue to achieve intelligence successes in a variety of different forms. A spying team based out of Tibet, for example, successfully infiltrated and photographed Chinese military bases in 1962, allowing CIA officials to relay some of the first intelligence

on Chinese missile capabilities back to the United States. Two years later, in 1964, sensors planted in the ground in Lop Nor, Northern Tibet, were able to successfully gather information on China’s first nuclear test.<sup>17</sup> The Tibetans also set up signal-interception stations on the Chinese border to gather Chinese military communications,<sup>18</sup> and used these for tactical analysis. On other occasions the CIA, working with Mustang rebels, also used military interceptions to show a relaxation of PLA efforts at the end of the Indo-Pakistani War,<sup>19</sup> suggesting that there was little chance of a Chinese invasion of northern India, which had been viewed as a possibility at the time. The hybrid paramilitary and intelligence effort in Tibet gathered an unprecedentedly large amount of usable human, signals, and geological intelligence through the early and mid-1960s.

The CIA project did not, however, exist in a political vacuum. In an era of increasing globetrotting by world leaders, the need for the policy and diplomacy apparatus to support the CIA’s Tibetan activities became ever greater. President Lyndon Johnson’s abrupt cancellation of a summit with the Indian Prime Minister in 1965 undermined vital Indian cooperation in keeping up and running the “Special Center,” part of the Tibet project based across the border in India.<sup>20</sup> Dismissal of South Asian developments was, of course, not unusual for President Johnson, who was by this point subordinating most Asian issues to the burgeoning Vietnam conflict.

In 1965, adapting to the political realities of Vietnam and Johnson’s almost monomaniacal focus on it, the CIA came up with an ingenious justification for increasing funding to Mustang. Agency representatives lobbied the administration by claiming that the Indian Intelligence Bureau had committed itself to the cause of Tibetan liberation, and that it might be willing to volunteer troops for a second front in Vietnam if the United States continued to support the Tibetan cause.<sup>21</sup> The program remained fully funded throughout the Johnson administration.

Into the early 1970s, the Tibet program continued to aspire to equal parts “political, propaganda, and intelligence operations.”<sup>22</sup> Pursuit of its objectives became more strained, though, as Kissinger and Nixon moved toward a Chinese rapprochement and China established more solid authority along the Tibetan border. The Mustangs, facing severe casualties every time they fought, began to focus more exclusively on intelligence.<sup>23</sup> As the CIA began to scale back funding and resources for the rebels, though, achieving the program’s intelligence goals began to become more and more difficult. As China increased controls over the borders of Tibet, CIA efforts to place active Mustang intelligence collectors in Tibet became “extremely hazardous.”<sup>24</sup> China continued to assert greater control over the southern area of Tibet immediately across from the



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Mustang encampment, and State Department officials began to express greater doubts that the Mustangs could be a viable obstacle to China were conflict to break out.<sup>25</sup> The Mustangs were gradually abandoned financially by the CIA.<sup>26</sup> As support evaporated, the Nepalese government saw an opportunity to retake its border territory, forcing out the small remaining group of rebels.<sup>27</sup> An era of integrated policy and intelligence through covert operations had come to an abrupt end.

### ANALYSIS: LESSONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE

**W**hile we may like to make it so, the story of the Tibet project's end is not a simple one of intelligence interests being squashed under the foot of a foreign policy colossus. Rather, policy and intelligence aspirations were inextricably linked in the Tibetan project, and that linkage proved simultaneously to be a reason for its intelligence successes and its downfall. The Tibetans would never have captured the invaluable Great Leap Forward documentation without CIA financial support. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence officers likely would never have gotten wind of the documents' existence without there having been U.S. paramilitary officers in the field. Even despite significant success on the intelligence side, however, the CIA began to see the writing on the wall for the Tibetan program during the mid-1960s. It started to lean increasingly toward the side of politics, rather than pure intelligence, in order to be justified. Having difficulty justifying the program on its own foreign policy merits, playing to President Johnson's Vietnam War focus seemed a better option for keeping the program's doors open. Amid the Sino-American thaw of the Nixon administration, the program withered on the vine and died, as Conboy put it, "with a whimper."<sup>28</sup>

There were two main ways in which the Tibetan CIA project depended on the policy process: first, it existed within the larger context of U.S. East Asian policy—and sudden changes such as the Indo-Pakistani War or the attempted opening of China; and second, it was *itself* a foreign policy venture, albeit a profoundly unsuccessful one. Any justifications for the program on intelligence grounds were forced to contend with the project's inherent links to failed policy. Former Tibetan CIA operative John Kenneth Knaus argues that it was the second factor (increasingly clear unfeasibility), rather than the opening of China, which motivated the ultimate fall of Mustang.<sup>29</sup> He bases this appraisal, that "the Mustang guerrillas were never a bargaining chip" with China, on an interview with David Anderson, an American aide in Warsaw.<sup>30</sup>

