The Game of War – Modeling the Clash Between India and Pakistan as a Classic Game Theory
This article provides a brief overview of the turmoil between India and Pakistan that has been occurring for the past several years, and goes on to depict their current diplomatic situations with a game theoretic approach. The author begins by describing the situation at hand and listing a few of the more recent altercations between the two countries. The article also provides some background as to what each of the nation’s current goals and relevant policies mean for the progression of the situation. A key element is India’s No-First-Use Policy which states that India will use its nuclear weapons in retaliation only, and not as a first offense. This puts India in a vulnerable position and gives Pakistan knowledge of its opponent’s strategies before any moves are even made.
The current situation between the two countries can be modeled as a “prisoner’s dilemma game” with each country having two identical options: launch an attack against the other player, or launch no attack. A Nash equilibrium exists when both players attack at the same time, because they will both do damage to the other player – which is each countries goal. However, a clear better outcome for each player is for neither of them to attack and thus not get damaged. The existence of India’s no-first-use policy, and the fact that Pakistan has knowledge of this policy, is what is fostering the choice of the latter option. Pakistan’s dominant strategy is to not attack, as long as India’s stays true to this policy. Therefore, country leaders and military officials are doing everything in their power to ensure that this policy stays in place for as long as possible, guaranteeing peace in the region.