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Break the Law? Or Break the Bank.

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050/full

Food security is a pervasive problem in many parts of our world. For many West African countries, the fishing industry provides a major source of protein, income, and employment to its people. But an increase in illegal fishing has brought instability to the region’s economy and further corruption in its government due to the tempting economic incentives–driving down fish stock values, depleting job opportunities in the industry, and overfishing its surrounding waters. 

 

Although the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance(MCS) government sector is trying to curb this growth of illegal fishing, it’s lack of resources for surveillance monitoring, sanction reinforcement, and legislative implementation incentivizes illegal fishing even further. 

 

All these factors put fishermen in the artisanal sector in a very hard spot–they could easily switch into the illegal fishing sector to live a more comfortable life, or they could stay in the legal fishing industry. Suppose a payoff matrix for fishermen modeled as below (with arbitrary values not based off any factual evidence).

Where the players are fisherman choosing between two strategies (to illegally fish or to be an artisanal fisherman) with arbitrary financial payoffs each fisherman would get–depending on each other’s choices. With economic gain as the “most significant incentive” and limited enforcement of sanctions amongst a weak government, the best economic payoff for both fishermen would be to both go into illegal fishing. 

 

This simple game theory chart shows the incentives for fishermen in West African countries to go into the illegal fishing industry, where the outcome of each participant’s choice of action depends on the actions of other participants. As the illegal fishing ring infiltrates the fishing industry, fishermen who stay in the artisanal profession will see their profits decrease and economic stability decrease. While, if you choose to illegally fish, more profits can be made. 

 

When considering the choices that two competing fishermen in the same industry, the Nash equilibrium would be for both of them to illegally fish–where neither fisherman has an incentive to change their strategy to one-up each other. 

 

Here are the possible scenarios that led to this conclusion:

 

  1. If fisherman 1 (F1) chose to illegally fish, fisherman 2 (F2) would illegally fish, leading to an equal payout of $100k (and vice versa).
  2. If F1 chose to NOT illegally fish, F2 would still illegally fish and receive a higher payout than F1. 
  3. If F2 chose to NOT illegally fish, F1 would choose to illegally fish and receive a higher payout than F2. 

 

If both fishermen were looking out for their personal economic gain, they would both choose scenario 1 since there would be no incentive for either fisherman to change their strategies–representing the Nash Equilibrium of this game. 

 

These payoffs are by no means an accurate representation of the situation in West Africa, but do show the choices that fishermen in that region must consider. The payoffs can fluctuate widely, based on any changes in the political, social, and economic climate. These values are always changing and players must continuously evaluate their strategies to choose accordingly. 

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