It strains belief, however, to suppose that the sudden change in the U.S.'s China policy under Nixon had no effect whatsoever on the CIA program's quick unraveling in Tibet.<sup>31</sup> The end of the CIA program came at the same time as the administration's indefinite postponement of a meeting solicited by the Dalai Lama, and a general move away from seeing Tibet as a useful partner in East Asia.<sup>32</sup> It is difficult to discount the opening of China as a significant factor in both why Mustang was scrapped and why something more effective was not put in its place. Likely it was these two spheres of *policy*—both "grand strategy" and the ineffectiveness of the Tibet project at achieving its policy aims—which converged to bring the project to an unceremonious end.

The reason why U.S. strategy and the Tibet program ended up in conflict was primarily a policy one. The Nixon administration, if it had kept the doors open on Mustang, would have been trying to address the same problem (Chinese aggression and obstinacy) from two different directions at once: both diplomatic and covert. The administration rightly judged hostile covert operations and diplomacy as contrary approaches, and picked one over the other.

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To conclude, the demise of the Tibet program points to some uneasy truths about the relationship between intelligence and policy, particularly in an era of increased oversight of the IC by entities such as the "303 Committee" (to which the CIA had to present on the Tibet project several times). Intelligence operations have to prove their worth in the policy arena in order to receive the support they need. The problem with the political oversight process, though, is that sometimes it guesses wrong. The greatest reason for failure in Tibet, and U.S. inability to keep up intelligence strength there in the long term, was that the CIA invested in a losing cause. Because the policy behind the Tibet operations was both ineffective and contradictory with larger U.S. foreign policy goals in the Nixon administration, its intelligence successes were overshadowed. Intelligence-minded officers might take away from the Tibet incident the importance of not making covert operations focus too much on either policy or intelligence—successful projects must embrace both.

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## ANALYSIS: LESSONS ON COVERT OPERATIONS

The Tibet episode demonstrates the importance of remembering that on-the-ground covert operations have the potential of establishing a *very* effective framework for intelligence gathering, even if the main objective of the covert action is paramilitary. While this “dual-use” model of paramilitary activity can end up with local collaborators feeling used or betrayed (as many fighters in the Mustang force certainly did),<sup>33</sup> it has significant potential for increasing the effectiveness of intelligence efforts. Policymakers and intelligence officers should tread with great caution in conducting intelligence this way, to avoid the accusation of “using” collaborators for their own purposes. Nevertheless, to see covert operations one-dimensionally as a mere issue of policy, as for example Ambassador Galbraith did, is to throw away a very useful method of conducting intelligence.

One of the biggest failures of the Mustang project in Tibet was that it tried to be, both in manpower and money, a complex covert operation, but was not really covert. The Chinese knew about the project as early as 1961, and would likely have used it as a bargaining chip with Nixon and Kissinger had the program not already been on the way down. In order for a project like Mustang to achieve its intelligence goals, it must have a long time to establish local connections and build intelligence infrastructure. A covert operations effort must be genuinely covert in order to achieve these goals.

On the whole, though, the example of Tibet provides valuable encouragement for an Intelligence Community that often fears becoming too fragmented. As MacGaffin noted in his essay, it is easy for paramilitary action to become a black sheep in the IC—not quite held to the same standards as standard HUMINT or SIGINT collection, and not quite sure how it fits in. The example of covert action in Tibet illustrates how covert operations were as much an instrument of intelligence as policy. Mustang gathered intelligence to serve its own purposes but also to feed back into the policymaking process.

### APPLICATIONS TO INTELLIGENCE ISSUES TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE

It is not uncommon today to encounter foreign policy issues where intelligence and policy dimensions come into conflict with one another. One current foreign policy concern that bears some uncanny resemblances to the Tibetan example is the issue of Syria.

In Syria, we hold the simultaneous goals of channeling aid to a rebel cause<sup>34</sup>—albeit more hopeful than the Mustangs—while ushering through an agreement with the acting Syrian government on the destruction of chemical weapons.<sup>35</sup> While our official policy tries to embrace diplomatic channels, we are simultaneously acting through the IC to undermine the government with which we are negotiating. It remains to be seen how U.S. intelligence in Syria, which likely benefits greatly from a working relationship with rebel groups,<sup>36</sup> will survive a rapidly changing and somewhat unpredictable policy. If President Assad continues to follow through on the destruction of his chemical weapons stockpiles, or if the rebels begin to lose moral or military high ground, it is unclear whether we will be able to maintain a robust intelligence presence there. The example of Tibet would suggest that intelligence collectors and analysts should plan to weather the dual storms both of changes in overriding U.S. policy and in the viability of rebel forces.

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Perhaps a more interesting and open question is how the relationship between policy and intelligence will adapt to an advancing digital age. One of the hallmarks of 21st century cyberattacks and cyberespionage is a degree of anonymity that similar human intelligence efforts in the past never enjoyed. While the most notorious government-sponsored cyberattack yet performed (the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear centrifuges) was eventually discovered by Iranian engineers,<sup>37</sup> the difficulty Iran had in figuring out the problem suggests that better-conceived cyberattacks or intelligence hauls may achieve complete anonymity. If this does in fact become a reality, we may live to see a world in which covert actions or intelligence become increasingly decoupled from foreign policy. Governments may become more able to both effectively make diplomatic overtures and simultaneously skewer the subjects of those overtures from behind without anyone being the wiser. Such a change could make the balance between policy and intelligence significantly less delicate.

On the whole, we come away from our study of the Tibetan episode with a sobering reminder, applicable across the spectrum of intelligence activities, that the policy and intelligence worlds are tightly connected. Even in an increasingly computerized age, it will likely remain impossible for the intelligence world ever to be completely free of the policymaking process (and of politics). It is those intelligence efforts which make both good policy sense and intelligence sense that will prove most durable in the long run.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> John MacGaffin, "Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action," in *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 81.
- <sup>2</sup> "Note on U.S. Covert Actions," in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1964-1968, Vol. XVII.
- <sup>3</sup> Jim Mann, "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, Files Show," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 September 1998. <<http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993>>.
- <sup>4</sup> R. Sengupta, "The CIA Circus: Tibet's Forgotten Army," *Friends of Tibet Outlook*, 15 February 1999, <http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/usdefence/usd7.html>.
- <sup>5</sup> Jim Mann, "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, Files Show," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 September 1998, <<http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993>>.
- <sup>6</sup> Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *The CIA's Secret War in Tibet* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 4.
- <sup>7</sup> Carole McGranahan, *Arrested Histories: Between Empire and Exile in 20th Century Tibet*, University of Michigan, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2001, 45.
- <sup>8</sup> Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 27.
- <sup>9</sup> "On This Day: 31 March," *BBC*, 9 December 2013 (acc), <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/31/newsid\\_2788000/2788343.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/31/newsid_2788000/2788343.stm)>.
- <sup>10</sup> John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 140.
- <sup>11</sup> Joe Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War in Tibet," *Military History*, 12 June 2006, <http://www.historynet.com/cias-secret-war-in-tibet.htm>.
- <sup>12</sup> Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 205.
- <sup>13</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Legation in Hungary, 6 April 1961, in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, <<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d165>>.
- <sup>14</sup> Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War*, 243.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 249, Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War."
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>17</sup> Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War."
- <sup>18</sup> Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 227.
- <sup>19</sup> Memorandum from the White House Situation Room to President Johnson, 23 September 1965, in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, <<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d223>>.
- <sup>20</sup> Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 215.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 219.
- <sup>22</sup> Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee, 23 September 1965, in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, <<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d278>>.
- <sup>23</sup> Knaus, *Orphans*, 294.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>25</sup> "Editorial Note," in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273>.
- <sup>26</sup> Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), 6 September 1972, in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d280>.
- <sup>27</sup> Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 249.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

<sup>29</sup> Knaus, *Orphans*, 296.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Melvyn Goldstein, "The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, 153.

<sup>32</sup> Kissinger makes a good case for not postponing the summit, but does not end up following through. (Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 23 March 1970, in *FRUS*, 1960-1976, Volume XVII, <<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d275>>.

<sup>33</sup> R. Sengupta, "The CIA Circus: Tibet's Forgotten Army," *Friends of Tibet Outlook*, 15 February 1999, <http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/usdefence/usd7.html>.

<sup>34</sup> Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum, "Syria has destroyed chemical weapons facilities, international inspectors say," *The Washington Post*, 31 October 2013, <[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-has-destroyed-chemical-weapons-facilities-international-inspectors-say/2013/10/31/dc1ff6b8-4214-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-has-destroyed-chemical-weapons-facilities-international-inspectors-say/2013/10/31/dc1ff6b8-4214-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html)>.

<sup>35</sup> Alexei Anishchuk, "Russia, U.S. agree on how Syria should eliminate chemical arms – Putin," *Reuters*, 8 October 2013, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/uk-russia-syria-idUKBRE99706320131008>.

<sup>36</sup> Though the intelligence collected this way has sometimes seemed more to favor the Syrian government than the rebel ("Classified U.S. Military Document: Syrian Rebels DO Have Chemical Weapons," *Washington's Blog*, 12 September 2013, <<http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/09/classified-u-s-military-document-syrian-rebels-do-have-chemical-weapons.html>>).

<sup>37</sup> Marcy Oster, "Second computer virus infiltrates Iranian systems," *JTA*, 26 April 2011, <<http://www.jta.org/2011/04/26/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/second-computer-virus-infiltrates-iranian-systems>>.

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